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Abstract 
Creating a praxis model for performing communication ethics scholarship is 
important in Postmodernity, as a multiplicity of narratives requires knowledgeable life-
long learners who are willing to understand historicity and one’s place within traditions. 
This study relies on Alasdair MacIntyre’s seminal work, A Short History of Ethics, as it 
provides an historical lineage of Western philosophers who wrote about ethics within the 
time span from ancient Greece, to modern day. Major metaphors are extracted from the 
works of these philosophers as guiding hermeneutical entrances into historical and 
temporally bound narratives, used as the praxis portion of this work. Narratives, epics 
and poetry, including Homer’s Odyssey, Dante’s Inferno, Voltaire’s Candide, and Albert 
Camus’s The Plague, are used as praxis examples for communication ethics. Through the 
works of these scholars, authors, and poets, a philosophical discussion ensues on 
communication ethics bound within the historicity of Ancient Greece, Medieval 
Christianity, the Enlightenment and Modernity. This work identifies various rhetorical 
interruptions experienced by those societies within Western thought and the effect on 
communities, religious institutions, and governments. 
Throughout this work, historicity is understood through the use of novels as they 
relate to the philosophy of communication ethics set within historical traditions. Through 
stories, one can find the ground on which to stand in the 21st century, and ethically 
communicate with others in Postmodernity. MacIntyre suggests that the exercise of 
virtues will allow one to join in a tradition or continue within a tradition in which one is 
already embedded. Communication ethics is part of the dialogue that develops within 
societies and needs to be understood within the stories and narratives of Postmodernity. 





Chapter One:  A Short History of Ethcis and Rhetorical Interuptions ..............................1 
 
Chapter Two:  Greek Ethics and the Odyssey .................................................................32 
 
Chapter Three:  Medieval Christian Ethics and the Inferno............................................66 
 
Chapter Four: Enlightenment Ethics and Candide........................................................109 
 
Chapter Five:  Modern Ethics and The Plague ..............................................................150 
 





 The Scholarship and Praxis of Communication Ethics 
 1 
Chapter One:  A Short History of Ethcis and Rhetorical Interuptions 
In our society the acids of individualism have for four centuries eaten into 
our moral structures, for both good and ill. But not only this: we live with 
the inheritance of not only one, but of a number of well-integrated 
moralities. Aristotelianism, primitive Christian simplicity, the puritan 
ethic, the aristocratic ethic of consumption, and the traditions of 
democracy and socialism have all left their mark upon our moral 
vocabulary. [. . .] 
It follows that we are liable to find two kinds of people in our society: 
those who speak form within one of these surviving moralities, and those 
who stand outside all of them. Between the adherents of rival moralities 
and between the adherents of one morality and the adherents of none there 
exists no court of appeal, no impersonal neutral standard. For those who 
speak from within a given morality, the connection between fact and 
valuation is established in virtue of the meanings of the words they use.  
To those who speak from without, those who speak from within appear 
merely to be uttering imperatives which express their own liking and their 
private choices. The controversy between emotivism and prescriptivism on 
the one hand and their critics on the other thus express the fundamental 
moral situation of our own society. (MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics 
266) 
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Once time passes we can reflect back upon various influential decisions and 
changes that were made on matters concerning anything from family to community, from 
church to politics, from country to international affairs, and suggest that a rhetorical 
interruption may have occurred within that specific setting. These rhetorical interruptions 
are times in our lives, or in history, when standard ideas, stories and narratives that we 
had come to agree upon and live our lives within, begin to be questioned and changes are 
made. Michael Hyde reminds us “the call of conscience is itself a rhetorical interruption” 
(78). An announced disparity in social norms and general feelings of what is appropriate 
for a particular society or community from one time period to the next may be 
recognized.  
A form of historical conscience moved those within a particular time period and a 
particular society from one historical period to another. Examining the communicative 
call of conscience birthed through rhetorical interruptions visible by examining historical 
transformations can help one focus on communication ethics in a way that is helpful in 
understanding the role of communication ethics. This constructive examination of 
communication ethics can take place through the vehicle of an historical novel. 
Alasdair MacIntyre, a preeminent philosopher who is currently a permanent 
Senior Research Fellow for the Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture, is 
internationally known for his work in ethics. His text A Short History of Ethics, 
originally published in 1966, traces a history of philosophical ethics from the ancient 
Greeks through to modern times, ending in the mid-twentieth century. MacIntyre also 
wrote an account of the morality of the philosophers Aristotle, Saints Augustine and 
Aquinas, and David Hume in his 1988 work Whose Justice? Which Rationality? These 
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philosophers espoused what MacIntyre considers traditions that he repeatedly uses to 
discuss the historical changes to moral thinking: the Platonic/Aristotelian (Greek) 
tradition; the Augustine/Aquinas (Christian) tradition; and the Hobbesian (Enlightenment 
tradition) that all led to modern liberalism (Whose Justice? 11, Short History 148). 
MacIntyre suggests in both texts the importance of retelling history, because in order to 
have an understanding of rationality as it relates to tradition, it is necessary to retell 
history (Whose Justice? 8-9). 
This work will review Alasdair MacIntyre’s discussion of A Short History of 
Ethics and focus on major philosophies found within the time periods designated as 
Ancient Greece, Medieval Society, the Enlightenment and Modernity by engaging the 
metaphors that are embedded in the theories of prominent philosophers of the time. The 
metaphors will then be a springboard for discussion of rhetorical interruptions found 
within historical novels the Odyssey by Homer, the Inferno as part of the Divine Comedy 
by Dante Alighieri, Candide by Voltaire and The Plague by Albert Camus. These novels 
offer a dialogue for communication ethics to be discussed in terms of their historical 
importance as well as the historicity they offer in discussion of postmodern day issues. 
David Carr defines historicity as “a term used in the phenomenological and hermeneutic 
tradition [. . .] to indicate an essential feature of human existence” (673). Historicity is 
not a linear looking back upon, but rather, it is past and present affecting future 
possibilities.  
Introduction—The Problem and the Status of the Problem 
 Outlining Alasdair MacIntyre’s A Short History of Ethics and the connection to 
communication ethics, this first chapter explains the need for a praxis orientation to 
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communication ethics and the reason for the choices of the periods and novels outlined in 
Chapters Two through Five of this work. A discussion of communication ethics 
scholarship and the praxis of communication ethics will be highlighted throughout these 
chapters. In this work, a praxis application of philosophical theory is important for the 
student of communication ethics, in trying to put the theory into practical application in 
real-world situations.  
This work interprets historical narratives in relation to the philosophical thinking 
of particular historical periods. Ancient Greece offers the obvious—the beginning of 
written philosophical thought for the West through the work of Homer. Medieval Society 
and the Christian perspective will be discussed in terms of St. Augustine, St. Thomas 
Aquinas and Dante Alighieri, the great author of the epic, the Divine Comedy, from 
which the Inferno is the first part. The Enlightenment and the work of scholars who 
ushered the West into Modernity, including Immanuel Kant, will be discussed alongside 
Voltaire’s classic comedy Candide. Finally, Modernity will be represented through the 
works of ethical philosophers such as G.E. Moore, John Stewart Mill and Henry 
Sidgwick in connection to Albert Camus’ post-World War II novel The Plague.  
This interpretation of narratives will assist with the discussion of communication 
ethics. The first part of Chapters Two through Five examines the ethical philosophy of 
scholars as noted by Alasdair MacIntyre’s A Short History of Ethics, in conjunction with 
this evolutionary sense of historical change. The second part of Chapters Two through 
Five will concentrate on a specific novel from each of the announced historical periods. 
The novel discussion will illuminate communication metaphors that are given birth 
within the novels and then these metaphors will be connected to the ethical philosophy of 
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the historical moment. This work will add to the small amount of scholarship on the 
pedagogy of communication ethics, especially for higher education at the undergraduate 
level. This work engages in a discussion of communication ethics scholarship and praxis 
as it relates to historical novels written during evolutionary societal changes, integrated 
with prominent philosophers writing about ethics during those specified eras.  
The schema for Chapters Two through Five includes the following: First, there 
will be an introduction to the period discussed in the chapter. A discussion of each 
philosopher will follow, as outlined by Alasdair MacIntyre, and will include major 
metaphors that emerge from the work of the philosophers outlined, work that has 
significance for communication ethics. Third, the ongoing conversation will be 
illuminated to include the modern day scholarship alongside a discussion of the rhetorical 
interruption Next, a discussion of historicity as it relates to the author of the novel will be 
discussed. Fifth, a discussion of the historical engagement of the novel will offer readers 
a summary glimpse into the narrative. Finally, philosophical and rhetorical implications 
of the metaphors from the novel in concert with the philosophers of the day will be 
discussed. Each chapter will conclude with a summary explaining the rhetorical 
interruptions that informed communication ethics of each of the periods discussed in the 
novels. 
In performing a database search of refereed scholarly journal articles via 
PROQUEST on the topic of “communication ethics,” there were 30 articles identified 
from 1990–2004. However, 16 of those were book reviews and another five did not relate 
to the topic of philosophical communication ethics (a few involved health care and a few 
the environment). When the search was performed for “communication ethics and 
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pedagogy,” only one article in the past 24 years was identified (Arnett, “Freire’s” 150-
171). A search performed through the Communication Institute for Online Scholarship 
(CIOS) “ComIndex” database delivered more abundant results. A search of article titles 
dating from 1900-2004 yielded 103 references for the key words “communication 
ethics.” The majority of the results, however, were journal articles discussing media and 
ethics. There were also many articles on virtue ethics and Aristotelian theory.  
A few modern-day journal articles will be useful in constructing the discussion to 
be found in Chapter Five in regard to Modernity and communication ethics. However, 
questions remain as to how to usefully define, discuss and attempt to construct practical 
scholarship and discussions about communication ethics for postmodern-day students in 
relation to the history that proceeded Postmodernity. Therefore, this work is an effort to 
increase the discussion of communication ethics as being historically understood. 
Research Approach: 
MacIntyre’s illumination of philosophers in conjunction with novels 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s A Short History of Ethics will be used as a framework for 
this work, as his acclaimed scholarship provides an outline of philosophers who are 
crucial to the study of ethics. MacIntyre delineates various time periods and philosophers 
who wrote during those eras, throughout A Short History of Ethics that make for useful 
parameters when discussing natural demarcations in history and philosophical thought. 
MacIntyre refers to “Greek Ethics” (Short History 18, 83-109, and specifically 89), the 
“Middle Ages” (119-124, 157) and “Christianity” (Short History 110-120). He also refers 
to the “Enlightenment” within the discussion of the French Enlightenment (Short History 
181-183) and  “Kant” (Short History 181-183, 190) but he discusses in great detail the 
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“British & French 18th century arguments” (Short History 157-189). Finally, MacIntyre 
refers to “Modern Moral Philosophy” at the end of Short History of Ethics (249-269). 
Central issues important to the Greek, Christian (Middle Ages/Medieval), Enlightenment 
and Modern societies, then, will be delineated in the chapters of this work. By discussing 
these time periods and various ethical philosophies emerging during these eras, major 
metaphors and themes that reflect the societies’ outlooks and beliefs during those times 
will surface.  
For students of communication ethics, this work engages the conversational 
invitation of the novel as a practical application of the announced ethical theories during 
the time periods listed. The goal of this work is to consider the contemporary significance 
of the rhetorical interruption found in the movement from Greek ethics to Medieval 
Christian ethics to Enlightenment ethics and, finally, to Modern ethics and determine if, 
by reading these novels, the authors allude to what that “call of conscience” might have 
been during the various “interruptions.” Examining the rhetorical interruptions and the 
historically situated questions that the rhetorical interruptions announced will be 
beneficial for the study of communication ethics looking to the decisions made during 
those periods that changed the culture and the communities forever.  
The core of this work includes six chapters. This chapter, Chapter One is the 
introductory chapter, discussing Alasdair MacIntyre’s A Short History of Ethics and the 
argument for the need for communication ethics pedagogy. Chapter Two discusses Greek 
Ethics and the Odyssey. Chapter Three focuses on Christian Ethics and the Middle Ages, 
and the Inferno. Chapter Four includes a discussion on various Renaissance and 
Enlightenment philosophers and Candide. Chapter Five delineates modern philosophies 
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and focuses on The Plague.  Finally, Chapter Six concludes the work with a discussion of 
implications for history and historicity—why the examination of historical novels and the 
various rhetorical interruptions is crucial for a postmodern discussion of communication 
ethics and how this will assist in the understanding of the historical implications of the 
study of communication ethics.  
Alasdair MacIntyre 
Alasdair MacIntyre suggests that virtues will lead to the unity of a human life if 
grounded within a tradition (After Virtue 204-225). In defining the pre-modern concept 
of virtues, it is necessary to say something about the accompanying “concept of selfhood, 
a concept of a self whose unity resides in the unity of a narrative which links birth to life 
to death as narrative beginning to middle to end” (MacIntyre, After Virtue 205). 
MacIntyre suggests that virtues should be situated within the concept of finding “the 
good life for man and not only in relation to practices” (After Virtue 220) 
 Through communication we can realize our ethical selves. In modern times, our 
behavior is somewhat controlled by the social situations in which we find ourselves. 
Alasdair MacIntyre suggests it is through a narrative that one finds him/herself emerged 
within a rule-bound community. He explains, “behavior is only characterized adequately 
when we know what the longer and longest term intentions involved are and how the 
short term intentions are related to the longer. Therefore, we are writing a narrative 
history.” (After Virtue 208). Communication ethics, then, is the praxis of the philosophy 
of the Ancients to the Moderns, as MacIntyre explains, a type of “intelligibility” for 
which we can be held accountable for which only we (humans) are the authors (After 
Virtue 209). Therefore, speech becomes intelligible in a narrative and the purpose and 
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speech acts require context (MacIntyre, After Virtue 210) within which intelligibility will 
become obvious and make sense and the intelligibility will be “the conceptual connecting 
link between the notion of action and that of narrative” (MacIntyre, After Virtue 214). 
 When Alasdair MacIntyre discusses narratives in After Virtue, he does so to 
suggest that one is always coauthors of his or her own story, but one is also under certain 
constraints. “A central thesis begins to emerge: man is in his actions and practice, as well 
as in his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal. [. . .] through his history, a teller of 
stories that aspire to truth” (216). MacIntyre explains how the individual is the subject of 
the narrative in that the narratives are concepts of selfhood (After Virtue 217), where “I 
am the subject of a history that is my own and no one else’s, that has its own peculiar 
meaning” and second, correlatively “I am not only accountable, but I can ask others for an 
account, I am part of their story, they are part of mine.” (After Virtue 218).  
Along with narratives, Alasdair MacIntyre points to traditions as holding families 
and communities together. A person is part of a family who will inherit a “moral starting 
point” (220). The thought of one’s past influencing one’s morals is contrasted with 
Modernism’s individualistic thinking, “I am what I choose to be.” Exercises of virtue 
strengthen traditions and keep those traditions from disappearing, whereas a lack of 
virtues corrupts traditions (MacIntyre, After Virtue 223). Our practices are embedded in 
history, “the history of a practice in our time is generally and characteristically embedded 
in and made intelligible in terms of the larger and longer history of the tradition through 
which the practice in its present form was conveyed to us [. . .]” (After Virtue 222). Jack 
Russell Weinstein explains the importance of the connection between ethics and the 
traditions in which one is not only raised, but continues to live within: 
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MacIntyre convinces his readers that morality is inseparable from cultural 
heritage, and that different ways of reasoning—different ways of 
thinking—are in constant conflict. He describes a world in which rival 
moral systems struggle to survive and to overshadow their competitors, 
and one in which beliefs can only be defended by appealing to important 
texts, sacred scriptures, and lengthy histories. (On MacIntyre, iv)  
This connection of communication ethics, history, culture and reasoning is investigated in 
this work because of the movement found within postmodernity to understand multiple 
narratives working within our world.  
Communication Ethics 
 Over the past 60 years, scholars have engaged in the differentiation of 
communication ethics from ethics. Richard L. Johannesen wrote an extensive and 
incredibly useful compilation work on communication ethics in his highly revered text on 
Ethics in Human Communication. In this text, Johannesen investigates human 
communication and ethics and provides a categorical outline and discussion of 
communication ethics from various perspectives as well as presenting case studies at the 
end of the 5th edition. Johannesen explains his main contention in relating communication 
and ethics by suggesting that:  
Potential ethical issues are inherent in any instance of communication 
between humans to the degree that the communication can be judged on a 
right-wrong dimension, that it involves possible significance on humans, 
and that the communicator consciously chooses specific ends sought and 
communicative means to achieve those ends. (2) 
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Communication ethics involves choices, duty, obligation, right and wrong, how one 
makes a decision and then articulates it to another.  
On a micro-level, these are significant components found within interpersonal 
relationships that must be identified and understood to effect relationships in a positive 
way. On a macro-level, decision-making affects societies in total. Therefore, 
communication ethics needs to move from a theoretical discussion to a practical 
application in order for dialogue and language to be used in communication.  
Because, “[L]anguage is a tool that can be used in better or worse ways to achieve 
human goals” Sharon L. Bracci and Clifford G. Christians see communication ethicists 
and moral theorists working in tandem, both groups considering methods to “evaluate the 
use of language” in order to explain why to evaluate means used to achieve certain ends 
(1). “While moral philosophers speculate broadly about the nature and grounds of being a 
good person, communication ethicists focus on the ethical person in and through 
language” (Bracci and Christians 2). Our field has continued to expand, as Ronald C. 
Arnett outlined in his review of communication ethics scholarship in communication 
journals over a 50-year period of the twentieth century.  
In Ronald C. Arnett’s description and analysis of the scholarly works in the field 
of communication ethics, he explained that the main perspective outlined by theorists and 
contributors to communication ethics texts, is “choice making” (“Status” 56). When we 
make an ethical decision, the fact that we have a choice to make is what turns us from the 
theoretical to the practical. Aristotle explained his use of the word phronesis, as Arnett 
outlined, the “focus on deliberative choice via practical discourse [can be] found in 
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Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics” (Arnett, “Status” 56). Aristotle’s work points toward 
communication ethics as forms of phronesis and decision-making.  
Similar to Ronald C. Arnett’s article on the status of communication ethics 
scholarship, Richard L. Johannesen wrote of the trends in the field of communication 
ethics as well as pointed toward what those trends recommend for future research 
agendas in his article “Communication Ethics: Centrality, Trends and Controversies” 
(201-235). Johannesen explained that when viewing the self, it should not be as an 
emotivistic, modern self, but rather as a “situated, embedded, socially constructed self,” 
perhaps located within an organization (“Communication Ethics: Centrality” 227). This 
article is an excellent bibliographic source, as Johannesen offers detailed analysis of the 
writings on communication ethics in the past two decades and suggests trends that 
include media, organizational, individual and social ethics, freedom and responsibility, 
ethic of care, and virtue or character ethics (205-216).  
As Johannesen consistently explains in his analysis of the literature on 
communication ethics, consideration needs to be given to communication ethics in a 
postmodern world. This can be a challenge, but a welcomed challenge as diversity, 
culture and technology all influence how we act and react within our separate, yet 
technologically related cultures. Situating communication ethics within the real world is a 
necessity that scholars realize in writing about the need for a praxis orientation. 
Communication ethics is ethics in action. This work specifically looks at the 
philosophies that informed a given community during the critical periods in history. This 
work then identifies the rhetorical turns and the reasons behind those choices, and seeks 
to understand the ethical communicative actions brought about in specific historical 
 The Scholarship and Praxis of Communication Ethics 13 
 
moments. Uprisings and revolts that revolved around hunger, slavery, war, land 
ownerships and civil rights all have created rhetorical turns in various civilizations 
around the world. This work seeks to understand the reasoning behind decisions made in 
various historical periods and, hence, extrapolate the information and make it useful for 
ethical decision-making in Postmodernity. A crucial component of communication ethics 
is investigating how society communicates and the methods and media used. 
Communication ethics scholar Kenneth E. Anderson considers the need to look at 
how history and the medium (technology) used for communication affected the practices 
and the communicative theories of the day. For example, Greek communication was oral, 
the printing press enacted the shift during the Enlightenment to written, and now, 
cyber/computer mediated-technology has affected modernity (Anderson 4-5). Throughout 
this work, various types of “media” will be reviewed, from basic narrative, to poetry, to 
fictitious novel, to historical biographies, so that an interpretive narrative can be utilized 
to bring forth the communication ethic of the various time periods discussed.  
Ethics will continue to be discussed as society changes. There is not a right or 
wrong answer when deciding on ethical decisions and outcomes as “ethical 
considerations form an integral part of human existence and are constantly disputed. 
Human beings argue about ethics partly because it is so central to their lives” (Machan 5). 
Because those within society are in constant dialogue with each other, those involved in 
the dialogue will be questioned as well as perform the questioning as to what ought to be 
done. Every corner turned, whether done consciously or not, one can ask questions that 
have ethical communicative considerations on a daily basis. In today’s postmodern 
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culture, differences need to be recognized with society inviting dialogue, not just with 
people, but also with changing historical conditions (Makau & Arnett x). 
Ethics 
 Ethics has a long history of people engaging questions as to what is the 
appropriate decision, what ought to be done (Jensen xi), how should the search be 
conducted for the morally and ethically correct answer (Andersen 13)? These central 
questions propel the writing of what is considered the hallmark of ethical theory, 
Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, through to the Modern-day listing of Henry Sidgwick’s 
engagement of the contemporary conversation of ethics in his The Methods of Ethics. 
These ethical questions become communication action metaphors in communication 
ethics, guiding the way for a discussion of the practical maneuvers toward, and 
consequences for, communication ethics. Therefore, this work will proceed to distinguish 
ethics from communication ethics in an effort to enlighten discussion around the actions 
of ethics woven throughout our communicative efforts during engagement with other 
community members (civil, political, religious, familial societies).  
Richard L. Johannesen’s Ethics in Human Communication is useful in 
understanding various types of communicative ethical thought. However, the historical 
perspective, following works from Ancient Greece to Modern times, is not illuminated by 
Johannesen. In terms of gestalt theory, offering a basis by which to understand our own 
current-day history in terms of what came before and the actions that follow 
(backgrounding and foregrounding), would be beneficial for logically defining why 
decisions were made as well as analyzing implications of those decisions. Identifying 
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rhetorical interruptions from previous societies may assist us with recognizing current-
day struggles in our own postmodern lives. 
Studying the theory of communication ethics will be useful from a historical point 
of view, working back to ancient Greece, forward to early Christianity, toward the 
Renaissance/Enlightenment and, finally Modern scholars, by following the lineage of 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s A Short History of Ethics. In conjunction with this theory, a 
discussion of novels/comedies written about or during these announced time periods will 
be useful resources in attempting to outline the theories of the day in regard to ethical 
communicative practices.  
A Short History of Ethics and Contemporary Relevance 
 Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue, a scholarly exposition that followed Short 
History of Ethics by 25 years, explained his vision of the danger of ignoring praxis and 
the connection between theory and action, suggests the Enlightenment was a failed 
project, and that we have lost our teleological compass. Therefore, we find competing 
narratives in Postmodernity, each having its own compass. MacIntyre explains that 
“emotivism,” a practical and philosophical plight, is used to explain decision-making 
centered on one’s “preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral 
or evaluative in character” (After Virtue 12). Emotivism turns us away from thoughtful, 
grounded, knowing, action. Therefore, examining practical applications of ethics is 
crucial for contemporary students. 
Robert Bellah engaged in such a work in Habits of the Heart, an elongated 
sociological explanation of what happens “after virtue” (xii). Bellah et al. discuss 
problems that occur when the focus is on individuals themselves, thus limiting us in 
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formation of bonded communities (xii, 302). Bellah discusses praxis of human 
community and how, in terms of emotivism, individualism is problematic. Therefore, this 
work performs a move similar to Bellah’s move, but this work will follow Alasdair 
MacIntyre even more exactly.  
Alasdair MacIntyre’s A Short History of Ethics is used as the guiding outline for 
investigating communication ethics in an historical fashion within this work. In his well-
respected survey and analysis, MacIntyre looks at the communicative aspects of the 
community based on philosophers who were writing during those time periods. 
MacIntyre suggests that history is an important part/piece of moral concepts (Short 
History 2-3). This work follows the historical progression of MacIntyre in his A Short 
History of Ethics and provides a companion to MacIntyre in examining communication 
ethics. This intellectual alignment is unusual but reliance on MacIntyre is not without 
precedent.  
What might be seen as “missing” in this work is a theoretical discussion on 
Postmodernity, as well as a novel to represent postmodern times. However, since 
MacIntyre published A Short History of Ethics in 1966, he ends his discussion with 
Modernity and this work will do the same, recognizing that a glimpse into the theory of 
Postmodernity could encompass its own project. However, in Chapter Six, this work 
offers a discussion on why Postmodernity was inevitable based on the philosophical 
discussion that occurs in the previous chapters of the work to that point (in addition to 
what this historical exposition means for communication ethics in postmodern times).  
Communication ethics becomes the praxis (theory informed action) of 
philosophical ethics. This work will move from MacIntyre’s theory into implementation 
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in practical, every-day interactions. This work is not engaging, nor working within a 
relativistic posture, nor being anachronistic. This work will engage questions within a 
given historical moment in order to enlighten this historical moment of Postmodernity. 
Alasdair MacIntyre is known throughout the world for his work in ethics, and 
Jack Russell Weinstein argues that MacIntyre’s connection of history to philosophy is 
important to study in tandem with morality. “MacIntyre convinces his readers that 
morality is inseparable from cultural heritage, and that different ways of reasoning—
different ways of thinking-are in constant conflict” (Weinstein iv). It is MacIntyre’s use 
of praxis that will inform communication ethics, as communication is a form of praxis 
for ethics. 
Another point that needs to be made regarding parameters around this work 
includes the realization that there is, indeed, a lack of insight into vernacular voices found 
in the writing of Alasdair MacIntyre’s work on the history of ethics. MacIntyre focuses 
his work on, and in the West, beginning A Short History of Ethics with the ancient 
Greeks and concluding with continental and a few American scholars. MacIntyre does 
not enter his work through Egypt, India, Asia, nor Islamic or Jewish religions (Short 
History xi). MacIntyre set his own parameters and worked within them, as he noted in his 
preface to the second edition of A Short History of Ethics. There is obviously room and a 
need for investigation of ethics in the east, and feminist ethics, but this work will stay true 
to the work of MacIntyre as a guiding focal point. 
Though he uses MacIntyre’s work on ethics to elucidate his work on Coordinated 
Management of Meaning theory, Vernon E. Cronen critiques MacIntyre’s limiting of his 
work on traditions to that of Western traditions. “The effect of this was to lose sight of 
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the fact that Western traditions are held together by diverse and widely known set of 
cultural practices. [ . . .] By losing track of the broader conception, culture, MacIntyre 
failed to see the diversity of resources by which one tradition may encounter another” 
(33).  MacIntyre responded to his critiques in the Preface of the second edition of the A 
Short History of Ethics, published in 1997 by acknowledging some of the philosophers he 
did not include in the first edition, as well as suggesting that his work was the “short” 
history of Western ethics and, therefore, the book should be read as such (vii-xix). 
There are, indeed, modern-day scholars writing on universal ethics and third-
world countries, all of which are valid and important. Gerald A. Larue offers an insightful 
explanation of ethics in ancient Mesopotamia and suggests that once writing was 
developed stories were written about, 
[. . .] heroes who exemplified virtues most admired, legal codes that 
defined acceptable and non-acceptable conduct and instructional 
formulations, all of which inform us about the nature of ethics as it first 
developed into something sufficiently explicit to be the subject of 
reflection and discussion. [. . .] Western ethics has its roots in these 
ancient approaches to the problems of regulating a settled society. (29) 
Another view from a non-Western tradition explained by Purusottama Bilimoria 
discusses Indian ethics. Bilimoria explains: 
In India it was recognized that ethics is the ‘soul’ of the complex spiritual 
and moral aspirations of the people, co-mingled with social and political 
structures forged over a vast period of time. And this is a recurrent 
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leitmotif in the culture’s profuse wisdom literature, legends, epics, 
liturgical texts, legal and political treaties. (43) 
So, it is not that these important societies are being ignored, but rather, this work notes 
that the West did not have the sole key that unlocked the doors to the house of ethics. An 
interesting fact in Bilimoria’s explanation is that ethics can be found in the small 
narratives of literature as well as legal documents; texts that identify—both implicitly and 
explicitly the communication that occurred within a culture regarding the overarching 
agreements found within an ethical community. However, for brevity and to continue to 
use MacIntyre’s work as a backdrop to this work’s discussion, this work will continue to 
be exclusive to MacIntyre’s focus on scholars focused on Western philosophy, as 
described and expanded upon in Short History of Ethics, as well as After Virtue and 
Whose Justice? Which Rationality?  
Rhetorical Interruptions 
Communicative disparity that characterizes fluctuations from one time period to 
the other—the movement from ancient Greece to the Christianity of the Middle Ages, to 
the Enlightenment, to Modernity, (and then to Postmodernity) can be viewed as 
“rhetorical interruptions” (Hyde 78). Michael Hyde describes and expands on Martin 
Heidegger’s notion of “historical call,” and the changes that occur in our lives because of 
this call from one person to another. A sense of transformation occurs when one realizes 
that things are not as they once were.  
Hyde suggests, “that the call of conscience is itself a rhetorical interruption” (78). 
Discussing the interruptions and the outcome upon human communication and the ethical 
implications of choice making will assist the student of ethics in determining what 
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worked in the past and, potentially, how to make decisions in the future. Therefore, this 
work seeks to understand history through the contemporary significance of ideas, figures 
and events. Time lies not only behind, but also beside and in front of us. 
Explaining the importance of the historical moment and how rhetorical 
interruptions allow those moments to come alive, Ronald C. Arnett suggests that the 
moment speak to those listening: 
It is a moment that calls clearly. Communication does not rest with us 
alone; the historical moment speaks. It is our response that furthers the 
conversation. History is marked by public points of memory. Awareness 
of the significance of a given historical moment begins with a rhetorical 
interruption, calling us from the routine of everyday life into response, 
into what both Bonhoeffer and Levinas would call responsibility. 
(Dialogic Confession 5) 
The significance of this work is that it will provide a historical connection to 
communication ethics so that the study of communication ethics can be united with 
premier contemporary philosophers and engage communication ethics from a praxis 
orientation.  
Communication ethics cannot be studied in the abstract. As Postmodernity moves 
forward, it is important to view communication ethics from a historical perspective, and 
then attempt to determine the questions that are being asked during specific time periods. 
Using novels will assist in understanding the motives behind the decisions that were 
made in the various time periods.  
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  In the West, the metaphor of progress was thrown away, and the teleological path 
was lost. In Postmodernity, reflection has become problematic and, yet, it is a necessity. 
The visualization of each chapter finds life in explication of a given novel appropriate to 
the historical moment that each of the chapters analyze. The following is an outline of the 
chapters that will explore the philosophical theory of communication ethics in the time 
periods announced. Once the theory is delineated, attention is turned toward a practical 
side of communication ethics, attempting to outline the theory put into action in each of 
these historical time periods through the various novels that could be used in 
communication ethics pedagogy. 
Historicity and Novels 
Two questions are answered in this first chapter. First, why have these time 
periods been chosen for review? Second, why use novels as a praxis orientation to 
viewing communication ethics? First, Alasdair MacIntyre points to “Greek society” 
(Short History 5) and the philosophers who were the first to give us ethics in a written 
and systematic manner: “[. . .] there came in the fifth century B.C. a new class of teachers 
and a new class of pupils. Books on moral philosophy commonly concentrated on the 
teachers, the sophists, whom we see mainly through the antagonistic eyes of Plato” (Short 
History 11). The writings of the ancient Greek philosophers offer a framework for 
interpreting and understanding the first written system of ethics and how life changed 
once travel and other worldviews became apparent via the sophists.  
The rhetorical interruption Homer offers begins Chapter Two of this work. Then, 
a rhetorical turn can be found in Christianity during Medieval time that is the focus of 
Chapter Three. This is the first system to allow for everyone to be involved in the 
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discussion, not just free men, since the Sophistic period, as explained by MacIntyre 
(Short History 115; Whose Justice? 117). The founding and exaltation of science could 
be viewed as the rhetorical interruption of Christianity and religion that brought the West 
into the age of the Enlightenment, which is the focus of Chapter Four. Finally, 
Modernity, which makes science and technology and the progress they author, the god 
terms (Burke 33, Weaver 212) of a new age is the focus of Chapter Five. 
Second, presenting an invitational story, along with the engagement of theory, is 
an approach that allows these novels to be given life. Communication ethics can be 
interpreted within a narrative approach via the practical outlet of a novel and readers are 
able to view philosophy and history in congruence with each other. This work seeks to 
understand history through the contemporary significance of ideas, figures and events. 
Each novel will be viewed as a story that explains the time period surveyed. Within each 
of these novels, various forms of communication can be explained in relation to the 
ethical norms of the period in question.  
Roy Porter explains in his bibliographic text, The Enlightenment that stories of 
“fiction became available during the Enlightenment” and were “vehicles for exploring the 
implications of Enlightenment ideas” (59). These novels will allow a case study of sorts 
by which to view the communication ethic(s) of the day in action and offer a canvas for 
understanding; a backdrop by which to convey meaning.  
The significance of the whole of this work is threefold. First, it provides a 
historical connection to communication ethics. Second, it unites the study of 
communication ethics with a premier philosopher of ethics (Alasdair MacIntyre) with 
communication ethics in action (the novels). Third and finally, novels will be used as 
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historical case studies for communication ethics as a practical effort to draw correlations 
between theory and praxis. The following section of this first chapter is a description of 
the five chapters to follow in this work, describing the ethical theory and practice 
discussed as they relate to human communication. 
Chapter Two:  Greek Ethics & The Odyssey 
 Chapter Two of this work recognizes that the study of Greek philosophy and 
literature substantiates the documented changes that occurred in Athens during the age of 
Antiquity. Alasdair MacIntyre explains “Social changes had not only made certain types 
of conduct, once socially accepted, problematic, but had also rendered problematic the 
concepts which had defined the moral framework of an earlier world” (Short History 5). 
To the postmodern observer, it seems as if MacIntyre could be explaining the changes we 
are witnessing from Modernity to Postmodernity (as well as the earlier shifts from 
medieval to the Enlightenment and the Enlightenment to Modernity—the rhetorical 
interruptions that will also be discussed in subsequent chapters). A discussion of Homer 
(circa 800 BC, novel is from the 540 BC version), Plato, Aristotle and Sophistic writings 
begin Chapter Two, followed by a response from modern scholars and ending with the 
discussion of the praxis of The Odyssey for communication ethics.  
Alasdair MacIntyre discusses the breakdown of social forms within ancient 
Greece (Short History 10). Rules no longer held true for all citizens. Because of travel, 
and the Sophists’ interaction with other cultures, rules were questioned. “The society 
reflected in the Homeric poems is one in which the most important judgments that can be 
passed upon a man concern the way in which he discharges his allotted social function” 
(Short History 5). What became problematic in Athenian society is that these functions 
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were questioned once the Sophists began to travel as well as the customs of the warring 
Persians who had entered the city. Ken Anderson explains the history of communication 
ethics from the standpoint that one must consider the community and culture within 
which communication is taking place (3-20). It is this Greek culture, this time period, and 
the disruptions occurring within this community that this work attempts to understand.  
Alasdair MacIntyre illuminates the classical period of ethics by addressing such 
metaphors as judgment, courage, justice and im/morality (Short History 1-83, After 
Virtue 121-129). These metaphors speak to Athenian as well as modern-day life. Other 
Greek metaphors that will be viewed through both the lens of MacIntyre as well as other 
modern day scholars include good, hero, knowledge, duty and responsibility. An 
understanding of these metaphors will allow one to recognize the communicative efforts 
made by the citizens of the day and specifically those found immortalized in the Homeric 
story of the Odyssey.  
Chapter Three:  Medieval Christian Ethics & The Inferno 
Christianity offered an alternative to the elite as Alasdair MacIntyre suggests that 
it was the first major philosophical system interested in the poor since Stoicism (Short 
History 115; Whose Justice? 117). There was a new type of concern about the 
“disenfranchised” and a move from theism to monotheism. Previously, philosophical 
systems were for the upper class; so, the Christians were the first to bring religion and 
philosophy to the common people as “Christianity introduced even more strongly than 
the Stoics did the concept of every man as somehow equal before God” (MacIntyre, 
Short History 114-115). Because Medieval times stretch over a thousand years by most 
accounts, Christianity is the foremost overarching narrative construct viewed as the major 
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theme of medieval times. Aurelius Augustinus, known as Saint Augustine, Bishop of 
Hippo (354-430) and Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) are the two central theological 
and philosophical figures outlined by MacIntyre (Short History 110-120; Whose Justice? 
146-240). For this chapter, it will be critical to ascertain whom Augustine and Aquinas 
were writing for and what perspectives they brought to the discussion of Christianity as 
well as the whole of medieval society.  
A characterization of the time period with an explanation of the major Christian 
metaphors, including confession and sin, natural law, obedience, justice, hierarchy and 
rule (MacIntyre, Short History 111-117) is discussed in Chapter Three of this work. 
Alasdair MacIntyre suggests that religion helped medieval citizens find answers to the 
mysteries of various questions raised by both slave and free (Short History 109). Chapter 
Three will conclude with an examination of how Dante’s Inferno adds to the conversation 
on communication ethics. “The Divine Comedy is in outline—but only in outline—a 
summation of the Medieval world view and is heavily indebted to the philosophy of 
Thomas Aquinas” (Cantor and Klein 8). Dante’s sarcasm and humor is specifically suited 
for this type of poetry. Specific focus on how Dante responded to, and/or was influenced 
by the Christian Church of the thirteenth century of which he was a part is discussed in 
Chapter Three. 
Norman F. Cantor and Peter L. Klein explain the significance of medieval writers 
on the Renaissance: 
Dante is the exponent of the early Renaissance thought that marks the 
transition from the church and group-centered medieval world to the state 
and individual-centered Renaissance culture. Machiavelli is the great 
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theorist of the High (or full) Renaissance in which the potentialities of 
statism and humanism are carried to their ultimate conclusion and 
presented in forms that helped to shape modern European civilizations. 
(Renaissance 3)  
Both of these great political and poetic philosophers worked as “political exiles from 
Florence” (Cantor and Klein, Renaissance 4). Chapter Three will focus on medieval 
metaphors outlined above and will be reviewed in terms of communication ethics as they 
relate to the history of the Medieval period and MacIntyre’s discussion of both Augustine 
and Aquinas and the work of Dante, specifically found in the Inferno. 
Chapter Four :  Enlightenment Ethics & Candide 
The Enlightenment was, as we have seen in the turn from the Homeric age to the 
Sophistic movement, and again with the end of the Greek reign and the beginning of 
Christianity, a time of narrative disruption. Science was king and Christianity was being 
questioned for what seemed to be the first time in over a thousand years. In Critique of 
Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant asked if God can be proven, and if so, did it need to be 
done?  
The discussion in Chapter Four focuses on the communicative turn that is 
exemplified at the end of medieval times and ushered philosophers, such as Kant, into the 
Enlightenment. Europe seemed to know it was in a state of flux, that change was on the 
horizon, that life as they knew it was never going to be the same. Some have argued that 
the American Revolution, as much as the French and Scottish Enlightenment and 
eventual French Revolution, marked the rhetorical interruption. So, what was Kant’s 
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stance? Alasdair MacIntyre turns toward Kant for a description of ethics during the 
Enlightenment (Short History 190-98).   
Immanuel Kant attempted to establish the fact that God did not need to be proven. 
Humanity simply needed to have faith; a faith in a metaphysical world that was being 
challenged by the scientific method of the day. Reason and science were valid only 
within a certain field and not faith. Not only was metaphysics the most esteemed of 
sciences being challenged, but also experience and the source of knowledge were being 
challenged as well (Dixon vii).  
In Chapter Four, a discussion of the philosophers discussed by Alasdair 
MacIntyre who wrote during the British and French 18th century thought is offered along 
with metaphors embedded within their work, including, property rights, the individual 
and freedom. Focus is given to Kantian metaphors outlined by MacIntyre, including 
reason, intuition (a priori), the transcendental and, finally, the categorical imperative as it 
relates to universal morality (Short History 190-99). Two key Kantian texts are reviewed 
in Chapter Four, including Lectures on Ethics and Critique of Pure Reason due to their 
import to Kant’s work and view on ethics and reason. With the guidance of these 
Enlightenment metaphors and, specifically, the metaphors emerging from the work of 
Immanuel Kant, Chapter Four turns toward the writing of Voltaire and his volatile and 
incredibly telling text Candide.  
Candide is a short text written in the middle of  the eighteenth century, that 
allowed Voltaire to anonymously announce his political disrespect for theology and the 
theory that God will make sure all things come out for the best in the end. Candide is a 
response to the philosophy of the day as Voltaire used Candide as his counter to the 
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theodicy and philosophy of the rationalist Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (Brooks 158-165). 
This chapter also explores Kantian ethics as they relate to Voltaire’s work in Candide.  
 Voltaire connects various characters with incredible flaws, on a journey of life. 
They all have something to offer toward the moral of the story. Major metaphors found 
within Candide include pessimism, the categorical imperative, (an almost perverse) 
optimism, and unwavering faith in God vs. evil. These metaphors are compared and 
contrasted to Alasdair MacIntyre’s view of the Enlightenment and in relation to 
communication ethics and the rhetorical interruptions that were occurring as medieval 
life came to an end as described in Chapter Four of this work. 
Chapter Five:  Modern Ethics and The Plague 
 The movement from Enlightenment thinking to Modernity is the focus of Chapter 
Five along with a discussion of Albert Camus’ The Plague, written at the end of World 
War II. Having lived through Nazi Germany’s attempt to rule Europe, and as a supporter 
of the French resistance, (Lottman 249) Camus was writing on the cusp of yet another 
rhetorical shift. Camus wrote during a time when institutions were questioned and the 
world was becoming more global. The beginning of the end of acceptance and 
acknowledgement of metanarratives (Lyotard xxiii-xxv), postmodern philosophy marked 
an end to Modernity. Lyotard suggests the postmodern “transition” begun with the end of 
reconstruction in Europe by the end of the 1950s and Ian Hamilton Grant, who wrote 
Postmodern Thought suggests postmodern times begins with the 1960s (36-40).  
Chapter Five explores a few philosophies of modern thought as explained by 
Alasdair MacIntyre. In A Short History of Ethics, MacIntyre discusses Modernity in 
reference to scholars, such as John Stuart Mill a Utilitarian intellectual who studied 
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Bentham from an early age, thanks to his own father’s influence (235, 251); as well as 
Mills’ “critics,” including G.E. Moore.   
Other Alasdair MacIntyre pieces are also referenced and examined for the fifth 
chapter of this work, including After Virtue, and Whose Justice? Whose Rationality? 
Specifically, MacIntyre discusses “emotivism” throughout After Virtue and describes the 
concept as a type of individualism that is problematic in modern times, as making 
decisions based on one’s own attitude and beliefs (xx). Stephen Darwall further explains 
emotivism and gives a non-cognitive definition. “Emotivism can explain the intimate 
connection that many philosophers think exists between ethical judgment and 
motivation” (72).  John G. Messerly, in his An Introduction to Ethical Theories, also 
explains the origins of emotivism (24). Individualism and emotivism are important 
metaphors discussed in Chapter Five, as the relate to the Modern philosophy coming out 
of a rhetorical shift occurring in the Enlightenment and culminating at the end of 
Modernity.  
For the praxis portion of Chapter Five, this work uses Albert Camus’s The 
Plague, which offers a glimpse into the world during and after World War II. Camus 
lived through Nazi Germany’s assault on innocent Jews of various descents. Through the 
vehicle of The Plague, Camus showed his audience the mundaneness of the lives of those 
living in the onslaught of a life-taking plague. From the opening of the novel, we meet 
the characters who live in Oran, a “large French port on the Algerian coast, headquarters 
of the Prefect of a French Department” (Camus 3).  The plague comes to town and infects 
anyone and everyone at the beginning of the novel. There is not a systematic reason 
 The Scholarship and Praxis of Communication Ethics 30 
 
available that is able to predict who will be the next victim of the plague. The plague 
simply claims its prisoners without notice.  
Narrated by the fictitious Doctor Rieux, The Plague is a novel that explains how 
Rieux cares for the plague’s victims and the narrator describes what happens within the 
confines of the city walls from beginning to possible end of the plague. Another 
character, Joseph Grand, who did not contract the disease, became a statistician for the 
government early in the novel. Grand was very proud of the accurate recordkeeping. The 
improved order of burying the dead at the cemetery, according to the Prefect, was very 
systematic and impressive, “and though the burials are much the same, we keep careful 
records of them. That, you will agree, is progress” (Camus 158). Progress is a key 
metaphor for Alasdair MacIntyre, which is explored as it relates to Modernity throughout 
Chapter Five. 
Chapter Six:  The Rhetoric of Story-laden Communication Ethics 
This final chapter views and reviews communication ethics as a story-laden 
praxis. The major metaphors that were outlined in Chapters Two through Five are 
reviewed in order to discuss their centrality to communication ethics. The metaphors 
emerge from both the philosophical writers outlined by Alasdair MacIntyre and the 
novels themselves. The chapter includes a discussion on the implications of teaching 
communication ethics through the use of novels.  
The focus of Chapter Six is the discussion on Postmodernity and communication 
ethics and why Postmodernity was inevitable. The discussion is in terms of rhetoric and 
story-laden communication ethics through the work of Paul Ricoeur’s Time and 
Narrative Volumes 1 through 3. 
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As the concluding chapter, Chapter Six reviews the significance of this entire 
work. This work seeks to provide an historical connection to communication ethics, 
uniting the study of communication ethics with premier philosophers of ethics, engaging 
communication ethics in terms of praxis in order to experience communication ethics in 
action, and using novels as historical case studies for communication ethics as a practical 
effort to draw correlations between theory and praxis. First, the discussion begins with 
Ancient Greece in the time from Homer and the Odyssey through to Aristotle. 
This work seeks to identify the traditions and major metaphors of the various 
periods discussed in the following chapters, including the polis being most important as 
the publicly announced forum for citizenship and ethical communication in the Ancient 
Greek world. The medieval world saw traditions, especially the Church, as the forum in 
which communicative action could find an ethical home. During the Enlightenment, 
contention within the tradition and the home of the Catholic Church was disrupted by the 
offerings of other Christian institutions, as well as science and the need for proof in the 
academy. In modernity, traditions were dismissed with turning inward to the self. Finally, 
in postmodernity, a resurrection of traditions gives people ground upon which to stand 
and a multiplicity of communication ethics to offer traditions and narratives for the good 
that Aristotle was searching for 2,500 years ago. 
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Chapter Two:  Greek Ethics and the Odyssey 
The question of what constitutes a good reason for action is thrust upon 
them only when they are already confronted by alternatives, and 
characteristically the first uses of practical reasoning will be to justify the 
pursuit of some good not to be achieved by following the customary 
routines of the normal day, month, and year. It is only later when these 
routines have more largely and more radically been disrupted that the 
question of whether it was not in fact better to follow the older ways 
unreflectively can be raised, and when the conservative offers his 
contemporaries good reasons for returning to an earlier relatively 
unreflective mode of social life, his very modes of advocacy provides 
evidence that what he recommends is no longer possible. (MacIntyre, 
Whose Justice? Which Rationality 54) 
 
While one is, as they say, “in the moment” it is difficult to see the forest for the 
trees. In Homer’s time, it was a matter of form that people were virtuous because they 
followed their duties which were manifested in their actions. How do we know this? 
Twenty-eight hundred years later, through the content and poetry of Homeric myths, 
including Homer’s Odyssey, one can appreciate the “chief means of moral education” in 
these heroic “stories” (MacIntyre, After Virtue 121). A discussion of Homer’s poetry 
follows in this second chapter as a form of praxis in attempting to determine the 
communication ethic of Ancient Greece.  
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Myths can open up the question for a discussion about the rhetorical interruptions 
of the time period. What was changing in ancient Greek society to cause such 
interruptions? Before the Sophistic period, and the various wars that brought invaders to 
Greece, there was an agreed upon story of the Greek city-state, (the polis). There was a 
type of universal understanding where a delineation of roles were common and 
expectations and duties of individuals for the good of that polis were understood and 
second nature. Did the universal form of the understanding of the polis fade away and 
lead the community to decisions based on the particular? What led to the difference of the 
order of the universal versus the particular?  
Alasdair MacIntyre claims there was a “radically different social order” in the 
years between Homer and the Sophists (Short History 10). Why and how this difference 
manifested itself will be considered in this second chapter as the rhetorical interruption of 
the age, as well as how a communication ethic manifested itself in this ancient 
civilization.   
Within the Homeric texts, Alasdair MacIntyre recognizes a utopian form of 
society, which carried a pre-supposed social order (Short History 8). But, MacIntyre 
further clarifies that there are other historical documents which explain that in ancient 
Greece, between the launching of Homeric culture and the engagement of scholarly travel 
by the sophists, “there is no longer a single and unified society in which evaluation can 
depend on established criteria” (Short History 9). The rhetorical interruption based on 
travel and the newness of other lands and other people, as well as peoples from invading 
armies, created changes in social orders. 
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Within Homer, a single, fundamental order with agreed upon social practices gave 
meaning to discordance. Therefore, a person would know where to ‘stand’ if they found 
themselves within certain conflicts. A reading of the poetry of Homer will assist in the 
understanding of the heroic society as described in the Odyssey that will allow for the 
study of theory in relation to practice. The Odyssey was of central importance to the 
Greeks as epics such as this were forms of understanding, listings of what was commonly 
held as acceptable community practices, and types of “sacred writings,” no less 
(MacIntyre, Short History 10).  
These poems offered the Athenians a guide on how to live courageously, bravely 
and be a good person in order for the polis to be successful. The polis was the 
foundational structure of the Athenian city-state that offered standards for how to judge 
various practices (MacIntyre, Whose Justice? 34). From Homer to the Sophists, and from 
Socrates and Plato to Aristotle, there was a significant change in the way of “doing,” and 
the opening up of their world brought change upon the polis as to what was courageous, 
just and noble. Though ‘doing’ is not a philosophically sophisticated metaphor, it 
explains the effort of daily living. The rhetorical interruption of the induction of other 
cultures upon the original Greek culture allowed for a change in philosophy, culture and 
tradition that had not been seen in Homer’s time.  
Introduction 
From the opening of A Short History of Ethics, Alasdair MacIntyre posits the idea 
that words no longer held the same meaning in ancient Greek Society as they had 
hundreds of years earlier. The Greeks of Plato’s (427-347 BC) and Aristotle’s (384-322 
BC) time began to question morals. Qualifying, descriptive words no longer held the 
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same meaning as they had been used in Homeric myths (MacIntyre, Short History 5). 
Homer began a description of Greek life and morality, Plato attempted to reveal reality, 
and Aristotle allowed for a generative form of agency and utilized phronesis, the ability 
to use practical wisdom and creatively engage philosophical theories. War and travel 
away from the polis created a time of change and uncertainty where the universal Greek 
understandings of roles and duties were questioned and eventually no longer recognized.   
Based upon A Short History of Ethics, After Virtue, and Whose Justice Which 
Rationality? this chapter examines Alasdair MacIntyre’s understanding of ethics and 
virtues of Ancient Greece. In illuminating the characterization of this ancient time period, 
MacIntyre explains that there had been an order of living that was basic and fundamental, 
in that, “to be dikaios (just) is to conduct one’s actions and affairs in accordance with this 
order” (Whose Justice? 14). The Greeks were in agreement with this overarching 
narrative of how to act within the Athenian state. Courage and justice were virtues that 
were understood and stable in Homer’s narratives of Greece. This narrative was contested 
once travel, war and trade escalated within and outside of Greece, as is evident in the 
works of the sophists (MacIntyre, Short History 10-11). Socrates lived during a period 
that was on the cusp of Homeric life and the beginning of sophistry.  
As Alasdair MacIntyre explains, Socrates offered definitions and syllogisms to 
help explain his own ideas of morality (Short History 14-21). Plato offered the a priori of 
forms that would give order to life and Aristotle offered how members of the polis might 
work toward the good via use of the mean, within the confines of the Platonic philosophy 
(MacIntyre, Short History 57-83). Starting from the ‘beginning’ then, this work moves 
through the philosophy of these men, starting with Homer and ending with Aristotle.  
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Homer: Heroic Society 
Alasdair MacIntyre suggests that Homer’s poetry was a pragmatic effort that 
eventually became known as a type of revered ideal for later philosophers. Homer 
described in his poetry the forms of life that he witnessed in the society around him. 
Homer did not know he was practicing the antecedent to Greek philosophy. Plato 
followed and then Aristotle, who later used Homer’s work as a basis of his own 
philosophical ethics. These men were attempting to determine an understanding of how 
humans work together in community, as well as individually. What was the essence of 
human life? The ancient Greek writers who eventually became the first recorded 
philosophers attempted to answer this question via their myths, orally conveyed traditions 
and eventual writings. These myths all had characters that followed roles that were 
evident in a private and public setting. 
There was a hierarchy of roles within Homeric society that outlined how one was 
to be judged based on how they performed their duties (MacIntyre, Short History 5-8). 
The appraisal of a man’s actions was predetermined by the title/role given to them and 
the class structure in which they were all embedded. Thus, there was an agreement as to 
how to view and represent justice. Therefore, to be virtuous was to act according to a 
predetermined set of publicly agreed upon social practices which would lead one in living 
an ethical life. For instance, one could experience shame because the entire community 
understood what was expected of each other. Unfortunately, hospitality became as 
important as retribution. Being hospitable to strangers was the courteous and just way to 
act, as was killing a murderer of a family member in retribution. It was one’s duty to 
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avenge the death of a kinsman. These types of virtues were universally understood within 
the polis.  
Homer wrote on the cusp of a rhetorical interruption that Alasdair MacIntyre 
suggests is evidenced in the writings of Theognis of Megara (Short History 9). MacIntyre 
points to the difference in moral vocabulary from the time of Homer to the Theognid 
corpus through to the writings of the traveling philosophers, known as the Sophists (Short 
History 5). In explaining the change from Homeric time to Theognis, which may have 
been about two to three centuries in time, MacIntyre posits, “There is no longer a single 
and unified society in which evaluation can depend on established criteria” (Short History 
9). This would explain the difference between the work of Plato and Aristotle another 
two centuries later.  
Four hundred years seems like a long time, and one would assume change was an 
eventual happening. However, that is a postmodern view looking back upon a classical 
time period where time moved much more slowly as communication was not as easily 
accessible. Communities were very insular until the travel of the sophists. Colonization 
and travel revealed other ways of life and living (MacIntyre, Short History 10). 
Therefore, the transformation over those 400 years was important and life altering.  
Alasdair MacIntyre suggests that Homer was a/the pre-philosophical writer who 
offered the philosophers that followed him a guide for understanding social practices. 
Homer’s writings had offered a mythological, sacred writing upon which judgments of 
actions had been based. However, Plato was committed to a transcendental metaphysics, 
and Aristotle contradicted him by suggesting that practices should be embedded in social 
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institutions. Hierarchical formations were beginning to change by the time Plato and 
Aristotle were writing. 
Between Homer and writers five centuries later there is a great change in 
Greek myths about the order in the universe. The Homeric myth does 
reflect, though with much distortion, the workings of an actual society in 
which a close form of functional organizations is presupposed by the 
moral and evaluative forms of appraisal which are in use. The later 
assertions of order in the universe reflect not a structure that is, but one 
that was, or one that is struggling to survive. They are conservative 
protests against the disintegration of the older forms and the transition to 
the city-state. The myths themselves cannot but open up the question of 
the difference between the order of the universe and the order of society. 
But above all, this question is sharpened by a widening awareness of 
radically different social orders. (MacIntyre, Short History 10) 
Deciding what constitutes a good man was no longer an obvious decision as travel 
brought the world of the inside out, and invaders brought the outside in. The Greeks had 
stumbled upon a “discovery of rival social orders” (MacIntyre, Short History 11).  
Alasdair MacIntyre also explains the difference between Homeric poems and 
later, philosophical reasoning concerning practical reasoning. In his text After Virtue, 
MacIntyre posits, “All practical reasoning arises from someone asking the question, 
‘What am I to do?’” (24). So a person would understand their role and duty in Homeric 
poetry because “the characters already know independently of their reasoning what action 
it is that they are required to perform” (MacIntyre, After Virtue 19).  Because of the 
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historicity of the heroic age and the fact that subsequent cultures passed stories on 
through an oral tradition over many centuries, various discussions about the ethics of 
these cultures is conveyed and debated today as MacIntyre explained in After Virtue 
(121-129).  
The narrative structure and moral education of the Greek “heroic age” is 
accounted in stories (MacIntyre, After Virtue 121). Discussions about the heroic age may 
not be historically (chronologically) accurate, however, they provided moral background 
to contemporary debate in classical societies. The idea of a man’s role and status is also 
detailed in Homeric society. A man’s determined status outlined his rights and privileges 
(MacIntyre, After Virtue 121). Aretê is excellence of any kind usually translated to mean 
virtue, and the notion of courage-sustained households, because if one was courageous, 
one was considered a good friend. Alasdair MacIntyre explains that there is an important 
connection between being courageous and the concepts of “friendship [. . .] fate and 
death [. . .]” (After Virtue 122). Therefore, in Homer’s heroic society, morality and social 
structure are one in the same (MacIntyre, After Virtue 123).  
Fate is an accepted, social reality in Homeric society. Death is obvious, so the 
man, “who does what he ought moves steadily toward his fate and death” since, for the 
ancient Greeks, “human life has a determinate form” (MacIntyre, After Virtue 124). The 
outcome of war was prosperity, but the paradox of this situation was that the definition of 
war is death. Winning then becomes a form of losing, in the form of loss of life 
(MacIntyre, After Virtue 128).  
According to Alasdair MacIntyre, there are three central interrelated elements in a 
unitary framework found within heroic poetry. First, there is a conception of what is 
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required by the social role which each individual inhabits. Second, there is a conception 
of excellence or virtues in these qualities that enable an individual to do what his or her 
role required. Finally, there is a conception of the human condition as fragile and 
vulnerable to destiny and to death, such that to be virtuous is not to avoid vulnerability 
and death, but rather to accord them their due (MacIntyre, After Virtue 128-9). 
Alasdair MacIntyre refers to this ancient Greek world as a heroic society and 
suggests that members of heroic societies cannot withdraw from community. Only on the 
outside is one a stranger because one’s “identity in heroic society involves particularity 
and accountability” (After Virtue 126). MacIntyre pointedly asks, if we no longer have 
that social structure (of the heroic society), what can be learned from Homer? First, 
morality is always tied to the socially local and particular, and second, one can only 
possess virtues in a tradition in which one inherits them (MacIntyre, After Virtue 126).  
The ancients’ history was such that hierarchy was all they knew, and society was 
built upon the reliance upon slavery and having women stay at home. It was not a perfect 
world, but the philosophy was and is still useful in their historical moment, as well as the 
current. For hundreds of years, Homer offered those who read his poetry, or heard it via 
the oral tradition, a way of life that was familiar and one within which they all agreed to 
live. These traditions were ethically understood within their communicative offerings. 
However, it was the writings and teachings of the Sophists that began changing the tides 
and the notions of ethics began to shift.   
The Sophists and Socrates: Rhetorical Teaching Methods 
Depending on the location, the people and the culture, various forms of what is 
“just right and fitting” were found to govern Greek societies, cities or states (MacIntyre, 
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Short History 14). Therefore, it was the sophist’s duty (the rhetorician who traveled from 
state to state in order to teach the young men) to learn and understand the customs of the 
local peoples in order to teach throughout the land. “Thus the criteria of justice are held 
to differ from state to state” in ancient Greece (MacIntyre, Short History 15). What was 
right and just in one city might not have be so in another. Coming out of Homeric times, 
where everyone was in agreement with the terms and conditions of justice, this change in 
Greek culture was problematic in that ethics became relative to the people and the 
culture. This was the fifth century BC in ancient Greece, and the sophists were paid for 
their knowledge and teachings of rhetoric, sometimes for better or for worse. 
As a teacher, Socrates’ (469-399 BC) lived and worked during, as well as 
following the time period of the Sophists. Socrates was known to be aggravating to those 
who he was supposed to be offering moral counseling. Socrates never gave an answer, 
instead, he wanted his pupils to think and arrive at their own conclusions based on his 
question-and-answer style of reasoning (thus we now have the Socratic Method). He 
taught through a method of constant questioning of his pupils, and it was Plato who wrote 
of Socrates’ teachings. 
Alasdair MacIntyre explains Socrates through the eyes of Aristotle’s comments 
about his predecessor. “We see him use what Aristotle calls inductive arguments 
(arguments which invoke examples and generalize from them), and we see him 
syllogizing (that is, drawing conclusions deductively from various premises)” (Short 
History 21). MacIntyre continues that it was smart of Socrates to cause his pupils to 
become so exasperated that they found the lesson only in not being able to answer the 
question. The interlocutors then understood that Socrates’ arguments “derive 
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contradictory or otherwise absurd consequences from admissions secured form his 
interlocutor, and induce the interlocutor to retract” (MacIntyre, Short History 20). 
Through the contradiction in which he found himself bound, this type of argument 
engaged Socrates’ pupils and they would eventually understand his point. “So the 
discovery of one’s own ignorance survives as the one well-founded moral aim” 
(MacIntyre, Short History 21). Socrates believed that he was asking the right questions 
about ethics.  
Socrates wondered by which criteria one should make decisions. However, 
Alasdair MacIntyre explains that the philosophers that followed him were able to 
consider, even more precisely, at a micro-level, how to define the moral vocabulary used 
to even consider those criteria because during Socrates’ time “moral usage has ceased to 
be clear and consistent” (Short History 24). Plato then shadowed his mentor’s writing by 
offering a universal order tied to a “social order” (MacIntyre, Short History 25). 
Plato: The a priori and Forms  
“Plato set most of his central problems in ethics” as he wrote his dialogues with 
Socrates as the “mouthpiece” for Plato (MacIntyre, Short History 26). Two of Plato’s 
works included the Gorgias and the Republic, in which he explored rhetoric and the 
ethical (or unethical) nature of persuasion. Within the Gorgias, Plato suggested that the 
sophists taught a rhetoric that could be used in unethical ways because the students were 
taught to be able to persuade others without the particular knowledge necessary on a 
particular topic. Therefore, rhetoric could be used for good or bad, dependent on the 
desired outcome. However the idea of responsibility comes forward as being necessary in 
the actions of the speaker. It was then in the Rhetoric that Plato suggested the purposeful 
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life should be lived within a certain type of community where the recognition of good 
would occur.  
Plato believed that philosopher kings should be the leaders of the community, as 
only a select, elite few would have the intelligence or would have been bred with an 
education to advise others in such a capacity. He was still looking for justice defined, 
including what type of actions could lead a man to be just (MacIntyre, Short History 33). 
Plato suggested that philosophers could be educated to make decisions based on Forms 
that would allow for understanding of various predicates in a dialectical argument 
(MacIntyre, Short History 42). The argument would then be rational with a goal toward 
the good that was transcendental in nature. In the Meno, Plato wrote about a boy that was 
quickly taught geometry by Socrates. But, Socrates made the point that the child simply 
memorized the geometric theorems, he did not learn them.  
To Menon, Socrates asks: “But to get knowledge out of yourself is to remember, 
isn’t it?” (Plato, Dialogues: Meno 50). Socrates suggested that knowledge is in one’s 
soul. Referring back to the young boy, Socrates explained that the young man had an 
opinion of what was true. Wondering if virtue could be taught, Socrates questioned 
Menon, asking him if he knew any teachers of virtue (Plato, Dialogues: Meno 55). Since 
the answer was no, Socrates suggested “virtue cannot be taught” (Plato, Dialogues: Meno 
61). Virtue, then, was a priori for Socrates, as knowledge already exists, and therefore, 
one would have to learn to recollect/reconnect. Socrates explained to Menon, “Virtue is 
seen as coming neither by nature nor by teaching; but by divine allotment 
incomprehensibly” (Plato, Dialogues: Meno 67). That knowledge and virtue can only be 
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found in the transcendental is what had put Plato on a different path than his student, 
Aristotle.  
In addition to the assumption that Plato made, suggesting that there are “forms 
and that knowledge of them” can only be known by the educated elite, Plato also 
assumed justification of conduct is one-in-the-same for all, a form of the universal 
(MacIntyre, Short History 49). The problem with this justification system is that it only 
related to the elite who were concerned with the Forms. Alasdair MacIntyre questions, 
then, how could one who is not a philosopher king be able to make decisions that are for 
the good of all, if they are not privy to the sophisticated knowledge of the Forms? 
Aristotle criticizes Plato in regard to this very question (MacIntyre, Short History 50).  
Aristotle: The Good and the Mean 
Plato and Aristotle both lived and wrote during a time that assumed that there was 
agreement on action and proper living of the good life. However, this assumption 
excluded slaves and women—of course, as well as the laborers who were on the bottom 
of the hierarchy. MacIntyre also suggests they were fooling themselves into the belief 
that the universal of Homer’s age still existed (Short History 97). However, turning 
toward Aristotle’s understanding of ethics is useful for this work in that an understanding 
of what he felt was a practical ethic is available in the form of his Nicomachean Ethics, in 
addition to Aristotle’s other writings. 
Though Aristotle considered his writings on ethics, including the Politics, to be 
grounded in the need for political education,  
Both are concerned with the practical science of human happiness in 
which we study what happiness is, what activities it consists in, and how 
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to become happy. The Ethics shows us what form and style of life are 
necessary to happiness, the Politics what particular form of constitution, 
what set of institutions, are necessary to make this form of life possible 
and to safeguard it.  (MacIntyre, Short History 57) 
Alasdair MacIntyre is quick to point out that what Aristotle meant by political also 
included the notion of the “social” (57). Aristotle wanted his theory to be practical, as 
practical wisdom, phronesis, (Arnett and Arneson 46) is Aristotle’s legacy that can 
continue to be used in today’s postmodern world.  
Aristotle suggested that all people be moved to action for the desire of the good 
because there is a teleological destiny toward which to strive. Aristotle asked one to 
consider what activity he or she be involved with to achieve the good life. In seeking that 
good, one would use the mean (the middle between extremes) in decision-making in 
order to arrive at the good. For instance, one should choose between the two extremes of 
courage and cowardice in order to act properly in various tactical situations. What is valid 
in one situation may not be in the next. For Aristotle, then, phronesis becomes important 
throughout daily living, using responsible knowledge to choose which virtue and at what 
intensity to attain the good in life, fitting for an individual within the polis.   
In summary of the work on ethics from these early Greek philosophers and the 
metaphors that are found within their works, it is evident that Homer wrote about the 
universal values attributed to the roles people engaged in with their families and 
communities for the good of the Athenian city-state. With courage and a sense of the just, 
Homer showed a tradition of Greek life that was understood and accepted until a 
rhetorical interruption occurred during the sophistic period in Greece. Socrates followed 
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by offering a dialectical argument for finding the good and Plato continued in this 
tradition by writing about the Forms that were necessary in order to guide a virtuous life 
that was just. Aristotle agreed, for the most part, with his mentor Plato, but felt the 
philosophy he offered could not be relegated to just the elite and a few philosopher kings 
but to all people who could use virtues for the good life to be attained by all Greek 
peoples.  
The Ongoing Conversation 
This work now turns to the communicative implications of the ethics these men 
espoused in their myths and philosophical teachings, based on the current-day 
conversations of modern scholars. Homeric myths advocated a heroic society based on 
actions within predefined roles. How men interacted with each other and within the polis 
was paramount. Plato suggested a utopian form of relationships between educators and 
those beneath them in the social hierarchy. Plato would have it that the philosopher kings 
teach that good “is only used properly when it is used as the name of a transcendent 
entity or when it is used to express the relation of other things to that entity” which 
enabled a “class division” to persist (MacIntyre, Short History 43-44). Aristotle 
attempted to explicate the ethical theories of Plato for daily living. 
In regard to ethics, Christopher Rowe suggests that the focus of ancient Greek 
writers, specifically Plato and Aristotle, revolved around the two themes of eudaimonia 
and arête, with the closest translations to English being “happiness and virtue” (122). The 
primary Greek virtues that would then be regarded in ethical terms would have included 
“wisdom, justice, courage, and moderation, with ‘piety’, which relates to right behavior 
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towards the gods” (Rowe 123). The Greeks were concerned with these virtues on both a 
civic and personal (familial) level.  
What would be good for the polis, acting just and brave, choosing the mean—
without excess or deficiency, and in a way pleasing to the gods, would be good for a man 
and his family. How one communicated within those groups, or dyads, is important for 
ethical consideration. If one acts with wisdom, he or she is mentoring others via 
communication. If one is acting pious, it may be through non-verbal communication, by 
offering a guest something to eat or gifts. It would be through communicative actions that 
a person acted with virtue.  
In explaining his relevance for today, Christopher Lyle Johnstone offers Aristotle 
in terms of historicity for the contemporary world (16-34). Johnstone explains that 
Aristotle recognized the need for putting virtues into daily living:  
His is an ethical theory that grounds moral value in the realization of our 
human potential for thinking and reasoning, that recognizes the need to 
adapt ethical judgment to an individual’s particular character and to the 
situation in which one finds oneself, that features the application of 
intelligence to ethical problems, and that gives primacy to communication 
and rhetoric in the processes of practical reasoning and moral judgment. 
(Johnstone 18) 
The primacy of communication ethics is what is crucial to this work, as it is within 
communicating with ourselves, others, groups, families and communities, that we find 
ethics come alive. Decision-making is not performed in a vacuum, and Christopher Lyle 
Johnstone and Aristotle realized the need for moving the philosophy of the elites to the 
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masses to envision a society where competing goods can be discussed and debated in a 
story that is formed within a narrative construction based on the history of the larger 
mass.  
To bring communication ethics into our daily lives and engage in communicative 
praxis a question needs to be brought to the period: What happened to enact the rhetorical 
interruption? What were the changes that occurred between the time of Homer and the 
Sophistic movement, and how did those changes affect communication and the ethical 
climate within the Athenian city-state? The Greeks explain a corporately agreed upon 
narrative through the stories of the heroic voyagers. Should Odysseus return to his home 
and be a mere mortal, or stay on the island and be remembered as the immortal God? 
There is an eventual shift between the time of Homer’s writing and the Sophistic 
movement, where opinion, not truth, became sacred. 
What was right for one did not mean right for all in the sophistic period. Men 
traveled to other cities, teaching young men about rhetoric and had to follow the societal 
rules in which they found themselves. Travel opened up a new world for the Greeks, as 
well as did the Peloponnesian War, which found the Spartans invading on and off for 40 
years, during the time of Plato and right before the birth of Aristotle.  
Homer describes the arrangement of Athenian life in terms of bravery and how 
heroes act within their stories.  There is a connection within these myths between 
morality and social practice. Within the Odyssey, Homer creates memorable human 
portraits that allow the reader to see the face of the actors fighting for heroic glory 
(Taplin 54-69).  In his definition of ethics, Tibor R. Machan explains that people are 
constantly judging each other’s actions, paying attention to how people behave and the 
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resulting consequences (6). In the confines of ethical decision making, reflection is 
crucial because people do not want to act improperly or live in a society where people 
irrationally make decisions or without contemplation choose the (in)appropriate actions 
with (un)fortunate consequences (Machan 6). 
Homer described what he saw within the home and polis of Ancient Greece. Plato 
was searching for what already was which needed to be made visible. Aristotle was 
searching for what was necessary in a given historical moment. The Sophists were 
engaged in a return to rhetoric suggesting that people should beware of both of these 
endeavors as attempted by Plato and Aristotle, as they were both true yet limiting.  
This work continues then with a discussion of the communication questions and 
consequences of the rhetorical turn or turns made from the time of Homer through to the 
Sophistic period. Paul Ricoeur’s discussion of Harald Weinrich’s third notion of the 
communication axis “putting into relief” can be used to allow for historicity to be 
understood in terms of the Odyssey and the ancient Greek historical moment (Time Vol. 
II 67-74).  
Historicity—Homer 
Within the poetry of Homer, Alasdair MacIntyre suggests that a man’s social role 
offers an opportunity for judgment of that man, based on how he carries out his specified 
role (Short History 5). Since these roles were questioned in Greek Society, MacIntyre 
believes that social changes can be viewed within the framework of Greek poetry, such as 
that of Homer, because Homer’s poetry was full of the daily life of a Greek warrior and 
how he attained and accomplished those roles and the consequences of his actions.  
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Homer explained Athenian life in terms of bravery, and Plato/Socrates explained 
through The Republic that the democracy was in its final stages of decline. Plato wanted 
to reclaim the common good. Aristotle moved from his mentor’s transcendental to a 
universal philosophy with embedded social practices by connecting ethics to the 
Athenian narrative code. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics gives us a detailed and well-
analyzed description of how Aristotle defined happiness and what was good for the polis.  
For Aristotle, the focus of Athenians’ actions and speech should have been in support of 
their teleological goal, which would be the good for the individual as Aristotle would 
have it relate to the polis.  
Aristotle explicated the values explained in Homer and adds a philosophical 
nature to them. He attempted to discover via social practices how the citizens enacted 
their moral obligations to the city-state, as well as to friends and family. Role, duty and 
doing are major metaphors for Aristotle. The Sophists began to question the universality 
of Athens during their travels and educating the youth of foreign lands. As they began to 
work in these lands, they realized that the criteria for justice varied from place to place. 
With the invasion of Greece by the Spartans, travel, colonization and the beginning of the 
sophistic journeys to foreign lands, different sets and types of moral order were found 
(MacIntyre, Short History 10). It is within the ancient myth of the Odyssey one can 
visualize the time before narrative disruption. Life for the city-state beginning to come 
under siege is what Homer describes in his epic, the Odyssey.  
Historical Engagement—the Odyssey 
Homer’s Odyssey explains to the postmodern reader the consequences of a heroic 
culture. Through this narrative, organized meaning (Ricoeur, Time, Vol. 1 3-90) was 
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offered to the community that passed this oral tradition through the generations. The 
Odyssey begins in the middle of the story of the great warrior, Odysseus, who is lost at 
sea and presumed dead by his family, including his wife, Penelope, and son, Telemachos. 
From the outset of the novel, the audience understands that the story beings in the middle 
of the events.  
Book 1:  After leaving Ithaka to fight the Trojan War, Odysseus never returned 
home to his wife and child. While the other men returned 10 years later, nobody knew 
where Odysseus was. Therefore, he was presumed dead by most people. The reader finds 
out that Odysseus was on an island, being held captive by the goddess Calypso. His 
family did not know he was alive but they continued to hope and carried on with their 
lives as best they could. However, Odysseus’ wife, Penelope, did not want to accept other 
suitors, as she felt there was a possibility that her husband was yet alive.  
The problem was that the suitors continued to stay at her great palace and lived off 
her wealth. These men were constantly working toward winning her hand in marriage 
with their goal of becoming King of Ithaka. Penelope kept them at bay by explaining that 
she could not consider suitors because she was working on Odysseus’ father’s (Laertes) 
funeral shroud, for he was a great man and she wanted to have it ready for a death that 
had yet to come.  
The goddess Athene, “guardian spirit of the family,” begged her father, Zeus, the 
most powerful god of the gods, for Odysseus to be sent home and returned to his family 
(Lattimore 6). Zeus explained that Poseidon was the only god who was not appreciative 
of Odysseus, and therefore, Poseidon was out for revenge. The reader comes to 
understand that Odysseus killed Poseidon’s son, Cyclops. Back at the palace, Telemachos 
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was distressed about the suitors taking advantage of not only his mother’s wealth but her 
kindness as well. The goddess Athene visited Telemachos to instruct him.  
Athene arrived at the palace disguised as an old friend of Odysseus and offered 
that Telemachos’ father may still be alive and encouraged the son to travel and search for 
his father, perhaps in Sparta to see if he had survived the war and sea travel. Athene 
encouraged Telemachos, suggesting that he should be brave and have courage in 
attempting to find his father.  
Book 2:  Telemachos asked the suitors to stop taking advantage of his mother 
Penelope. Though moved by his passion, they still considered Telemachos young and 
immature and did not give him credit. The suitors suggested to Penelope that she needed 
to choose one man, as she was leading them on. Penelope retorted that she could not 
choose a new husband until the funeral shroud that she was sewing was completed. 
However, Penelope was taking too long to complete the shroud because in the evening 
she disassembled what she sewed that day. Telemachos secretly deployed for the sea in 
search of his father.  
Book 3:  Still disguised as Mentor, the goddess Athene traveled with Telemachos 
and arrived in Pylos, where Nestor was king. The old king told a lengthy tale of his 
family’s war effort and explained the various murders committed by his family in 
retribution for other murders against his family. The king offered the accompaniment of 
his son, Peisistratus, and they left the next day for Sparta. 
Book 4:  Now on Sparta, the group arrived at the palace of Menelaus and his wife, 
Helen, who the battle of Troy was fought over. Menelaus explained the great escapades 
of the warrior Odysseus and how he fooled the Trojans with the wooden horse. Back in 
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Ithaka, the suitors realized Telemachos was gone and would probably mature by his 
return and could be much wiser and stronger. Therefore, they fashioned a plot to kill 
Telemachos upon his return.  
Book 5:  Athene requested from the gods that Odysseus be released. The gods 
agreed to send Hermes, the messenger god, (hermeneutics in action). Odysseus set sail, 
but Poseidon sent a great storm on the sea, casting Odysseus shipwrecked. Thanks to 
Athene, who stopped the storm, Odysseus survived and then arrived on the shore of 
Phaeacia.  
Book 6:  After an eloquent speech begging some young ladies playing in the 
fields for oils with which to bathe, and a change of clothes, Odysseus went to the palace 
with the princess to meet the King and Queen of Phaeacia.  
Book 7:  Odysseus did not tell the king who he was, but the king invited him to 
marry his daughter. Odysseus declined but asked for safe passage home instead. They 
held a feast in Odysseus’ honor and promised to assist him on his journey home.   
Book 8:  During the feast, Odysseus was challenged to an athletic game and won 
the contest. Music and stories filled the evening’s highlights, one of which was how the 
great Odysseus won the Trojan War. Odysseus cried upon hearing the beautiful music 
and story about him. The king asked Odysseus to tell more about him, but he only 
revealed what happened with the Cyclops and how he landed on Calypso’s island. 
However, Odysseus did not tell them his full story of the war, nor reveal his identity.  
Books 9 through 12: Odysseus explained his exploits with his men and being lost 
in the land of the Cyclops, a one-eyed creature and son of Poseidon. After eating some of 
Odysseus’s men, the Cyclops imprisoned the rest of the crew. Odysseus persuaded the 
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monster to drink of his wine and sleep, and then Odysseus blinded the Cyclops and 
escaped with his men.  
Odysseus further described the ordeals he and his crew faced during the first 
seven years of their odyssey. Odysseus even described how he traveled to the underworld 
of Hades to consult a prophet for advice on how to return to his home of Ithaka. Through 
their journeys, the men came upon various women and female spirits that would tempt 
and seduce them. One such time when their boat passed the Island of the Sirens, the 
spirits attempted to lure the men with their singing. In line with this theme of the distrust 
of women, Odysseus was warned during his trip through hell that when he does return to 
his home island, Odysseus should arrive in disguise, as “There is no trusting in women” 
(Homer 180). He received other advice about his travels that lay ahead and then left 
Hades with wisdom to set forth on his journey home.  
Odysseus ended his story to the Phaiakians by explaining how his men ate from 
the cattle that grazed on another island, even after Odysseus had told them not to take the 
peoples’ cattle. After they had set sail for home, everyone but Odysseus had died in a 
storm. Odysseus became shipwrecked, and he alone landed on Calypso’s island of 
Ogygia. The Phaiakians shower Odysseus with gifts, as they were always giving to 
others, and Odysseus then left for his home of Ithaka.  
Books 13 and 14:  When Odysseus arrived quietly on Ithaka, he met the goddess 
Athene who assisted him in concealing himself and disguised Odysseus as an old man. 
His own former swineherd, Eumaeus, who showered Odysseus with hospitality, though 
he did not recognize him, invited Odysseus inside his home.  
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Book 15:  Turning the tale toward Odysseus’ son, Homer switched the story to 
the whereabouts of Telemachos. Athene informed Telemachos to head back home 
because his mother was about to wed Eurchus. The goddess warned Telemachos of the 
plot to kill him upon his return. 
Book 16:  Telemachos journeyed to the home of Eumaeus, where Odysseus was 
staying, and Eumaeus explained that Telemachos must run and tell Penelope of his return 
to the island. Once Eumaeus was gone, Athene assisted Odysseus in revealing his identity 
to his own son. Now reunited, father and son agreed on a plot to kill the suitors. Odysseus 
sent Telemachos to their palace to remove all of the weapons, except for enough for the 
two of them to fight the suitors.  
Book 17:  Telemachos returned home and told his mother about his travels, but 
that he had not found his father. For the time being, Telemachos kept the secret of 
Odysseus’ arrival home from her. Odysseus and Eumaeus proceeded to the palace and 
were embattled by insults along the way, as nobody recognized the great Odysseus. 
When they arrive at the palace, the suitors were cruel to both strangers, but Penelope 
called them to her side to inquire as to who they were. 
Book 18:  Upon fighting a beggar who challenged him to a fight, Odysseus won 
the challenge. Penelope then announced that she would finally choose a suitor, because 
her son was reaching adulthood and that was what Odysseus had asked her to do before 
he left for war. 
Book 19:  Odysseus continued to be taunted by the suitors, but Penelope asked 
Odysseus to come and tell her his story. A maidservant was told to wash Odysseus’ feet, 
and his true identity was exposed then, as she saw an old scar on Odysseus’ knee. The 
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maid was asked to keep his secret, which she did. Penelope decided to have the suitors 
compete for her by stringing Odysseus’ bow and shooting it through the holes of a dozen 
axes, as her husband was known to do when he was home.   
Books 20 though 22: Penelope was so sad that she would rather die than continue 
to live and even asked someone in the palace to kill her. Zeus sent a favorable sign in the 
form of thunder and the contests for the suitors was announced. Odysseus demanded an 
attempt at the contest, though the other suitors balked, because they failed in their 
attempts to string the bow and shoot through the axe handles. After winning the contest 
by shooting through all of the axe holes, Odysseus and Telemachos armed themselves 
against the suitors. Father and son slaughtered some of the suitors and even killed 
Penelope’s disloyal female servants.  
Book 23: Finally, Penelope recognized Odysseus, but leery that he could be a god 
in disguise, she asked Odysseus to prove his identity by describing their bridal bed that 
Odysseus constructed, built around an olive tree as the bedpost. The two retired to bed 
and told each other the stories of the previous years. 
Book 24: Odysseus woke and visited Laertes, his father, but they were first taken 
to the gates of Hades, and met some of the suitors who were killed the day before. Then, 
Odysseus revealed himself to his grateful father and told some of his story of the day 
before. Other men then arrived at Laertes’ home to avenge the deaths of their sons (the 
suitors). Athene, disguised as Mentor, gave a speech that the men should not continue to 
murder each other, and instead, live together peacefully. 
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Homer’s classic, the Odyssey, offers a glimpse into the ancient Greek world 
where tradition is important and universally understood. Courage, patience, wisdom and 
heroic measures are immensely appreciated and expected of the men of the communities.  
Following the suggestion of Christopher Rowe as discussed earlier, the main 
virtues found in the works of Plato and Aristotle include wisdom, justice, courage and 
moderation as well as piety—specifically relating to the actions toward and from the 
gods. These virtues can be witnessed in the writings of Homer. The virtues herald a 
discussion for communication ethics as to how these virtues were announced and 
witnessed within the polis, as well as within the homes of the ancient Greeks.  
Philosophical and Rhetorical Implications of Metaphors 
 There are many metaphors that can be obtained through the reading of Homer’s 
poetry, as he had many lessons to teach. The metaphors of the philosophers from 
antiquity are also the metaphors found in the Odyssey. Expectations of young men 
included courage and wisdom because warriors were constantly fighting for the 
protection of their homeland or colonization over seas and foreign lands. The heroic 
culture was populated by men who had the wisdom to choose the mean from between 
Aristotle’s extremes. Justice was served when people did not follow the rules of the land, 
of the culture, of the society. Kindness, generosity and hospitality were crucial to the 
social life of the Athenians, as they were pious in their actions toward each other, in 
hopes of favorable impressions upon their gods. Finally, it was only through memory of 
the past and the stories that were told between generations that the young grew to 
understand the culture into which they were born. They were to act nobly, with a just 
heart and a strong sword.  
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Courage and Wisdom 
Odysseus’ actions consistently showed how courageous he was to continue to 
fight even without his men. Odysseus was incredibly brave and wise and had the cunning 
wisdom to accomplish the various missions he set out to complete. He was even able to 
persuade the gods to send him home. The same held true for Telemachos, who, as a 
young man was not yet mature to the ways of the world. But he left his mother and his 
home to search for his father without any guidance except for the name of a destination. 
Odysseus fought a giant, by blinding him in the only eye that he had, and thinking 
ahead as to how to strategize for the escape of his men. The men secured themselves to 
the underbelly of the sheep so that even a blinded monster could not feel for them with 
his hands. The men were able to leave without Cyclops knowing they were getting away. 
Odysseus showed his skill through his cunning knowledge. He was wise and able to keep 
quiet when necessary (when he constantly hides his identity from various kings and/or 
enemies), and he spoke in a brave language when he showed his true self, as the former 
ruler of Ithaka.  
Odysseus was a smart and very wise man. This is probably why the goddess 
Athene, goddess of wisdom, was fond of him and wanted him safely returned home. 
Odysseus had the cunning wisdom to think his way through a problem. It was not that he 
had the strength, as Achilles did, to fight and be a noble warrior. He was a cunning man, 
who was smart enough to know when to stay quiet and when to act. Odysseus exercised 
the very mean that Aristotle wrote about. He had the knowledge and ability to act when 
necessary and had the resolve to wait and be patient when it too was necessary. 
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Heroes were important to Homeric society, as Alasdair MacIntyre explains, and 
men were concerned with being honored while still alive and being respected as well, 
when dead (Whose Justice? 41). The question was—is it better to be known as a dead, yet 
courageous warrior, or stay alive and only be known to your immediate family? Calypso 
offered Odysseus the type of infamy that comes with being notorious, but he just wanted 
to get back home. Based on the roles they knew they had to follow, it was not a question 
of whether or not they should act one way (brave) or another (fearful), instead, it was a 
decision as to when and how should the mean be employed? Telemachos was nervous 
about leaving his mother, but he knew it was time to act more mature, be a man, and 
leave his home to find his father.  
Justice 
Justice is served to Odysseus’ men as he had told them not to slaughter the cattle 
of the Phaiakians, but they did not listen. Because they were hungry, the men desired the 
food too much to listen to their leader, and they eventually ate the cattle. When the crew 
left the island, the gods were not happy, and all of his men perished in a storm on the sea, 
except for Odysseus. This incident created by the gods was a form of retribution for not 
listening to prudence or to orders.   
This type of retribution is familiar to the Greeks, as it was legitimate to kill the 
family of the killer of one’s own family.  
So classical Greeks, like Greeks of the archaic period, for the most part 
understood the forms and structures of their communities as exemplifying 
the order of dikē (justice); and what gave literary expression to that 
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understanding above all else was the recitation and the hearing and the 
reading of the Homeric poems. (MacIntyre, Whose Justice? 25) 
In Book 3, King Nestor described a form of retribution he paid on another family for the 
murders of his kinsmen. This type of justice would continue for generations. Loss of life 
was a type of justice that was common in the ancient, classical and medieval periods.  
Justice as explained by the Sophists varied “state to state” and characteristics of 
justice were different depending on the land within which one was situated (MacIntyre, 
Short History 15). For Socrates, justice was not associated with the lower end of the 
hierarchy, including slaves. MacIntyre tells the story about Euthyphro who had to 
prosecute his own father for the murder of a slave, where Socrates “was more shocked at 
a man’s prosecuting his father than they are at allowing a slave to be murdered” (Short 
History 20-21). For Plato, justice referred to the understanding of each person’s place 
within the polis. He held that there were three levels of participants within society—the 
artisans and the laborers to produce the goods for the society; the soldiers to defend that 
society; and the rulers to lead (MacIntyre, Short History 36). Justice, then, was “everyone 
knowing his place” (MacIntyre, Short History 39). Thus, justice was a functional 
endeavor for Plato. Justice was an important virtue in Athenian society, and so too was 
piety.  
The Habit of Kindness to Strangers/Piety 
Kindness was shown to strangers in Ancient Greek culture because hospitable 
behavior was assumed to be appreciated by the gods. The kings of all of the lands, which 
Odysseus visited, showered him with gifts before he left their land, and not because 
Odysseus had revealed himself as a king himself. The gods and goddesses would change 
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identities so a Homeric character would not know if they were dismissing a beggar or a 
god with rudeness. This type of action is indicative to the piety of the civilization. There 
was great concern about the behavior of the people in relation to the opinion of the gods. 
The community members acted kindly toward each other because it was good to do so, 
and the gods would approve of the piety shown to each other.  
In defining the various roles within a culture, Paul Ricoeur suggested that one 
could not understand those roles without the setting and the “situatedness” of the 
characters within the plot (Time, Vol. 2 chapter 2). The social role expected within a 
heroic culture included men who would leave to bravely fight in wars far from home. 
Within the role of warrior, kindness was still expected, as Odysseus constantly 
remembered to be thankful to his hosts, even though he was trying to fight his way back 
home. He never overstayed his welcome, yet it was the custom to offer strangers lengthy 
stays/visits if necessary.  
In Book 17, as Odysseus, the former hero of Ithaka, made his way to his own 
palace, he was disguised as an old man and was accompanied by his old Swineherd. 
Therefore, nobody recognized him, and many strangers acted cruelly to both men. This 
was a horrible act of hostility that was not typical of Greek culture, yet it shows a 
disregard for people lower in status. Once Odysseus arrived at his palace, the suitors were 
even more rude and hostile.  
Zeus was a protector of strangers, so the god of gods was to be concerned for the 
“Other,” which is important for ethical communication. There was universal agreement 
as to how to act concerning treating strangers, treating each other. It was traditional and 
understood throughout various cities. That is why the type of cruelty shown Odysseus, 
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even though he is dressed as a stranger, exemplifies the a-typical type of communication 
that normally is not shown to anyone, including a stranger.  
The action of hospitality is a habit learned in Athenian society. Plato would 
suggest that people act because of a habit; they have been taught to do so, but they do not 
understand why they are acting so. Only an elite few truly comprehend the why to their 
actions. Therefore, for Plato, people within the polis would act with piety because it was 
the only way they knew how to act; it had been the universal of their society.  
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle wrote about the various types of friendships 
available to be had (192-224). He explained that one would be more cognizant of their 
relationships to close friends, than with various acquaintances or with strangers. Aristotle 
explained various types of friendships and compared these forms of friendships to 
corresponding types of government. From oligarchy to democracy to monarchy, 
friendships are explained as to the type of equality and reciprocity shown to each other. 
For instance, he compares a monarchy to a father-son relationship and a timocracy to a 
brotherly friendship (Aristotle 209-210). The last metaphor to be discussed regarding 
Homer is time as it relates to one’s communicative relationship to others within the polis.  
Memory (time) 
Odysseus saw time—his past and future-when he went to Hades. He saw those 
who had died, as well as anticipation of his future. Events shape history. The story of the 
Trojan War tied one to the history of that society as it defined the characters and 
explicated the morals of the story as well as the people.  
Though Odysseus was gone for 20 years, the community still remembered him. 
Though the events are not chronological, the reader still understands those events 
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(Lattimore 2-3). History is tied to events and a story. An epic like the Odyssey keeps that 
history alive. Therefore, the tradition is maintained and passed through the generations 
for all to remember and understand the virtues that the philosophers were teaching in the 
academy. As the Greeks recognized the importance of time, so too did St. Augustine of 
Hippo (who will be discussed in the next chapter), as he was concerned with time before 
time. Did god exist first, or did the earth?   
A summary discussion follows to explain the communication ethics questions 
raised within this second chapter and how the identified metaphors can be brought into 
“relief” and establish modern day significance for Homer’s work in terms of 
communication ethics (Ricoeur Time, Vol. 2 67-74).   
Summary 
 Immediately recognizing that these great writers and philosophers, from Homer’s 
world to Aristotle’s a few hundred years later, formed the work students now read from 
ancient Greece, is of great significance. The ideal of the community, the polis, what all 
men strive to make good while maintaining and achieving happiness is paramount in 
ancient Greece. However, also immediately recognized is the lack of participation by all 
people. Slaves and women were not given any place in the communicative opportunities 
of their cities. They were not part of the plan for Aristotle, though Plato has been known 
to say if a woman is useful, use her. However, their work is still useful and illuminating, 
but the exclusion of the majority of people is duly noted.  
 Explaining the difference in communication between people from ancient to 
modern day, Ken Andersen notes that “Classical theorists” (Greeks and Romans) did not 
discuss the importance of communication between family members, a type of modern- 
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day interpersonal communication. Instead, what was focused upon was the meta- 
communication of the polis. “Classical writers developed theories which tied 
communication ethics to communication activity designed to serve maximally the 
interests of the community (state), taking account only of the shared public functions of 
communication” (Andersen 10-11). This difference is important to realize, for modern 
theories now take into account the heavy reliance on interpersonal communication ethics 
between two people or a small group communication ethic.   
This type of interpersonal communication is how much of modern day 
communication is communicated. In the home, amongst family members, important 
communication occurs between parents, children and siblings; in the work place—
between employers and employees, customers and staff. Ken Andersen ends his point by 
suggesting that what has occurred has been an “evolution” of communication theories, 
the “democratization” of communication that has allowed a glimpse into the relationships 
of all people, not just rulers, men or the wealthy (11).  
The strength of the men that are discussed, the courage necessary to win wars and 
keep their families safe, is important to recognize because it is that courage that paved the 
way for colonization, scientific inquiry, political science and rhetorical theory. These 
were not easy tasks to achieve, especially without the technology to which modern-day 
soldiers, scientists and academicians are accustomed.  
The rhetorical interruption for this classical time period occurred after the 
Homeric poems were disseminated though a mostly oral tradition. These poems were 
understood to reflect the current day standpoint. It was only immediately after, during the 
Sophistic period, when colonization, travel and warring armies brought change into 
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Athens. Seeing how other people lived and worked with each other, definitions for action 
and decision-making were no longer universally understood.  
Attempting to determine whose justice, and through what thought processes, have 
been questions philosophers have worked through for thousands of years. “Athenian 
thought and Athenian practice were, among other things, dialogues with Homeric voices” 
(MacIntyre, Whose Justice? 24). The work of Homer is practical for postmodern readers 
as one attempts to understand the movement from a more universal notion of 
communication ethics to a culturally and socially bound form of virtues and ethical 
communication traditions in the 21st century.  
Chapter Three will look toward the end of antiquity as the rise of Christianity and 
the writings of Augustine, Bishop of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas brought forth a new 
way of considering society and the inclusion of all people. It was no longer a philosophy 
for just the elite and well educated of the community—Christianity was for the poor, the 
slaves and free person. The Medieval world was home to this Christian form of openness 
where politics and religion came crashing down on each other by the end of the thousand 
years that are considered to be the Middle Ages, from the fifth to the fourteenth centuries.  
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Chapter Three:  Medieval Christian Ethics and the Inferno 
The need in the thirteenth century for those confronted by the claims of the 
Aristotelian and the Augustinian traditions to move in the direction in 
which Aquinas did in fact move is thus in retrospect plain. Aquinas’ new 
account of truth challenged what had been the prevailing Augustinian 
view, so that it is not surprising that it was only Aquinas who at the time 
understood how to elaborate the conceptions which philosophy and 
theology alike required. (MacIntyre, Whose Justice? 170) 
 
Coming out of ancient Greece, there was a defined order of society found within 
the narrative of the polis. Within the Greek city-state, there was a hierarchical structure in 
which the elite ruled, the slaves worked, the artisans and laborers provided the goods and 
the soldiers defended the polis. Once the proselytizing of the Christian tradition began to 
occur at the beginning of the new century, a rhetorical shift is now recognizable in 
hindsight. The Christianity of the medieval period offered an equalizing stability to 
society.  
Christianity was different from other societies as well as religions in previous 
periods because it had not been since the time of the Stoics that the common person was 
offered equality (MacIntyre, Short History 115; Whose Justice 117). Alasdair MacIntyre 
explains that with the rise of Christianity, slaves, as well as the poor were offered a place 
of equality before God (Short History 115). No longer were the poor ignored, but instead 
they were welcomed to the table. Therefore, a “community” was announced where all are 
equal in God’s eyes. 
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However, in order to achieve this type of harmony, equality had to be available in 
the every day social life, as well as in the religious and the after-world. During the time 
that Augustine, eventual Bishop of Hippo (354-430) wrote and preached the spread of 
Christianity in the fourth and fifth centuries began to grow quickly, but had difficulty in 
the “conversion of educated pagans” (Cantor and Klein, Medieval Thought 1). Fast 
forward 700 years to the time of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), to witness the ruling 
monarchies and the papacy that had the strength to establish laws and stable churches so 
that aristocratic men could study Aristotle again in the comfort of countryside 
monasteries (Cantor and Klein, Medieval Thought 2). It was only in the sixteenth century 
that Christianity was threatened and diminished with the posting of Martin Luther’s 95 
Thesis on a German church door. 
Recognizing his minimal discussion of Christianity in A Short History of Ethics, 
Alasdair MacIntyre explains his lack of attention to Christianity by pointing to the 
problematic paradox that Christianity offers to medieval society regarding morality. 
Since St. Paul and Jesus both preached an ethic of living a good life until the second 
coming of the Messianic kingdom (which Medieval Christians believed was to occur 
imminently), these prophets and preachers of the day did not offer much in the way of 
how to live life in this world now. “We cannot, therefore, expect to find in what they say 
a basis for life in a continuing society” (MacIntyre, Short History 115). Because of this 
seeming deficit in ethical Christian theory, MacIntyre explains that Christianity had to 
find, establish and use a “conceptual framework” for daily living from somewhere else, 
and he explains “three main examples of this” (Short History 116), including the feudal 
society, Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas.  
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The example for living an ethical life, found in the writings of Augustine and 
Aquinas, will be the focus of this chapter. The first surrounds the communitarian ethics of 
the feudal society. The second and third focus on the philosophical communication ethics 
of Christian Platonism of St. Augustine’s work and the Aristotelianism of St. Thomas 
Aquinas’s writings. The question for these theologians was how to engage the faith. The 
theoretical metaphors illuminated in the works of Augustine and Aquinas, whose 
ministries bracket antiquity and the medieval periods, will be compared to the metaphors 
delineated from a reading of Dante Alighieri’s Inferno from his novel, the Divine 
Comedy.  
The Inferno will be discussed in order to establish a conversation regarding 
communication ethics from the medieval period, an era considered for this work to be the 
fifth through the fourteenth centuries. As the opening book of Dante’s Divine Comedy, 
the Inferno looks back as well as forward, as the Roman poet Virgil, who leaves the 
Pilgrim at the gates of Purgatorio, guides the “Pilgrim” through hell. A reading of Dante 
provides a glimpse into the effect the combination of politics and religion had on society 
by the end of the Middle Ages. 
Introduction 
Alasdair MacIntyre offers a short reading of the illumination of Christianity and 
ethics and gives minimal space to the ethical philosophy of Augustine and Thomas 
Aquinas in A Short History of Ethics. What MacIntyre does offer in his ethics text, 
however, will be explained in this chapter in addition to an analysis and discussion of the 
writings of these two theologians which appear in MacIntyre’s Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? MacIntyre explains in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? how Augustine 
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and Aquinas relate and modify within their own writings the teachings of Plato and 
Aristotle. Therefore, there will be a continuity of ideas from the Greek to the medieval 
teachings of Christianity that will be related to Dante’s work in the Inferno. 
Because of the medieval belief in the “six ages of man,” which ran from 
adolescence through late adulthood, there was a feeling that the earth had similar stages, 
and its last stage was at hand. Therefore, there was a pessimistic feel to the period of the 
Middle Ages (Le Goff Medieval 167), as it was imagined and still thought that Christ’s 
second coming would be where one would enjoy life and live peacefully.  
The disconnect between the ancient world and the Medieval world includes 
theology, of course, but the addition of Christianity meant that the characteristics of the 
virtues would be weighed within a religious vocabulary. As Alasdair MacIntyre explains, 
“When in the ancient world justice was extended beyond the boundaries of the polis, it 
was always as a requirement of theology” (Whose Justice 146). Augustine was concerned 
with justice, but based on love of neighbor as God would want, not based on hospitality 
found in ancient Greece. Augustine chronicles his exploits as a young man in his 
biographical text Confessions, where he discussed his confusion with interpretation of the 
Bible and his longing for his new God after his conversion in the garden. 
Augustine, Bishop of Hippo: Time, Confession, Discovery 
Alasdair MacIntyre explains Augustine as the Christianization of Plato in that 
“the world of sense perceptions” is replaced by humans’ earthly desires and the “realm of 
Forms” is replaced by the “realm of divine order” (Short History 117). MacIntyre 
explains that Augustine talked about his natural desires because of the woman he was in 
love with at a younger age, and who Augustine frequently discussed in his writings—
 The Scholarship and Praxis of Communication Ethics 70 
 
constantly worrying about his carnal knowledge of her and how it would effect his 
religious contemplation. For Augustine, it was God that illuminated the good for 
Christians, not the Platonic Forms, because it should be heaven that humans desire in the 
after life.  
 In his text Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Alasdair MacIntyre offers a 
more in-depth explanation as to how Augustine arrived at what is just and how justice is 
conceived for a Christian world, as this thinking is different from what Augustine learned 
from Platonic philosophy, as well as Cicero’s form of hierarchical government (153-154). 
Augustine used what he learned from these men, as well as St. Paul, when Augustine 
suggested that it is through a love directed at man because of a higher love of God that 
one acts justly, “When our love is directed toward a life which perfectly embodies that 
form in its actions, the life of Jesus Christ” (MacIntyre, Whose Justice? 154). This love of 
others is due in part to the actions a person’s will voluntarily allow him/her to take.   
 In contrast to the pagan world, Augustine suggested that the vice of pride was 
what led people to act, especially in combat and wars. Acting out of pride, and not love of 
man or god, was against Augustinian thinking. Therefore, Augustine felt justice was not 
part of the Roman world but only found in what he termed “the city of God” (MacIntyre, 
Whose Justice? 155). The most important virtue for Augustine was humility, and when 
compared to the most fundamental vice-pride, one can see how Augustine came to his 
idea of justice. Humility must inform justice for an ethical, responsive action.   
Augustine’s Confessions is outlined below because this short work offers a poetic 
and powerful glimpse into Augustine’s internal struggles and a view of his life before and 
immediately after his conversion to Christianity. Many scholars place Augustine in the 
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Platonic tradition or suggest that Augustine Christianized Aristotle. MacIntyre says, “The 
Platonic dichotomy between the world of sense perception and the realm of Forms is 
Christianized by St. Augustine” (Short History 117). However, Calvin L. Troup suggests 
in Temporality, Eternity and Wisdom: The Rhetoric of Augustine’s Confessions that 
Augustine’s writings are more in the line with Ciceronian thought (1-2, 73-75). 
Augustine combined the use of rhetoric and philosophy, a Ciceronian like effort of “an 
integration of both, which he called Wisdom” (Troup 73). Augustine’s influence on many 
centuries of thought, especially for early Christians is important for many reasons, 
including ethics, was informed by both the Ancient Greek and classical Roman worlds 
that preceded him.  
Augustine’s Confessions   
Through his prayer, Augustine made his confession to his God and was constantly 
struggling to understand his faith and more specifically, creation. He attempted to find 
the answers in prayer. As a young man, Augustine searched for answers to his own 
personal, religious and philosophical questions, and he was introduced to Catholic 
Christianity as an answer. Augustine abandoned his search for God in his youth but, in 
retrospect, he knew that God was always with him (25, 34). Then, as a follower of the 
Manichean religion, regarding the men with whom he practiced his faith, Augustine 
admitted “their heart was empty of truth” (40). Augustine continued to search for answers 
via prayer. This prayerful dialogue between he and his God is fascinating to read because 
he is so truthful in his doubt and his self-reflection.  
The entire work of Confessions is a long-form confession to God. Beginning with 
a sort of biographical sketch of his childhood and young adult life, Augustine wrote about 
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his mother’s love for him and how she prayed for his conversion, as well as his struggle 
to know God—this is his confession to God (83). Though he studied the liberal arts, 
Augustine felt he was still a slave to evil. In Book VII, Augustine investigated corruption, 
the forces of evil—and where this corruption and evil begins.   
Augustine was searching for clarity as he wrote the Confessions. He could not 
find answers to his religious questions in the form of the Manichean religion, of which he 
was a member in the early years of his life. He converted in the middle of his life to the 
religion of Catholic Christianity. Within the work of his Confessions, Augustine 
confessed to his God that he had faults, but in that confession, he also praised God. He 
did this confessing via prayer—a deep thought process where he was very particular in 
his choice of words. Augustine called upon his God, searching and questioning, “Have 
mercy so that I may find words” (5). He searched and found his place within the context 
of the Christian Church. 
After being introduced to the faith by Ambrose in Milan as described in Book V 
of the Confessions, Augustine began to read the Christian scriptures. Augustine felt he 
was blinded, walking through darkness (90, 148). Augustine attempted to situate himself 
in a story of the people, a narrative of the group of the Christian faith. Augustine longed 
for knowledge of creation—of both himself and the earth as explained in Books XII & 
XIII. He searched for his faith and questioned what part he was to play within that faith. 
Searching for the faith, his story—his situatedness and other questions guided 
Augustine’s inquiry of the Catholic faith.  
Throughout the Confessions, Augustine continually searches in this book—
looking for the answers to his questions through the vehicle of prayer. Calling upon God, 
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Augustine asked for mercy, hoping to find the appropriate words to both praise and thank 
God. As a child and young man, he was eager to fulfill manly desires. Augustine 
repeatedly asked God to forgive him for his sins of the flesh (24). In the early part of the 
first millennium, religious priests (men) were celibate and Augustine felt that his want for 
women was distracting to his prayer life. Augustine was also very concerned with 
exegesis of the Bible.  
Augustine questioned the vast amount of interpretations of the books of the Bible 
and wondered which one(s), if any, were accurate. He was a good critic, one who listened 
to other interpretations and did not dismiss them. Augustine discussed exegesis in the 
Confessions and commented on the multitude of interpretations of various types of 
literature, especially the Bible. Augustine felt that those involved in their faith would 
always have questions, and one needed to interpret the Bible for one’s self. At one point, 
Augustine contemplated if men cannot all (all of the critics) be right to some point?  
Because of Augustine’s use of Plotinus’ (a Neo-Platonist and Bishop of Sirmium) 
teachings, as well as his own knowledge of the Bible and St. Paul, he explained creation 
from both a Platonic and Christian point of view, especially regarding how the earth and 
heavens were formed. In interpreting the book of Genesis, Augustine admitted his 
confusion in deciding if his exegesis or those of other critics were correct, and he 
eventually questioned can’t all of these interpretations be truth if the believer so believes? 
Augustine wondered about the multiplicity and “diversity of truths” (271). Augustine 
suggested that there was “no single right interpretation” of the books of the Bible, or 
God’s word (259). He often prayed to God asking for some answers, hoping not to 
mislead others.  
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Augustine deplored those who disliked the “scriptures” and he also discussed the 
various versions of others’ interpretations. In Jewish and Christian tradition, Moses is 
said to be the author of the first five books of the Bible (the Pentateuch). Augustine 
explained others’ attempts to describe Moses’ intentions in Genesis in regard to the 
phrase ‘in the beginning God made heaven and earth.’ Augustine then illustrated in the 
Ten Axioms the multitude of variations on the interpretation of this line from Genesis 
(261). The point of this exercise was to show that there are so many versions, who can 
claim which was the correct or accurate explanation? Within these interpretations, can 
they all be the truth?  
Augustine was very concerned about deception and did not want to lecture to his 
flock with an incorrect understanding of the Bible. Yet, he understood, as stated earlier, 
that there were a multitude of understandings, especially with his first-hand knowledge of 
the Manichean faith and how they critiqued the Bible. Therefore, his self-doubt about the 
exegesis of the Bible shows Augustine’s humbleness. He knew there were many 
interpretations, yet, he was scared to offer what could be the wrong one. When reading 
Augustine, if you did not know whom the author was, you might think you were reading 
a contemporary text, as he describes the multiplicity of interpretations of author’s 
intentions. He is concerned with the various levels of meaning. 
Augustine suggested that the ability for Christians to understand their God and 
their faith was available to them because the metaphorical door was open. “Knock and 
the door will open,” a reference to the biblical verse in Matthew 7:7, suggested that it is 
more difficult to ask than for a person to give (Augustine 246), which is an echo of 
Cicero. Augustine was also curious about not only finding answers, but also in attempting 
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to understand the form in which one would perform this search. Time and form were very 
curious to Augustine, as he wrote extensively on these concepts.  
When he spoke of heaven and form—as in the forms that heaven and earth take, 
Augustine did not use time in an empirical sense, but as an extension of the mind 
(Ricoeur, Time, Vol. 1 15). Time is a phenomenological event for Augustine. Paul 
Ricoeur explained, “Augustine alone dares to allow that one might speak of a span of 
time—a day, an hour—without a cosmological reference” (Time, Vol. 1 15). Time is an 
extension of the mind. Augustine struggled to understand time, and time before time—
knowing these were phenomenological questions that were not answerable in the 
scientific sense.  
Augustine ends Book XII by saying that to seek God, and call upon God, is to 
believe God. God is there for anyone to claim. He also ends Book XIII, saying one can 
seek God, by searching for God’s door and God can open it. Augustine is searching for 
God in this confession, beginning and ending his text with the suggestion that God is 
there for anyone to find, and that God will open the door if asked to do so. The door is 
there for all, as God was there for Augustine, waiting. Once people are involved in the 
faith, they are going to have questions. However, as Dietrich Bonhoeffer suggested in the 
same vain as Augustine, “No question can penetrate behind God creating because it is 
impossible to go behind the beginning” (Creation and Fall 16). As Augustine questioned 
where to find God, he also questioned where to find the ethic within God. 
To perform an act with moral intention in the name of God is considered 
Augustine’s ethic (Book XIII). Augustine also discussed St. Paul and his communiqué 
with the Philippians. Paul was not concerned with seeking a gift but bearing a fruit—by 
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having the Philippians act well. If one acts in the appropriate manner, to one’s self and 
one’s neighbor, and “our heart is in it” then our treasure awaits us in heaven (Augustine 
287).  Augustine spoke of justice and injustices against other humans who should be 
shown mercy. Augustine was concerned with serving those oppressed and destitute. 
In explaining the trinity, Augustine said the father, son and Holy Spirit are above 
the earth, “borne above the waters” (277). Augustine referred to Acts 2:38, when the 
Holy Spirit is said to be a gift from God. “In your gift we find our rest. There are you our 
Joy. Our rest is our peace” (Augustine 278). Augustine discussed the trinity as analogous 
to three aspects of the self, “being, knowing, willing” (279). Augustine wrote of the 
Trinity, explaining that, “These three are inseparable yet distinct; they are one life, one 
mind and one essence” (279). The Holy Spirit, in particular for Augustine, was above 
(symbolically) so that his followers could metaphorically raise their hearts to God.  
This ability to give of one’s self to God is a gift from God—it is an option for all 
people. If one acts against injustice, treasure awaits that person in heaven. This is the 
Christian ethic for Augustine—to act morally in God’s name. By the outward signs God 
has given all to declare their faith (the bible, baptism, the ability to procreate) all can 
publicly, yet humbly, announce that they are, indeed, Christians. Therefore, what 
Augustine began eight centuries earlier, writing about his feelings found within a 
Christian world, Thomas Aquinas continued, but in an Aristotelian manner.  
Thomas Aquinas: Interpretation 
Thomas Aquinas, a native of Naples, Italy, was well educated and a nobleman. 
However, against his parents’ wishes, Aquinas became a friar in the Order of St. 
Dominic. “St. Thomas Aquinas synthesized Aristotelianism, Stoicism, and Christianity to 
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give the natural law its classic formulation” (Messerly 37). Alasdair MacIntyre explains 
the difference between Augustine and Aquinas in regard to God and avoiding earthly 
desires. Aquinas was concerned with how to live this life, now, and use those desires in a 
positive fashion for “moral ends” (MacIntyre, Short History 117). For Aquinas, it was the 
influence of Aristotle, and not Plato—as with Augustine, that spurred Aquinas’ work 
within Christianity. Aquinas was interested in the interpretation of Aristotelian 
philosophy for the Medieval Christian world.  
Natural law was Aquinas’ focus and his belief in original sin is a point where he 
was, obviously, differentiated from Aristotle. Aquinas believed in humanity “as it is,” not 
as it “ought to be” (MacIntyre, Short History 118). Aquinas looked for the good to be the 
natural end of achievement. In his text Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, as well as 
After Virtue, MacIntyre discusses the import of Thomas Aquinas in more detail than he 
does in Short History of Ethics.  
In chapter 13 of After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre explains that the problem in 
medieval society was, “how to educate and civilize human nature in a culture in which 
human life was in danger of being torn apart by the conflict of too many ideals, too many 
ways of life” (165). MacIntyre explains that contrary to the universal feel given to the 
Middle Ages, life was a mix of many differing cultures, based throughout the West. 
Therefore, twelfth-century life was concerned with the question as to how to combine 
Christian living within one’s daily life, using the virtues.  
Medieval thinking [. . .] marked a genuine advance in the tradition of 
moral theory and practice [. . .] the medieval stage in that tradition was in 
a strong sense Aristotelian, and not only in its Christian versions. When 
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Maimonides encountered the question as to why God in the Torah had 
instituted so many holidays, he replied that it was because holidays 
provide opportunities for the making and growth of friendship and that 
Aristotle has pointed out that the virtue of friendship is the bond of human 
community. It is this linking of a biblical historical perspective with an 
Aristotelian one in the treatment of the virtues which is the unique 
achievement of the Middle Ages in Jewish and Islamic terms as well as in 
Christian. (MacIntyre, After Virtue 180) 
The philosophy of Homer, Plato and Aristotle received a new academic vigor and there 
was a renewal of their teachings in the Middle Ages, from the time of Augustine through 
to Aquinas.   
The transition from heroic to what became known as Medieval Society was 
witness to the Christianization of ancient Greek stories. So, for example, a “pagan 
warrior” was now a “Christian Knight” MacIntyre, After Virtue 166). There was a 
definite relationship between pagan and Christian virtues around the beginning of the 
thirteenth century. Virtues that had been the basis of medieval life, justice being one of 
them, were being replaced with Christian virtues. What had been a necessity in Homeric 
terms—loyalty and courage to fight the aggressors, were embraced again in this medieval 
world.  
For the Middle Ages, Alasdair MacIntyre suggests that the “arena” of morality 
was the will, and character was simply a component of deciding what may or may not 
influence that will (After Virtue 168). With Christianity’s recognition of sin, decisions 
were made based on whether or not one was concerned about breaking or not breaking a 
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commandment of God. Did one have the will not to break the law? Was one too weak 
and not able to turn away from sin? The question then for daily living was how this 
Christianity, and the morality found within it, affected the politics of the society. 
Institutions that would eventually teach this philosophy were yet to be created. MacIntyre 
explains that there was a lot of “behavior” to be put in a little bit of “culture” (After 
Virtue 171). It was within the conflict between the religious and the public that 
MacIntyre suggests morality would take on its meaning in the Middle Ages.  
The question of how to live in this world remained for the Christians, before one 
went to the next (after) life. They were concerned with the doing of life. Roles were 
important within the community and family. The difference between the ancient and the 
medieval life was that Christians saw their role as being used by members of this world 
and a heavenly body as well, an “eternal community in which I also have a role” 
(MacIntyre, After Virtue 172). Another way of living within the context of a Christian 
life included the act of charity.  
Because of the act of forgiveness and reconciliation in the culture of the Bible, 
there was a new conception of love even for those who sin. The difference in 800 years, 
MacIntyre suggests, was that Aristotle did not know charity in this way (After Virtue 
173-4). Having written many texts, the choice of Aquinas’ investigation of Aristotle’s 
work in the Nicomachean Ethics will be valuable to this work, as it combines Aristotle’s 
view on ethics with a Christian bias brought to the work of the ancient philosopher by 
Aquinas.   
Aquinas wrote a Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in which 
Aquinas worked line-by-line and commented on the original Aristotelian text on ethics. 
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Aquinas created a table of virtues in “an exhaustive and classificatory scheme” 
(MacIntyre, After Virtue 178). The following is a short description of how Aquinas 
interpreted the metaphors found within Aristotle’s ethical system for his modern day 
Christian way of life. 
Aquinas’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 
Writing in the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas wrote a Commentary on 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. The Scholastic writers and scholars, as they were known 
in the late Middle Ages, discussed theology in terms of philosophical ethics and 
Aristotelianism.  In discussing Aristotelianism, Aquinas agreed that happiness is the 
ultimate good for all people. Happiness could be attained in this life, via activities and the 
arts. Happiness is an “activity flowing from virtue,” the “supreme human good” (Aquinas 
15). Though people desire honor to prove to themselves their capabilities, one cannot find 
happiness in honor; and happiness is not honor (Aquinas 22). The good sought by people 
varies by activity and/or art (Aquinas 36). In all activities, people seek a good that 
Aquinas described as “This ultimate end of man is called that human good which is 
happiness” (36). This end must be “perfect” and “self sufficient” (Aquinas 36). This type 
of happiness can only be defined for this life, because for Aquinas, happiness in the 
afterlife is “beyond investigation” (Aquinas 38).  
Aquinas explained that the persistent desire to continuously search to do good is 
what is important to Aristotle (43). One act of goodness does not fulfill the search; it is a 
continuous process, as Aquinas explained, “The sight of a single swallow or one clear 
day does not prove that spring is here, so a single good deed is not enough to make a man 
happy” (Aquinas 43). Happiness is a “virtue-oriented activity proper to man in a 
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complete life” (Aquinas 43). Happiness is divine and sent to us by God (Aquinas 56). 
Because happiness is the teleological reward for virtue, Aquinas suggested that man 
should aim to be happy because it would please God.  
Thomas Aquinas explained that “moral philosophy is divided into three parts”: 
individual (monastic) ethics, which would be considered one’s own personal ethics; 
domestic ethics that are concerned with family relationships, for instance; and political 
science which are ethics ascribed to the community, such as civic ethics (3). Aristotle 
suggested that political science is the most important science, as it is the most 
architectonic and concerned with systematizing (Aquinas 9). Within political science, 
systems can be developed. Political science is concerned with virtue attainment (Aquinas 
74). Therefore, all other skills fall under political science, “strategy, domestic economy 
and rhetoric” (Aquinas 10).  
For Aquinas, there were two principles of human acts. The first principle was 
intellect/reason—sciences that included both speculative intellect, such as teaching 
science and practical intellect, like art. The second principle was appetite, including 
choices made and how they are executed. All of this is concerned with a good as the 
telos, “for truth is the end of speculation” (Aquinas 3). These ends could be either a 
product or an activity (for example, medicine leads to health (product) where practicing 
gymnastics leads to a performance (activity). Aquinas explained a teleological end for 
humans, in that “human life or activity has some good end which is supreme” (7). 
Aquinas further explained the importance of theology for the ethical man: “The study of 
the ultimate end of the whole universe is considered in theology” and is contemplated in 
political science (10). 
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Aristotle taught that youth need maturity before they can speak on a topic, for 
example, to a crowd. Aristotle discussed a young student’s need for maturity while 
studying because a young man will have more emotion and less experience than his 
instructor will. One can study ethics, but that student must live a life before 
understanding political science (Aquinas 11). Young men and women need to recognize 
that they may be guided by their passions instead of the wisdom that can be learned 
through years of education and witnessing of their elders.  
Aquinas goes on to explain that passions can take over in the man searching for 
knowledge but will unfortunately “study this science in vain” (Aquinas 13; see also 18). 
Therefore, the student needs to act. Studying is not the end, but action is—that is action 
without faltering toward passions. Usually the young person does not realize this. In the 
pursuit of happiness, young men and women need to listen and learn from the wisdom of 
their mature teachers. There are many goods that can be pursued, one of which can be 
truthful dialogue within a relationship. For humans, relationships are incredibly important 
to the work of communication ethics because it is within relationships that one finds the 
quality of life that can lead to happiness. 
 Aquinas explained that Aristotle discussed the need for truth over friendships 
because, in the end, “he is the greater friend for whom we ought to have the greater 
consideration” (Aquinas 25). Though Aristotle agreed with Plato that truth is the higher 
friend, he disagreed with Plato about there being one “common idea of good” (Aquinas 
25). Aquinas said, “Truth is a divine thing, for it is found first and chiefly in God” (25). 
So being truthful, though it may harm the friendship, is more appreciated than lying to 
save a friendship for Aquinas.  
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In discussing moral virtue in general, Aquinas explained that a virtue should be 
chosen from the mean as recommended by Aristotle, (not in excess or deficit) and 
accomplished through action. Eventually, through habit, actions become virtues. For 
Aristotle, there were two kinds of virtues. First, there are intellectual virtues that are 
learned from teaching, rather than discovery. Aquinas said, “More people can know the 
truth by learning from others than by ascertaining it themselves” (84). Second, there are 
moral virtues that can become habitual through practice, from “customary activity” 
(Aquinas 84).  
However, Aquinas cautioned that these habits are not produced from nature (85). 
The principle act of virtue is choice (Aquinas 108). Aristotle speaks of virtues in Lecture 
VIII of the Nicomachean Ethics in terms of applicability and not just as universals. 
Aquinas explained why the need for applying these virtues is an effective activity, by 
suggesting that, “particulars are understood to the extent that the universal is verified in 
them” (111-2). 
For Aristotle, Aquinas explained that the “concerns” within political science and 
other public activities are either pleasurable or sorrowful and the person who “uses these 
well” will be virtuous, but if he uses them “badly he will be evil” (94). Based on the 
passions, activities become habits for people, both good and evil habits, however. 
Aristotle’s golden mean is famous and commonly known, as it explains that when 
activities are done in “excess or deficit,” a bad habit may be established, but “if done with 
moderation” then one will have done well (Aquinas 101). Aquinas explained that one is 
seen as good if one acts virtuous, evil if one succumbs to vices (101). Virtue need to be 
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found from among the mean then, not in excess or deficit and “the mean is not the same 
for all” (Aquinas 105). However, means are relative.  
Aquinas explained that it is difficult to find a mean, yet easy to deviate from it 
(124). Aquinas amplified the example given by Aristotle, that only a person who is an 
expert, or knows the answer can find a center of a circle. Aquinas explained that a 
geometry expert can find the center of a circle, but it is very easy for others to deviate 
from that center. Aquinas gave an excellent example of how difficult it is to find the 
middle. Many can be easily swayed one way or the other, and sometimes, in excess either 
way. It is not natural to be virtuous, but rather, acting virtuous needs to be placed into 
practice and become habitual. Therefore, what one aims for is not the natural, and is 
difficult to attain. If it were easy to be virtuous, more would be so. 
In his discussion on voluntary actions, fortitude and temperance, Aristotle 
suggested that one needs to have the right reasons for action. Aquinas explained that how 
we choose to act, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, is based on our knowledge. We 
can be brave and have fortitude or we can choose to act with intemperance. Aquinas 
explained why Aristotle worked with involuntary actions before voluntary: “The 
involuntary proceeds from a simple cause, as ignorance alone, or violence alone, but the 
voluntary has to take place by the concurrence of many factors. [. . .] It is a privation of 
the voluntary” (Aquinas 128). Therefore, it is difficult to act voluntarily and easier to act 
upon impulse and ignore the right reasoning.  
An action can be involuntary in two ways—first, because of violence, the good 
cannot be seen, and the appetite is not encouraged to power. Second, because of 
“ignorance” mental awareness is excluded (Aquinas 28). Aquinas suggested that a person 
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should not be blamed for acting out of ignorance (135). Repentance should be associated 
with this type of behavior (Aquinas 39). Voluntary actions are actions that occur out of 
knowledge of the agent (Aquinas 140). One makes a choice as to the appropriate 
voluntary course of action to take, based on what is within his or her grasp/reach. Choices 
can occur without passion but they should occur by reason (Aquinas 145). People can use 
counsel and receive advice from others in determining appropriate choice. Counsel 
should be used wisely, however, and not be used in obvious situations, but rather when 
one is confused about how to determine a decision (Aquinas 153).  
Aristotle taught much about refraining from unnecessary actions, which can 
include learning to avoid unnecessary speech actions. His was a guiding wisdom, a 
practical wisdom that is very useful in rhetoric and communication. To stay the course 
and choose the mean is excellent advice for modern-day communication ethics. 
Augustine established his dialogue with his God in the form of a confession. He 
was searching for an understanding of how to lead the people of his Church who were 
also trying to follow the same God. Through a love of God, Augustine taught that one 
could act justly and only within the city of God could the city of the faithful survive. 
Attempting to find God, while here on earth, would allow for action within a faith story. 
For Medieval Christianity, the notion of where people are looking for the good of 
antiquity shifted form the polis to the Church. The way that good was being engaged was 
now different.  
Aquinas was concerned with the education of youth so they would act only once 
they were mature enough to know the difference between the virtues and the vices. 
Thinking before acting, voluntarily acting based on counsel, is what Aquinas taught as 
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the ethical action, the praxis of doing. Teaching at the end of medieval times, Aquinas 
was on the cusp of a rhetorical interruption that would end the dominance of the Christian 
worldview in the West. Aquinas believed, as did Aristotle, that study had to be done in 
tandem with action and be guided with wisdom. His was a faith question that Aquinas 
found answers to by exploring the virtuous person acting toward a notion of the good 
within the Christian Church.  
The Ongoing Conversation 
In addition to Alasdair MacIntyre, other modern scholars have suggested that 
Augustine and Aquinas are two notable religious philosophers of the long history of the 
Medieval period to be reviewed. Jacques Le Goff and John Herman Randall, Jr. both 
suggest that Augustine and Aquinas are important contributors to the conversation of the 
Middle Ages. Known for writing about the history of mentalities (Le Goff 3), Le Goff 
suggests that Aquinas was the most “celebrated Dominican” (Medieval 87). Randall, Jr. 
who writes on the history of ideas (5), posits that the Middle Ages, “within the limits of 
the West was able to rise to the ideal of a untied Christendom, and bring all mankind 
within the scope of its aim” (102-103). There was little differentiation over the vastness 
of Europe, as most states had the same culture, agriculture and the Church, a very 
uniform way of life (Randall, Jr. 103), but, they all had different languages. One of the 
more critical issues for uniting such a large region was the commonality of the Latin text 
since most villages had their own dialects and no national language. As long as people 
could communicate, there was an understanding amongst vast regions of land.  
In understanding the mentality of the culture and education during these long 
years of Christianity, John Haldane points to the issue of who was teaching the 
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philosophy of the times. Much of the education after the fall of Rome was pushed from 
the cities and into the outskirts of the countryside, where monasteries were located, to 
educate the men of various religious orders, including Franciscans and Dominicans, such 
as Thomas Aquinas. Haldane exerts that the education was very concerned with 
“preserving the culture of the past” (139). For hundreds of years, then, the writings of 
Plato, Aristotle and Augustine, among others, continued to prevail, but within the 
confines of monastic life.  
In the introduction to their edited edition of Aquinas’ On Law, Morality, and 
Politics, William P. Baumgarth and Richard J. Regan, S.J. suggest that Aquinas was 
controversial in his day, attempting to emphasize Neo-Aristotelianism within his own 
philosophy. Baumgarth and Regan also agree that it is imperative to understand the 
questions brought forth during the time of Aquinas’ writing, in order to appreciate the 
“debate in light of the philosophical and theological traditions that informed his thinking” 
(xiii). They further explain that until Aquinas began teaching, Christians had accepted the 
Neo-Platonic context in which to view their theology, “Aristotle presented to Western 
Christians a view which, unlike that of the Neo-Platonists, fully accepted the reality of 
the visible world and sought to understand it as such” (Baumgarth and Regan xv).  
Aquinas brought Aristotle to the Christians in a new and dynamic way. 
In regard to Aquinas, John G. Messerly explains action and reason: “For Thomas, 
action in accordance with human nature fulfills God’s eternal plan and Scripture’s 
commandments; thus, the natural law is God’s law known to human reason” (37).  
Following the commandments is not the law of the land, but the law of the heavens for 
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those on earth—the heaven where Christians are taught they will spend their lives 
eternally.  
The natural law that Aquinas discusses has its roots in the Ten Commandments, 
but is developed through one’s conscience that Augustine wrote about at the beginning of 
the Middle Ages.  
This is the idea of moral purification as resulting in a ‘flight of the soul’ 
away from the world. [. . .] According to Augustine, God endows each 
man with a conscience whereby he may know the moral law. However, 
this knowledge is not sufficient for virtue, which requires that the will 
should also be turned towards the good. [. . .] love draws a soul to God.  
[. . .] so the movement effected by grace becomes a flight of the soul away 
from the world. (Haldane 135-136). 
Augustine set God in heaven above the earth, so Christians were expected to strive for 
that ultimate goal in heaven, a space above and not of this earth. However, Aquinas’ view 
of rational thought was based in logical thinking, using reasoning to conduct daily living 
(Haldane 141).   
Jack Russell Weinstein explains how the dominant narrative of Christianity in the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries excluded others from the discussion, as the religious 
doctrine was so dominant, but,  
This is not to say that Classical philosophy was ignored completely. St. 
Augustine of Hippo, in the late fourth and the fifth centuries, based his 
philosophical systems on a Platonic interpretation of Christianity and [. . .] 
in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Aquinas, filtered Christianity 
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through Aristotle’s work. Nevertheless, European intellectual inquiry was 
limited to the most orthodox of Christian presuppositions. (18-19) 
Within the late Middle Ages, one could find cloisters of men living a monastic life in the 
countryside, where it was difficult to spread the word of Christianity. However, the 
conventional philosophers were able to lecture to the Christians through the Churches. 
Both Augustine and Aquinas ministered to the people of God and taught them and 
or lectured to them about their common faith. Ken Andersen explains the prevalence of 
homiletics during the Medieval period as it relates to ethical communication: 
Writers on homiletics assumed, not only a moral character, but also a 
knowledge of the good by the preacher. Hence, ethical knowledge and 
practice were assumed for the most part. Speaking in the name of, and 
inspired by, God removed many of the burdens of developing an extended 
treatment of ethical communication. (8-9) 
Deference was given to the clergy during this time period, due to the universal opinion 
that the clergy was blessed by God to preach to the community. Therefore, the setting 
was particular and local, as the clergy worked within communities of believers. 
The rhetorical interruption that birthed a Christian Augustine was the rise of the 
teachings of the traditions of the Christians after the death of Jesus Christ. St. Paul and 
the New Testament were now sources of knowledge that the Christians had in their hands 
to teach the masses. Therefore, the turn began around the third and fourth centuries A.D.  
The fragmented social life of the Christians of the West was incredible during the 
time immediately following Augustine’s death through to the thirteenth century, as 
various invaders came into the Roman Empire from all fronts. This rhetorical interruption 
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saw a type of education that was contained in encyclopedias and summaries of 
knowledge. It was not until the end of the Middle Ages that there were scholars educated 
enough to critique Augustine and the other founders of the Church. It was not until the 
thirteenth century that a work of this magnitude, such was that of Thomas Aquinas, was 
able to be as prolific and accepted as Augustine’s writings and work.  
 A new addition to the Christian religious rhetoric was in the form and conception 
of the devil, which Jacques Le Goff suggests was a creation of the Middle Ages and 
really asserted itself in the ninth century (Medieval 160). The devil was to be the opposite 
of the “Good God” and the “struggle between them served to explain all the detail of 
events to medieval man” (Le Goff, Medieval 160). The devil was shown in two outward 
appearances, one as a seducer and the other as persecutor (Le Goff, Medieval 161). It was 
Dante who used the image of the devil and hell to posit his idea of the after life for those 
who did not follow the rules of the Church.  
 On the cusp of the thirteenth century, Dante was witness to many political 
changes in the papacy of which he was mortified. In the previous hundred years, there 
had been a constant struggle between the leadership of the Pope and the monarchs 
throughout Europe. The divisiveness came to a culmination of force when Pope Boniface 
claimed to be the superior leader of Christendom and that included dominance over civil 
leaders who, the Pope suggested, had to respect papal authority as the ultimate authority. 
Dante was incredulous at this move by the Pope and “perceived that the events at Anagni 
were a momentous turning point in the history of civilization,” for it was at Anagni that 
the Pope prepared the paperwork for the excommunication of the King of France (Cantor, 
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The Civilization 496). Dante was in favor of a combined rule of civil and religious 
leaders, not one dominating over the other. 
 The King of France was so infuriated that he had the Pope taken into custody. 
Boniface’s family was able to retrieve him from France, but he died shortly thereafter. 
The French cardinals had taken on greater influence in the Church and were able to elect 
a French archbishop as the next Pope who took the name Clement V. The shocking issue 
was that Clement decided to live outside of Rome, in Avignon, where the papacy stayed 
for the next 70 years (Cantor, The Civilization 495-496). 
 Compared to the beginning of Christian evangelization, the other end of the 
rhetorical interruption spectrum held the finale of Christianity’s dominance when Martin 
Luther hung his 95 Theses on the door of a German church. “This marked the end of 
Catholic exclusivity and the beginning of the Protestant Reformation” (Weinstein 19). 
This occurred almost 300 years after the death of Thomas Aquinas, but it also followed 
more than 1,000 years of Christian dominance. John Herman Randall, Jr., explains the 
significance of both the Reformation and the Renaissance on the Medieval world. He 
suggests that though these time periods were important for the demise of the Middle 
Ages, and explains that science and “the growth of the economic base of European 
society” had even a more fundamental role in ushering in the end of these dark times 
(163-164).  
 Augustine’s relevance for today is his form of critique. It was not dogmatic or 
deconstructive but incredibly constructive as he listened to what others had to say in a 
humble and respectful manner. Not to patronize the speaker/critic, Augustine was 
searching for clarity. He could not find answers to his religious questions in the form of 
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the Manichean religion. In the middle of his life, Augustine was converted to 
Christianity. Through prayer, Augustine confessed to his God that he had faults, but he 
also, in that confession, praised God. His prayer was a deep thought process in which he 
was very particular in his choice of words. He searched and found his place within the 
context of the Christian Church. Calvin L. Troup explains Augustine’s import for today: 
“If interdisciplinary study is not merely postmodernist fashion, but rather has become a 
necessity for negotiating the realties of postmodern life, I trust that Augustine might 
become as essential a guide [. . .]” (xi). 
Aquinas illuminated Aristotelian virtues that can be used in today’s postmodern 
world. Edward A. Synan’s edited edition of the lectures of Ignatius Eschmann, a 
professor of philosophy at the University of Toronto in the mid-twentieth century, 
provides a critique of Aquinas’ work concerning his Christian ethics. Synan explains as 
the editor of these lectures how Eschmann lectured on the “moral doctrine, proposed by 
Saint Thomas in the thirteenth century that can be read with penetration and profit as the 
twentieth century gives way to the twenty-first” (vii). Aquinas agreed with Aristotle that a 
teleological pursuit of the good is necessary for the virtuous life. Aquinas discussed 
choice making that is as relevant today as it was 800 years ago. Making choices work for 
current day is important, as the faith is lived out in daily doing.  
But, what would a non-virtuous life look like? How would that person be judged? 
How would a virtuous person spend eternity? What would ultimate damnation look like 
compared to a heavenly reward? Dante Alighieri attempted to answer those questions 
through the form of his epic poem explaining a detailed experience of a trip to hell, 
purgatory and heaven, in the Divine Comedy.  
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Historicity—Dante 
The Divine Comedy is a novel/comedy/poem written by Dante Alighieri (1265-
1321) that offers a glimpse into the history of late medieval times, specifically in Italy, 
focusing on the papal leadership. Born in Florence to a family of “modest social 
standing,” Dante was able to pursue an education and enter the life of poetry and politics 
in a thriving city (Cantor and Klein, Renaissance Thought 7). For over two centuries, the 
city blossomed as it served as the middle merchant area, especially known for the textile 
industry, between east and west (Cantor and Klein, Renaissance Thought 2-7). Dante 
served the city as priorate but war was looming. Because Dante was accused of “graft, 
embezzlement, opposition to the Pope and disturbance of the peace of Florence” he was 
exiled from the city he loved (Cantor and Klein, Renaissance Thought 8). It was while 
spending that time in exile that Dante composed the Divine Comedy. Dante’s works 
acted as a summation of the Medieval time period as Europe entered the time now known 
as the early Renaissance. 
Another of Dante’s political written works is De Monarchia, an explanation of 
why the Pope and the emperor should be two separate men/positions of authority. For 
Dante, the authority to rule the empire derives directly from Christ, and not from the 
papacy (De Monarchia as found in Cantor and Klein, Renaissance Thought 89-105). 
Joseph A. Mazzeo explains that Dante’s Divine Comedy should be read from a historical 
point of view. “We must come to the poem with our awareness heightened by a study of 
Medieval culture, [. . .]. The Architecture of the poem is not governed by exclusively 
literary theories of allegory, but by principles of medieval scholastic realism which state a 
real analogy between God and His creatures” (6-7). Understanding the landscape of the 
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Middle Ages is important for a comprehension of the metaphors found in the world of 
Dante.  
Etienne Gilson suggests that through the Divine Comedy, Dante asked the various 
leaders of the Church and empire to act justly and to cooperate, as justice is the highest 
virtue (192-193). Betrayal is what Dante considered the gravest of sins. Whether a man 
betray the emperor or the Pope betray the Church, leadership itself is betrayed and the 
betrayal is considered a traitorous action. Therefore, loyalty is what Dante espoused most 
(Gilson 194). Dante wrote in the Italian vernacular, and not the common and universal 
Latin of the Church, another metaphor for his spiteful ill will toward the Church and the 
political regimes of his Medieval world. 
Historical Engagement—Inferno 
Dante’s Divine Comedy is considered an epic poem, for many reasons, including its 
literary content as well as the fluidity with which it is able to be read. It is an epic in 
grand proportion because it speaks in a poetic fashion, on the Christian as well as 
political community of the high Middle Ages.  
For, to a greater or lesser extent, the term epic refers to a quality the poem 
creates that it is in some way exploring or celebrating something much 
larger than the particular characters and places it describes: it is bringing 
before us, to put the matter very simply, a world view, a sense of cultural 
completeness, so that as we move through the work, we experience the 
exploration of some big questions about individual and social purpose, 
about a system of belief, often about the past traditions and future 
prospects, about the major things which we use to define a culture. The 
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breadth of the epic brings before us a comprehensive picture of an entire 
culture in a way that an ordinary narrative, no matter how exciting, does 
not. (Johnston 1) 
Johnston explains the importance of an epic and that after hundreds of years, the reading 
of Dante’s Divine Comedy continues to be part of most canons of English or Rhetoric, a 
testament to its import. 
The Divine Comedy is a poem divided into three equal books, the Inferno, 
Purgatorio and Paradisio. Because of the length and magnitude of the Divine Comedy, 
the idea of Paul Ricoeur’s “part” and “whole” (Time, Vol. 3 29, 153) will be used in that 
the theme of the book as a whole will be quickly explained, but, this chapter will 
specifically focus on the individual part of the Inferno. This significant ingredient of the 
Divine Comedy represents not only Dante’s work, but also his response to Medieval 
Europe, the politics and the religion that surrounded him daily. While Dante was in exile 
from Florence, he wrote the Divine Comedy, and set the Inferno in the year 1300 (N. 
Pinsky 306). Dante was exiled because of his writings against the political establishment.  
The opening of the Divine Comedy begins with the first book, the Inferno, which 
leads the narrator, “the Pilgrim,” who is Dante, the writer, into hell. The Pilgrim’s leader 
throughout his visit is the poet Virgil. Unfortunately for Virgil, he is banished to hell 
because he was born and died precisely before the coming of Jesus Christ, and thus is 
found in the first circle with the other non-Christians. Throughout the following 
discussion of all of the cantos, metaphors will emerge, which will be discussed at the end 
of this outline of all 34 cantos.  
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Canto I: Beastly animals met The Pilgrim, keeping him out of hell, scaring him 
backward. The Pilgrim came upon Virgil, the classical Latin poet born in Rome. Once the 
Pilgrim realized who Virgil was, he offered Virgil praise and wondered aloud why Virgil 
was there in hell. Virgil pointed all around him and stated that those surrounding him 
were “tormented spirits” (Dante 7). The Pilgrim asked Virgil to assist him on his path 
through hell. In her notes to the novel, Nicole Pinsky suggests that Dante chooses Virgil 
as the guide because he is the premier poet and “an embodiment of art and human reason, 
exemplifying the best that can be attained without the benefit of Christian revelation” 
(307). Dante questioned from the beginning how Virgil could be in hell when his poetry 
and his life were exemplary, just because his fate was to live before Jesus Christ came to 
earth.  
Canto II: The Pilgrim asked Virgil how he knew the Pilgrim needed his 
assistance. Virgil explained that Beatrice had sent him. From the beginning, and 
throughout, Beatrice is always described as beautiful. Beatrice was watching over the 
Pilgrim from Heaven. Virgil explained to the Pilgrim’s relief that Beatrice “cannot feel 
what you suffer” (Dante 15). It is well known that in real life Dante was in love with a 
young woman who was his neighbor, named Beatrice. Beatrice had died at the age of 24. 
The Pilgrim pointed out at the end of this canto that he would allow Virgil to guide him 
and be his mentor and thus, “share one will” (Dante 17). The will of man is a reoccurring 
theme throughout the Inferno.  
Canto III: The Pilgrim read the famous sign at the entry of hell, suggesting those 
who enter should “Abandon all hope” (Dante 19). The inscription at the entrance 
confused the Pilgrim, and Virgil explained that the Pilgrim should leave his fears behind, 
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as Virgil would guide them through. The first types of sinners they come upon were 
cowards. Men and women who were damned to not being able to make up their minds 
were those who wavered in their decision making while on earth. In this canto, the reader 
sees the first forms of retribution, a type of eternal penance these souls had to face in hell. 
The punishment is always an exaggerated form of their sin or an endless recreation or 
reenactment of their sinful earthly action.     
Canto IV: The reader is introduced to the first of the nine concentric, funnel-like 
circles that comprised hell. Non-Christians were sent to this first circle if they had lived 
and died before the coming of Jesus Christ. It was explained that upon the rising of 
Christ, he did come down to hell and called upon the prophets, such as Moses, as well as 
philosophers, such as Homer and Plato, to join him in heaven. Such was the Christian 
doctrine of the thirteenth century, which taught that Jesus Christ did descend to hell to 
retrieve the prophets.   
Canto V: In this second circle of hell, people were banished here who had fallen 
victim to the desire of “carnal things” while alive on earth. These were people who loved 
when societal rules told them they should not (such as lovers who were married to 
others). Ancient figures, such as Cleopatra and Helen of Troy, were in this circle. The 
Pilgrim asked those in this circle how this happened to them, and their reply was that they 
had read Lancelot. In his explanation of the Inferno, John Freccero explains the story of 
the lovers, suggesting that they were not seduced by love, but by the “book and author” 
(313).  
Canto VI: Entering the third circle, the Pilgrim met Ciacco who explained about 
the division of the city, which Nicole Pinsky suggests is representative of Florence 
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warring between two political factions, of which Dante was on the losing side and why he 
was exiled from Florence (315).  
Canto VII: This canto explained the fourth circle where those who squandered or 
hoarded money while on earth were sent to their eternal damnation. These people were 
forced to constantly strike each other and bang into each other’s heads, with “fist closed,” 
representing their tight hold on their money (Dante 55).  
Canto VIII: In the fifth circle, the Pilgrim and Virgil were aboard a boat, 
attempting to pass, but the wrathful did not allow them admittance. Dante names an 
adversary in this canto, suggesting that Filippo Argenti was found in this circle.  
Cantos IX and X: These cantos discussed the sixth circle, where a new man 
opened the gate for them, but he was a heretic. The Greek mythical character Medusa 
was there, who could kill with her looks. Virgil warned the Pilgrim to cover his eyes. 
There were rows of sepulchers with bodies in them. Heretics were located on the edge of 
the city. The Pilgrim referred to the heretics as Epicureans, who, in Medieval times, 
believed that the soul died with the body. During the Middle Ages, the sin of heresy was 
thought to be a sin of reason, not of will (Freccero 319).  
Canto XI: Still in the sixth circle, Virgil and the Pilgrim could smell a putrid 
stench and took a break to get used to the odor. While resting, Virgil took the moment to 
explain that there were three rings within this seventh circle ahead. First, there was 
violence/sin on neighbor; second, sin on self; and third, violence on deity or nature. The 
less wrathful was the first, and therefore, different sins were accorded distinctive and 
various punishments. 
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Canto XII: Throughout the seventh circle that the poets had entered, Virgil and 
the Pilgrim came upon various rulers (real life names) that Dante knew during the 
fourteenth century. These men, now in hell, had killed members of their own family to 
obtain power (N. Pinsky 324). Therefore, crime against one’s neighbor was the sin.  
Canto XIII & XIV: In Canto XII, Dante explained that the travelers saw people 
who committed suicide, a sin on the self. Dante and Virgil were in the seventh circle and 
found themselves talking to dead tree branches and bushes, whose limbs (branches) bled 
if broken. These people committed suicide on earth, and in doing so, destroyed their souls 
as well. Between the second and third rings of the seventh circle, water came down from 
the real world to form rain. Those who were “violent to God” resided in this ring (N. 
Pinsky 326). 
Cantos XV & XVI: The Pilgrim spoke with Bruentto Latini, who in real life was 
a mentor to Dante. In hell, Latini was in the section with the sodomites. Nicole Pinsky 
explains that Latini may have been a homosexual in real life, thus the oddity of Dante 
suggesting his own mentor was such (329). Pinsky points to the irony of Dante, using the 
name of his mentor as a sodomite, yet the Pilgrim has great pity for Latini and wishes 
above all else for Latini to be free from hell. It is also noted that there are clerics and 
other religious men in hell for this Medieval Christian sin of sodomy. The Pilgrim began 
to look down into the eighth circle, a long drop below. 
Canto XVII & XVIII: In this canto, the Pilgrim explains the decorations of the 
shades he saw. They had colorful purses, some adorned with crests upon their necks. 
These people committed usury and fraud while on earth. The Pilgrim and Virgil then 
climbed on the shoulders of a monster with a human man’s face and flew a terrifying 
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flight down to the eighth circle. The Pilgrim notices people who committed fraud and 
those who seduced others.  
Canto XIX: The Pilgrim came upon people who committed the sin of simony, 
“which derives its name from Simon Magus: they used the Church and its offices 
fraudulently, for money and power” (N. Pinsky 332). Therefore, the Pilgrim finds three 
Popes in this canto; all men who Dante felt betrayed the Church and used the Church for 
their own advantage, including Boniface VIII, Nicolas III and Clement V, all Popes from 
the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.  
Cantos XX: The Pilgrim was shocked to see shades whose bodies were so 
grotesque because their heads were turned around backwards so that their backs were 
now their chests. He wept at the look of them, but the Pilgrim determined that it was 
because these people attempted to look forward and interpret the future. They had been 
women who were fortunetellers or men who were astrologers, and they were given the 
punishment of looking backward forever. 
Cantos XXI and XXII: These cantos have the Pilgrim meeting the damned who 
had used their political positions while alive on earth and sold other public offices. 
Robert Pinsky explains that this particular crime of the “barraters” is one of the 
accusations that faced Dante when he was exiled from Florence in the late thirteenth 
century (335).  
Canto XXIII: The Pilgrim and Virgil come upon a few different men of various 
religious orders, including Franciscan Friars, Benedictines and Jovial Friars, who were in 
thirteenth century Europe, the “Knights of the Blessed Virgin Mary.” Nicole Pinsky 
explains that even though their mission was to help women and children who were 
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orphaned they were known as jovial for living lives of luxury (337-338). These are the 
hypocrites that lived in the eighth circle, having committed the sins of fraud.  
Canto XXIV: Thieves were found in this canto, having to live naked, with arms 
tied behind their backs and with no way to escape the serpents at their feet. The thieves 
included Vanni Fucci, who the Pilgrim meets in this canto. Fucci explained that another 
man was accused of the crime, but the Pilgrim should have pity on Fucci, as he was the 
thief. Nicole Pinsky explains that in the thirteenth century another man was wrongly 
accused and sentenced to death before Fucci was convicted, but Fucci had escaped in real 
life (338-339).  
Canto XXV: This canto is an erotic, grotesque explanation of a horrible mutating 
monster that Robert Pinsky compares to those poets before Dante, as Canto XXV is a 
“blend of sexual transformation, quasi-scientific detail and subjective moral corruption 
associated with Horror. Dante’s difference from his classical predecessors seems to be 
related, as he implies, to Christian ideas of form, nature and substance” (340). The detail 
in this canto is indeed, horrific and shows these people—the sinners in hell—are truly the 
monsters they become. Dante also creates characters for a few real-life thieves, not hiding 
them behind character names, but instead using their actual names. This type of public 
shame is in addition to the punishment they already received.  
Canto XXVI and XXVII: The Pilgrim and Virgil came upon Ulysses, (the 
ancient Homeric character, who was actually Odysseus in the Iliad and the Odyssey) and 
asked him how he came to his death. Ulysses explained that he was not saved at sea (as 
Homer would have had his readers believe about Odysseus), but met his death in the 
raging waters. John Freccero suggests that Dante changed the “happy” ending because 
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“no one could survive such a journey on one’s own” (342). Freccero goes on to explain 
the different types of rhetorical styles in comparing and contrasting the ancient Greeks’ 
style, and Virgil’s writing style versus Dante’s.  
John Freccero explains how Virgil’s dialogue in Canto XXVI is different from 
that of Dante, as the men speak in an ancient style that was suitable for such superior 
discussions, where Dante used the rhetorical style of the Christians: 
This is a matter not of language but of the rhetoric, the ancients considered 
appropriate for the discussion of lofty themes. In the Gospels, Christ 
established a new Christian rhetoric by speaking of the loftiest matters in 
the humblest idiom. When Dante speaks of Virgil’s poem as tragedy and 
his own as comedy, he means that his poem is written in the humble 
speech of sacred Scripture. (342) 
Dante wrote for his time, the Scholasticism of the Italian Theistic society. In Canto 
XXVII, Virgil and the Pilgrim had politically charged discussions with Ulysses and 
families who had committed usury. These people charged more than the legal or usual 
amount of interest on loaned money, and therefore, abused their status or official business 
standing within the society. 
Canto XXVIII: In this canto, retribution was visualized in excruciatingly horrific 
detail. Those men who took part in or encouraged schisms from the Christian Church 
while alive were now in hell, cut in half (schism!) from head to toe. While the men were 
mourning and suffering from their wounds, they walked along a circle and they were 
again cut in half by the devil. The retribution was an attempt to punish in type, form and 
meaning of the crime committed.  
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Canto XXIX and XXX: Entering the ninth and final circle, Virgil asked the 
Pilgrim why he stayed so long in the last ring (the last canto, he stayed watching those 
who committed heresy). The Pilgrim replied that he thought he saw somebody he knew, 
which was a family member of his who had been murdered in real life. The sinners in 
these two cantos were “falsifiers” and in the ninth circle, the Pilgrim met men who had 
committed the sin of false chemistry (alchemy), trying to sell falsified gold and cures to 
increase years of life on earth. In Canto XXX, the travelers met counterfeiters who had 
burned at the stake for their sins on earth. Dante named various mythological characters 
who were fraudulent liars, as well as Italians, known to forge money that should have 
been made of gold. 
Cantos XXXI through XXXIV: As the travelers were taken to the last circle of 
hell, they saw a frozen lake at the floor. These cantos told the story of those who 
transgressed against their own family, betrayed their country and benefactors. Dante 
identified men who were fraudulent on earth, including two brothers who killed each 
other in an attempt to obtain their father’s inheritance and traitors who turned on their 
own compatriots in the heat of battle (N. Pinsky 351). It is in the final canto, XXXIV, 
that the Pilgrim meets the worst of the sinners, at the lowest depths of hell, Judas, 
betrayer of Jesus and Brutus and Cassis us, the men who conspired to kill Caesar. The 
Inferno ends with Virgil and Dante riding up to the top of hell very quickly, on the back 
of Lucifer’s body. Thus ends the first book of the Divine Comedy, as the Pilgrim moves 
forward to Purgatory and then finally to Paradise.  
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Philosophical and Rhetorical Implications of Metaphors 
Throughout these cantos, metaphors can be introduced to assist in the discussion 
on communication ethics in terms of the Middle Ages and Christianity as well as in terms 
of historicity for use in Postmodernity. There are many allegories throughout the Divine 
Comedy, but for purposes of this work, attention is given to the metaphors that have 
consistency with the metaphors of the works of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas.  
Justice (contrabass) 
Dante described hell in detail suggesting the sins of the will—crimes that people 
decide to perform with great thought—received the worst of the punishment. Dante 
weighted the sins, suggesting that sins of weakness were not as horrendous as sins of the 
will. Punishments were exaggerated forms of the crimes that were committed. The 
sinners suffered horrible fates, for eternity, in the pits of hell.  
That hell would have sections of sinners, where one would actually be rated least 
to worst based on the sins committed while alive, is haunting. It is bad enough that one 
would be damned to hell, let alone have a segregated hell where some suffer more, 
longer, or different from others. “The very point of having a system of punishments in the 
Inferno is that we are thereby called upon to consider moral evil as something graded and 
hence understandable as a complex interweaving of wroth and negation. [. . .] Sin is thus 
for Dante not merely a matter of degree but also a matter of kind” (Mazzeo 5). Therefore, 
Judas had to live in the furthest pit of hell where the punishment, then, equaled the 
enormity of the sin, known as contrapasso.  
In Canto XX, the fortunetellers who usually looked to the future, had to suffer in 
hell with their heads backwards. These sinners are even further down in hell compared to 
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murderers because Dante considered them as perpetrating fraud and placed them almost 
as low as Judas, the traitor. In Canto XXVIII, the men who encouraged schisms within 
the Catholic Church were brutally cut down the middle of their bodies. The metaphor of 
cut was not lost on the reader.  
It was noted earlier that Augustine believed that humility should inform justice for 
an ethical, responsive action. This type of contrapasso, punishment that somehow equals 
the crime or the severity of the crime, would serve as justice to the people of the 
Medieval world. Justice was one of the highest virtues in the classical world. A person 
receiving his or her just deserts was just as important as acting justly in the world of the 
Medieval Christians. 
Confessing 
Dante was very angry with the men who exiled him and the politics of his time. 
He was sent away because of what he believed in and what he wrote, publicly. There 
were men who were cruel, who stole from others, who cheated, and they were all still in 
the city Dante called home. Through the vehicle of the Inferno, Dante points to many 
men by name, civil and religious leaders, who were criminals, actually naming them 
directly, or giving them obvious pseudonyms. This type of calling out, naming the men 
that Dante felt were sinners, is his type of confession. Though they were forced 
confessions as Dante proclaimed who he thought were sinners and what he thought was a 
sin.  
Confessing is communication ethics in action. Baring one’s soul in an open and 
public forum is not an easy or a comfortable task. Confessing to one’s self, a form of 
intrapersonal communication could be considered ethical as well. However, Augustine 
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publicly proclaimed his rhetoric to his family and his Church. He told his mother how 
much love he felt toward his God that the Manichean religion was not what he had 
hoped. Calvin L. Troup suggests that in Augustine’s writings, “rhetoric intersects with 
history, philosophy, society, and faith, and has presented a premodern paradigm for 
rhetoric as the intersection and integrator that enables him to negotiate our 
interdisciplinary boundaries so deftly” (xi). Augustine is an excellent example of 
communication ethics announced in monologue (dialogue if you will). 
Augustine offered Christianity to those who were not perfect, for those who were 
not privileged. Through the Confessions, Augustine offered his own demons for the 
world to read. Most Christians would simply offer a confession in the innermost recesses 
of their own minds, praying to God. Augustine published them! 
The Divine Comedy continues in the next book to proceed to Purgatory and then 
to Paradise. Joseph A. Mazzeo explains the change in the type and character of the 
writing from the Inferno and Purgatorio, where both explained virtue and were 
psychological in nature, to the approach taken in the Paradisio. In the Paradisio, Dante 
examined and outlined how “the ethical realm and the life of conflict and choice prepare 
the way for a life of ideal emotional and intellectual activities” (Mazzeo 195).  Mazzeo 
also explains the symbols of light, love beauty and knowledge used by Dante in the 
Paradisio (196-201). 
Summary 
Dante was searching, perhaps for a way to make sense of his world. Through the 
words of his poetry, he was attempting to find justice and petition to the political process 
to have the Pope and a monarch act as leaders of the land, in peace and harmony. As 
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utopian as it sounds, that is what Dante wrote in DeMonarchia as explained by John 
Herman Randall, Jr. (104-107). Dante hypothesized a future Europe with a papacy that 
would teach based on “revelation” and a monarch that would lead with the use of 
“philosophic instruction” (in DeMonarchia Bk. III ch. 16 as noted in Randall Jr. 105-
107). This did not materialize during his time, but Dante wrote about it in comedic and 
poetic form, nonetheless. 
A span of more than 800 years was a large time frame to consider for this chapter. 
How could 30 pages cover a millennium? The goal of this chapter was not to span ethical 
thought from Augustine’s work that was birthed at the beginning of the Middles Ages 
and ending at the twilight of the Medieval period with Augustine’s work, but rather to 
delineate, and possibly compare, the two types of thought at either end of the spectrum. 
Alasdair MacIntyre explains the vastness of modern society and the various religions that 
ensued:  
In such religions (those that last) we find built up a set of beliefs and ways 
of behaving which become relatively independent of particular, specific 
forms of social life. For this very reason, we shall expect to find built into 
such religions enormous flexibility and adaptability with regard to 
behavior. We shall expect to discover a great capacity for coming to terms 
with quite different sets of moral standards in different times and places. 
(Short History 110-111)  
This is why an investigation of medieval ethics is of import now in Postmodernity. 
Recognizing various problems that occurred in history might be the problems one is 
facing in modern day that can be helpful in terms of the decision-making process.  
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 Communication ethics is having an understanding that there is a world around us, 
and we are not decision makers in a vacuum, but rather of a community of various types. 
Within the community of the Christian Church, Medieval society attempted to understand 
the good as a means toward happiness in terms of life on this earth. However, life on this 
earth is temporal, as the after life was where they would receive their reward, according 
to Christ’s teachings.  
The comparison and contrast of the two scholars, along with the work of Dante in 
the Inferno, presented ethics in light of a society that was beginning to include all 
people—not just the wealthy—into a receptive organization, that of Christianity. The 
Middle Ages or Christian Medieval society have only begun to receive more scholarly 
activity in the past 20 to 30 years (Haldane 133), but it has been very fruitful in 
understanding what led to the Renaissance and then eventually, the Enlightenment that so 
many have critiqued.  
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Chapter Four: Enlightenment Ethics and Candide 
Practical reason, according to Kant, employs no criterion external to 
itself. It appeals to no content derived from experience; hence Kant’s 
independent arguments against the use of happiness or the invocation of 
God’s revealed will merely reinforce a position already entailed by the 
Kantian view of reason’s functions and powers. It is of the essence of 
reason that it lays down principles which are universal, categorical and 
internally consistent. Hence a rational morality will lay down principles 
which both can and ought to be held by all men, independent of 
circumstances and conditions, and which could consistently be obeyed by 
every rational agent on every occasion. (MacIntyre, After Virtue 45)  
 
Following his chapter on Christianity, Alasdair MacIntyre shifts his focus from 
the end of medieval times to the beginning of the Enlightenment. He does this by 
examining the philosophy surrounding the social, economic and religious situation that 
surrounded the work of “Enlightened” philosophes, a term used for the philosophers and 
their work during that time. From the polis to the Church and now to the individual 
landowner, the philosophes of the Enlightenment offered their thoughts within a growing 
economic system that would change everything known to former land workers. This 
discussion will offer a practical guide to ethics that can then be transcended into 
communication ethics.  
A few of the philosophers that MacIntyre considers includes the work of Thomas 
Hobbes (1588-1679) a precursor to enlightened thinking. Hobbes was interested in the 
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relationships between the ruler and those ruled and suggested that rights and justice were 
based on one’s need to avoid punishment by a ruler. Benedict de Spinoza (1632-1677) 
was a proponent of mathematics and specifically geometry and suggested that it was not a 
god, but passions and desires that lead one to make decisions. John Locke (1632-1704) 
was concerned with sovereignty and the rights of the citizens to rebel, as he felt land 
ownership was a natural right. David Hume (1711-1776) also felt it a necessity for the 
citizenry to have property rights, and he was an important figure of the Scottish 
Enlightenment (Short History 130-189). 
But, it is Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) who was validated and acknowledged by 
Alasdair MacIntyre for the modern definition of morality (Short History 190), as Kant’s 
thinking and published works encapsulates the “enlightened” of his time (Short History 
190-198). MacIntyre posits Kant’s influence in the “majority” of philosophical writing 
that appears in Modernity since “ethics is defined as a subject in Kantian terms” (Short 
History 190). 
Peter Gay explains the import of the scholarly work of these men, as they were 
not philosophers who looked down upon history and explained what they saw, but, 
instead, were men who were “intimately involved in the life of their age” (“Introduction” 
23). This chapter will review the lineage of philosophical ethics outlined by Alasdair 
MacIntyre in A Short History of Ethics for the periods of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, with the majority of the discussion focusing on Immanuel Kant. An 
explanation of two of Immanuel Kant’s major works on knowledge, reason and ethics, 
Critique of Pure Reason and Lectures on Ethics, will allow for a discussion of the praxis 
of ethics found within the philosophy of the eighteenth century. An explanation of this 
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praxis will occur at the end of this chapter, with a delineation of the major metaphors that 
are illuminated within the work of Voltaire in his witty and satirical fictional novel, 
Candide. Voltaire was a prolific and well-known writer and philosopher during the 
Enlightenment. Through the works of these scholars and poet, this work offers a 
discussion on communication ethics bound within the historicity of the Enlightenment in 
terms of the rhetorical interruptions experienced in these two centuries within the modern 
European and American landscapes. 
Introduction 
In retrospect, perhaps, Alasdair MacIntyre understands that the idea of a universal 
moral understanding was and is not possible because social orders are not constant; they 
are ever changing experiences (Short History xvi-xvii). In Platonic fashion, Immanuel 
Kant wanted to consider the a priori of moral life (Critique 4) but MacIntyre explains 
that it was not possible, for a community needs to connect ethical standards to daily 
living and historical understanding (Short History 1). However, the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries still need to be investigated alongside Kantian and Enlightenment 
thinking in order to recognize it not only for its historicity and historical value but also as 
a comparison to the current, postmodern state. As MacIntyre would suggest in regard to 
history and the background against which one is entrenched, we need to first understand 
the philosophies working within the community in order to then appreciate the dialogue 
that ensued around the decisions that were made.  
In identifying the time period to be studied in this chapter, the Enlightenment as a 
whole is an obvious choice for discussion within this larger work, as seventeenth and 
eighteenth century Europe was a time of what Dorinda Outram calls “‘flash-points’[. . .] 
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or of ‘pockets’ where projects of intellectual expansion impacted upon and changed the 
nature of developments in society and government on a world wide basis” (3). 
Developments occurring on a worldwide basis from the 1600’s through to the end of the 
1700’s have included revolutions within governments, science and religious institutions. 
These changes took place with emergent modifications of not only the landscape of the 
European continent, but also the new America. It was a time of “critical consciousness” 
(Dupre xii-xiii). The Enlightenment was a time of rationality “validated by science” 
where ideas were no longer channeled from religion (Outram 3). Roy Porter concurs with 
the discussion on the “break” from the reliance on religion and the Bible as a “framework 
for understanding man, society and nature” (65). 
Peter Gay considers the actual time-frame for the Enlightenment by offering the 
parameters of counting a period that lasts one hundred years, 1689-1789, beginning with 
the triumph of the English Revolution and the “birth of Montesquieu” and ending with 
the “French Revolution and the death of Holbach” (“Introduction” 20). Dorinda Outram 
complains that Gay’s account of the Enlightenment excludes female thinkers. Outram 
also mentions A. Owen Aldridge’s critique of Gay’s work for not focusing on colonial 
worlds and the impact they had on the Enlightenment (6). As noted in Chapter One, this 
work also recognizes Alasdair MacIntyre’s lack of explaining vernacular voices within 
his historical writing regarding morality and the West. However, this work moves 
forward in light of the omission, noting the continued import of the effect of the 
European tradition.  
It also should be noted that recent (post-1970) work by historians and 
philosophers suggest the Enlightenment was the beginning of the work of Modernity, and 
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does not “cut off” the time period at the outbreak of the French Revolution (Outram 4-8). 
This work considers the fact that Alasdair MacIntyre wrote the first edition of A Short 
History of Ethics in 1966 prior to the scholarship surrounding the concluding years of the 
Enlightenment and before the discussion on the import of Eastern and American cultures, 
women’s issues on Enlightenment thinking and postmodern philosophy.  
Philosophers such as Jean-François Lyotard (1924-1998) and Michel Foucault 
(1926-1984) suggested the Enlightenment as the beginning of Modern times, where 
universal theories found within narrative structures and progress reigned supreme (Carr 
673). The traditional historically written Christian approach to the “sacred man” was 
being recreated as the scientific history of the “natural man” (Porter 16). Progress was 
privileged during the Enlightenment. The human intellect was no longer believed to be 
received a priori. Instead, John Locke suggested that humans had tabula rosa, a blank 
slate, and then knowledge acquisition would allow intellect to grow based on constant 
learning, not innate predetermined knowledge (Porter 18). Power over disease and 
economic expansion also paved the way for a belief in change that was positively defined 
as progress.  
The Enlightenment was a time of science reigning supreme as a substitution for 
religion and revolutions being fought in both Europe and the Americas for rights of the 
non-landed as well as freedom from royal leaders. Roy Porter, however, suggests that the 
progress of the Enlightenment could simply be viewed as a time when philosophers were 
replacing one myth for the other. The scientific myth replaced the religious, because there 
still had to be a belief in the progress to come as it was not guaranteed (Porter 19).  
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This chapter discusses the philosophers listed above in relation to Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s work in his text A Short History of Ethics as well as the metaphors that are 
illuminated by the work of each of these philosophers that personify the spirit of the 
Enlightenment. The metaphors will also be discussed in relation to Voltaire’s novel 
Candide. Based on A Short History of Ethics, the metaphors of rights, justice, freedom, 
reason, property rights, passions, duty, reason and ethics as they relate to Immanuel 
Kant’s form of universal morality will be considered in relation to Enlightenment 
thinking. These philosophical/enlightenment metaphors will also be compared and 
contrasted to the praxis metaphors found within Candide including optimism/pessimism, 
exile, universalism and God/religion.  
André Maurois suggested in his appreciation at the beginning of the novel of 
Candide that the various characteristics of the eighteenth century “was most fully 
reflected in the person of Voltaire” (13). The praxis that will illuminate the 
communicative ethics of the day is found in the work of Voltaire’s Candide, as the novel 
is a response to the social, economic, political, and religious structures of the eighteenth 
century. Turning to Alasdair MacIntyre’s reading of the philosophers of the 
Enlightenment then, this chapter begins with Thomas Hobbes and his work on justice and 
the rights of individuals within the framework of a state. 
Thomas Hobbes:  Rights and Justice   
Alasdair MacIntyre discusses Thomas Hobbes work and in particular, Hobbes’ 
text, Leviathan published in the early seventeenth century. Leviathan is considered one of 
the precursors to Enlightenment thinking. MacIntyre explains that Hobbes rejected late 
Aristotelianism, which viewed Aristotle’s work during the Scholastic period of which 
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Aquinas was a part. But, Hobbes was interested in “the notions of right, justice, 
sovereignty, and power” (MacIntyre, Short History 130). Hobbes was concerned with the 
new types of state/crown rights as compared to those of its subjects—especially the 
relationship between the two (MacIntyre, Short History 131).  
Because he was impressed with the work of Galileo, Thomas Hobbes was 
interested in systems and how individuals within those systems handle their own “self 
preservation” (MacIntyre, Short History 132). Finally, MacIntyre explains the impetus 
for individuals’ decisions. According to Hobbes, decisions are based on two guiding 
principles—domination of the ruler and avoiding death (for those ruled). MacIntyre 
disagrees with Hobbes premise, suggesting that people are not concerned with authority 
itself, but rather,  
what Hobbes failed to see was that the acceptance of an authority is in fact 
the acceptance of rules which give others and ourselves the right to act in 
certain ways or the duty to act in certain ways, and that to have right is not 
to have power, while to have a duty is not to act from fear of the power of 
others. (Short History 137-138) 
MacIntyre, however, does give credit to Hobbes because of what he established in regard 
to the connection of the theory of human nature and morality (139).  
Again, Alasdair MacIntyre continues to espouse the need for viewing morality in 
terms of the social implications which underlie human decision-making. MacIntyre then 
explains through his lineage of scholars that the only philosopher who can be compared 
to Hobbes’ work and be considered a philosophical peer to Hobbes at the time was that of 
Benedict de Spinoza. But, Spinoza stood in direct contrast to Hobbes (Short History 140).   
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Benedict de Spinoza: Freedom, Passions and Reason 
Benedict de Spinoza was known as a rationalist who was influenced by Thomas 
Hobbes and was concerned with the concepts of “freedom, reason and happiness” though 
Alasdair MacIntyre explains that Spinoza could have been considered an “atheist” in 
Judeo-Christian terms (Short History 142). Spinoza was convinced of the facts presented 
in the seventeenth century regarding mathematical geometry and therefore could not 
agree with a god who stood above the world which was created via miracles. Instead, 
Spinoza attempted to reason his way through the passions, which he linked to man’s 
decision-making process: 
The role of reason is simply to note facts, to calculate, and to understand; 
reason cannot move to action. For Spinoza this is a perfectly good 
description of man in his ordinary, unenlightened state. [. . .] In pursuing 
pleasure and pain we are therefore being affected by causes outside 
rational knowledge and control [. . .]. (MacIntyre, Short History 142-143) 
With this type of rationality, then, a person would be unaware of what was happening to 
them in their state of deliberation.  
However, Spinoza suggested that if a person were to recognize this state that 
he/she found themselves in, he/she would see that individuals themselves are part of a 
system of necessity. People would then recognize a form of freedom in their choice 
making. Because of the recognition of this system, an individual would gain knowledge 
and thus be free to choose certain paths in the future. Therefore, “Genuine virtue is 
simply the realization of this state in which knowledge, freedom and happiness are 
combined (MacIntyre, Short History 144). Though MacIntyre disagrees with Spinoza’s 
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idea of freedom (he does not believe it is simply knowledge that allows one to be free), 
he appreciates the ideas of Spinoza that explain the passions and desires. For Spinoza, the 
passions can be changed based on one’s own education of the self and learning to avoid 
extreme passions or desires. Then, one would be free in choice making in regard to 
emotions that can be changed in the future.  
At this point in the discussion of Chapter 11 in A Short History of Ethics, 
Alasdair MacIntyre breaks from his examination of his historical portrait of particular 
philosophers and their methods of ethics, and turns to the questions the philosophers 
raised in terms of morality. It is a critical juncture which MacIntyre notes in explaining 
that in the written history of man, three different types of morality have been offered 
from ancient Greece through to the 18th century.  
Alasdair MacIntyre suggests that the first type of morality denoted in history 
includes answers to moral questions that were based on the pursuit of the good and 
happiness for man. These ideas were formulated within Platonic & Aristotelian thinking. 
Second, decisions were based on punishment and reward in the Christian sense during 
medieval times. Third, and finally, MacIntyre suggests that Sophistic and Hobbesian 
thinking led individuals to choose actions based on achieving the most of their immediate 
needs (Short History 148). MacIntyre’s point suggests that the historical situation that 
surrounded philosophical ideas on morality during these times have to be considered in 
congruence with each other, as the history cannot be “detached” from the theoretical 
underpinnings of ethics (Short History 149). 
It is in this “New Values” chapter that Alasdair MacIntyre also discusses the 
beginnings of the rise of individualism as seen in the novel Robinson Crusoe (Short 
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History 151). Alexis de Tocqueville coined the metaphor of individualism when he 
visited American in the early nineteenth century. Tocqueville asserted that individualism 
keeps the individual away from joining the community because of concern for self-
interest (482-484). Within the framework of individualism, the individual does remain 
within one’s own immediate family and associate with friends, but, that person does not 
participate in the community as a whole. This individualism has been linked to the rise of 
modern times (Porter 59).  
Between the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the Enlightenment, 
Alasdair MacIntyre points to two scholars who influenced religion and politics (Short 
History 121-129). At the end of the Renaissance (fourteenth and sixteenth centuries), 
Martin Luther (1483-1546) began the Catholic reformation by posting his 95 Theses in 
1517 on a German church door. Coming out of medieval times, the Reformation was the 
beginning of the end of Catholicism as it had been known for a thousand years. 
MacIntyre suggests the import of Martin Luther’s consideration of the agent as 
responsible for his/her moral decisions (Short History 121-127).  
This type of reliance on the individual within a religious context gave rise to the 
public/secular form of agency when Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) began working 
within governmental systems. Power for the individual was of great importance for 
Machiavelli and, “Moral rules are technical rules about the means to these ends” 
(MacIntyre Short History 127). Therefore, with the seventeenth century coming to a 
close, MacIntyre explains the philosophies that bridge the Enlightenment’s two centuries, 
from the end of the seventeenth to the beginning of the eighteenth centuries. One such 
scholar, John Locke, suggested that those individuals that Martin Luther and Machiavelli 
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had concentrated on within society should own property, because it was their natural 
right.   
John Locke: Property Rights  
The beginning of the Enlightenment was upon Europe as John Locke, an 
empiricist, wrote An Essay Concerning Human Understanding after the revolution in 
England in 1688. His text discussed the rights of sovereign authority and the rights of the 
people to rebel, both Hobbesian-type considerations according to Alasdair MacIntyre 
(Short History 157). Locke sought to explain that authority of a ruling regime should be 
given to a particular sovereign in order to protect the natural rights of the people. This, to 
Locke, included the right to property ownership as the most significant of these natural 
rights.  
Alasdair MacIntyre specifies a problem with John Locke’s thought, explaining 
that the majority of people in England were beggars and paupers and did not own land, 
nor did they have the capability. However, MacIntyre kindly asserts that Locke wanted a 
majority vote to determine the laws of the land. Thus, MacIntyre gives Locke the 
notoriety of the beginning of modern democracy and popular consent from the majority 
(Short History 158-159). Locke’s natural rights theory suggested that one is aware of 
moral law due to reasoning (MacIntyre, Short History 160). Locke was a Christian who 
felt that the “thinking man must be a believer” because Christianity was a rational 
religion (Porter 33), compared to David Hume, a non-believer, who openly disavowed 
the connection of faith to property rights.   
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David Hume: The Passions 
David Hume, also an empiricist, was a Scotsman who denunciated the “ways” of 
his homeland and attempted to act and be more like an Englishman in his younger years 
(MacIntyre, Whose Justice 283). Hume was never accepted by the English and he 
eventually moved back to Scotland to live and ultimately took the integrationist position 
on the England and Scotland issue. Alasdair MacIntyre explains, “Hume began under 
Hutcheson’s influence, but while he follows Hutcheson in his rejection of rationalist 
ethics, the arguments with which he develops his own position are original and far more 
powerful than anything in Hutcheson” (Short History 169).  
As philosophers, Francis Hutcheson and David Hume differed in their opinion of 
Cicero’s De Officiis (MacIntyre, Whose Justice 287-89). Hume looked to Roman law, not 
Scottish, for his view of justice. Hume learned from Hutcheson that, “reason is practically 
inert” (MacIntyre, Whose Justice 285). Hume cataloged the passions and divided moral 
judgments into, “those prior to all reasoning [. . .] and those which tell us what the law of 
nature is” (MacIntyre, Whose Justice 285).  
David Hume considered human nature as universal and uniform. Hume deemed 
the passions, not reason as the impetus for moving people to action (MacIntyre, Short 
History 169). Hume believed that people acted based on love or hatred as well as pride or 
humility and what the Scottish were most proud of was property. Hume explained that, 
“Property was a right and justice was to serve the ends of property” (MacIntyre, Whose 
Justice 293-295). Therefore, Hume deviated from Aristotle when he suggested that 
society acts as individual property owners for rank and pride, where, of course, Aristotle 
suggested one acts as a good citizen for the benefit of the polis (MacIntyre, Whose 
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Justice? 211-212). Because of either utility or sympathy, Hume believed a person would 
act virtuously (MacIntyre, Short History 174). “Hume treats moral rules as given, partly 
because he treats human nature as given” (MacIntyre, Short History 175). The problem 
that Alasdair MacIntyre has with Hume is his lack of critique of, and his reliance upon 
the passions.  
Alasdair MacIntyre compares David Hume to Adam Smith in explaining that 
Smith, “like Hume, appeals to sympathy as the basis of morals” (Short History 176). 
However, Smith’s work differs with Hume’s utility, and suggested a person acts on an 
event because it is “fitting and proper” (MacIntyre, Short History 176). The final two 
philosophers that MacIntyre discusses as Enlightenment thinkers include Charles-Louis 
de Secondat, Baron de la Brede et de Montesquieu (1689-1755) and Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau (1712-1778), with the suggestion that Montesquieu’s work is the complete 
opposite of Hume’s thinking.  
Montesquieu wrote on political matters, having worked within the government of 
France for over a decade. Alasdair MacIntyre explains that Montesquieu was concerned 
with political science and felt that politics and morality could not be separated. 
Montesquieu deplored despotism and instead believed in a monarchy or republic system 
(Short History 179). Since he was a relativist, Montesquieu believed that rules could 
change from society to society. Then, within these societies different types of rule 
(despot, monarch, republic) may be appropriate, thus the relativism characteristic 
assigned by MacIntyre (Short History 180-181). Montesquieu and Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
both took their ideas on liberty from the English Revolution (MacIntyre, Short History 
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183). Like Montesquieu, Rousseau believed that politics could not be removed from 
morals (MacIntyre, Short History 187). 
 With a strong belief in the natural-man, Jean-Jacques Rousseau did not share 
his contemporaries’ desires for private land ownership by the people because of what he 
viewed as an eventual inequality between the landed and those that did not own land 
(MacIntyre, Short History 184-185). According to Alasdair MacIntyre, for Rousseau, 
“The task of a social reformer, therefore, is to construct institutions in which the primitive 
regard for the needs of others will be restored in the form of a regard for the common 
good. Men have to learn how in advanced communities they can act not as private 
individuals, as men, but rather as citizens” (Short History 187). Thus, Rousseau 
foreshadowed the concerns of Marx that espoused communal land ownership for the 
good of the whole. Rousseau believed in a conscience that is able to be consulted in 
moral issues.  
In summary, as medieval times ended, the precursor to the Enlightenment found 
itself in period of the Reformation, as Martin Luther and Niccolò Machiavelli both 
worked from the same premise of agency and the importance of the individual, but from a 
religious versus political viewpoint. Then, the sixteenth century offered Thomas Hobbes’ 
suggestion that decisions are based on the authority shown to people and their fear of that 
ruler. Benedict de Spinoza disagreed with Hobbes, suggesting it was the freedom offered 
within reason that brings one to have a passion regarding his/her decision making. John 
Locke’s theory suggested that land ownership was a natural right and Hume suggested 
that instead, it was the passions, such as pride, that moved people to desire such rights as 
land ownership. The Baron Charles Montesquieu and Jean-Jacques Rousseau both agreed 
 The Scholarship and Praxis of Communication Ethics 123 
 
that politics and morality worked together to bring about the common good. They just got 
there in different ways regarding land ownership. 
These men were all working toward the protection of people, from an individual 
viewpoint as well as a community. But, it was Immanuel Kant who looked to offer the 
answers found within an a priori. Alasdair MacIntyre turns to the preeminent philosopher 
Kant by explaining his extreme import to the Enlightenment. It is Kant’s work which 
helped to define the Enlightenment by offering a transcendental universal. 
Immanuel Kant: Reason, Ethics and the Universal 
Alasdair MacIntyre considers Immanuel Kant to be the epitome of ‘Enlightened’ 
thinking, as Kant is recognized as a major figure in philosophy who wrote on reasoning, 
ethics and morals toward the end of the Enlightenment period. As a German philosopher, 
Kant was profoundly influenced by, “Newton’s physics and the empiricism of Helvétius 
and Hume” (MacIntyre, Short History 190). Though he hardly traveled, and lived a 
relatively secluded lifestyle, Kant spent his career as an educator and writer, and 
produced the first of his books considered below, Critique of Pure Reason. This text is 
the first of the three texts usually referred to as the Critiques. Because Kant’s Critique of 
Pure Reason is considered one of his most important works, it will be beneficial to 
consider this text as it illuminates Kant’s bias and explanation of his theoretical 
philosophy of knowledge a priori that is then complimentary to his practical philosophy 
of value and formalist ethics.  
The other Kantian text to be considered in this work is his Lectures on Ethics, a 
compilation of lectures offered to his students in Germany in the mid eighteenth century. 
The lectures were transcribed in the early twentieth century and are useful to this work 
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since it is a very specific piece on ethics. These two texts will be reviewed below for their 
import on the topics of knowledge, ethics and the Enlightenment.   
To experience, Immanuel Kant believed that one must reach out and seize 
understanding based on the categories already composed through one’s education 
(MacIntyre, Short History 190-191). Kant would disagree with Locke’s idea of tabula 
rosa, however, as Kant argued that humans still brought beliefs to the occurrence. The 
questions then, that surrounded Kant, included how knowledge was acquired, and God’s 
existence as creator of a natural world where morality either is or is not found. The term 
critique does not mean criticism or denote a negative connotation. Instead, for Kant, the 
type of critique he performed, as well as the philosophes of the time, was a complete 
investigation of ideas to determine structure and parameters within philosophies on 
ethics, for example. 
Immanuel Kant suggested that there may have been a creator but that morality lies 
outside of nature. Kant’s theory was explained by Alasdair MacIntyre, “morals must be 
independent of how the world goes, for how the word goes is nonmoral” (Short History 
191). Kant looked to inclination, which one is born with, and duty which is the reason for 
one to act. For Kant, decision-making was based in a universal categorical imperative. 
Therefore, when one asks the question, ‘ought I to do this?’ it should be looked upon as 
asking, ‘ought this be done in all situations?’ According to the categorical imperative, a 
precept accepted by one person must be universally accepted as right for others in order 
to be accepted as ethical.  
In his philosophy of morality, Immanuel Kant offered parameters by which to live 
one’s life—not a list of what can be done, but instead, categorical imperatives of what 
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one ought not do, such as lie or cheat. These categorical imperatives do not prescribe how 
to live, but, instead, offer a “test” by which to measure decisions (MacIntyre, Short 
History 197). Imperatives reside in the agent, which was different than what had been 
expressed prior, since the mandates of a higher power throughout Medieval times was the 
authority.  
A university faculty member with a Pietistic faith born and raised in Königsberg, 
East Prussia, Immanuel Kant worked in response to a formal Christian rationalism, 
specifically in the Lutheran faith (Randall, Jr. 405). John Herman Randall, Jr. also 
suggests that Pietism deliberately turned its back upon science and reason, and clung to 
faith. Kant was attempting to reach the intellectual class and prove conclusively that 
reason and science were valid only within a certain field, and that outside this field, 
faith—Kant called it “practical reason”—could still establish the tenets of natural 
religion, God, freedom and immortality (Randall, Jr. 304). It is freedom that Kant 
suggested as allowing one to be enlightened. For as long as a man can think for himself 
and has the freedom to express his ideas, his will, there will be the age of enlightenment 
(“What is Enlightenment?” 3-10).  
Alasdair MacIntyre explains that for Immanuel Kant, inclination that is 
predetermined brings forth the duty that one might recognize when an action needs to be 
accomplished (Short History 193). Because of the autonomy of the individual, even if 
one believes in a supreme being, it is not divine intervention, but the individual who is 
still his/her own “moral authority” that houses the inclinations within themselves 
(MacIntyre, Short History 195). However, significant emphasis has been given to Kant’s 
“autonomy,” and scholars such as Habermas reject Kantian ethics, Pat J. Gehrke suggests 
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that autonomy is just half of Kant’s philosophy and that a community ethic can indeed be 
found in Kant (1). It is with this understanding of a useful communicative ethic that this 
work reviews two of Kant’s texts that specifically delineate knowledge and ethics, the 
Critique of Pure Reason and Lectures on Ethics.  
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781) 
In his “special introduction” to Immanuel Kant’s 1943 edition of Critique of Pure 
Reason, (his first of the three Critiques), Brandt V.B. Dixon noted that Kant should be 
studied in conjunction with the period of the day. Dixon realizes that Kant was writing in 
response to the “transition from the mediaeval to the modern view of the world involved 
a profound change in the fundamental conviction or assumption which men held in 
regard to experience and the sources of knowledge” (vii). In general, people questioned 
Christian and traditional authority while scientific investigation was preeminent in 
knowledge acquisition. Kant suggested that knowledge was manufactured and according 
to Dixon, Kant’s goal was to systematize the “a priori forms, or synthetic processes of 
reason” (xii). Kant was looking for the “resources of reason for the construction of 
experience” (Dixon xiii). Kant strove to understand and define knowledge and value 
within his writings (Seung ix). 
Brandt V.B. Dixon explains Immanuel Kant’s question for his inquiry in Critique 
of Pure Reason, as to “How is synthetic knowledge a priori possible?” (xiii). Kant 
explained knowledge as a priori, something that is known prior to the experience 
(Critique 1). Kant’s aim was to inquire into the transcendental character of the aesthetic, 
analytic and dialectic (Dixon xiv). Kant suggested that science was not everything. This 
Critique analyzed the presuppositions of the Newtonian conception of nature (Beck, On 
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History xxi). God’s existence and a metaphysical world could not be proven. Morally, 
however, Kant wanted the enlightened to feel a “religious reverence for something in the 
world greater than ourselves, we do and must respond to a beauty in things that cannot be 
scientifically explained” (Randall 412). This was Kant’s inquiry throughout most of his 
academic life.  
In the thirteenth century, St. Thomas Aquinas suggested, “reason was valid within 
limits” (Randall Jr., 411) and then after those limits, Kant wanted to explain the reaction 
of religion and faith upon science. Metaphysics was formerly the most esteemed of 
sciences, one that was not challenged. With the rise of scientific inquiry, metaphysics had 
been usurped. In examining reason, Kant intended to use certitude, as opinion was not an 
option, and therefore, he employed “objective deduction” and clearness (Critique xxii). 
Kant wanted to determine reason without the aid of experience. 
For Immanuel Kant, metaphysics was a science that investigated the problems of 
pure reason, “God, Freedom (of will) and Immortality” (Critique 5). Kant suggested that, 
“Philosophy stands in need of a Science which shall determine the possibility, principles, 
and extent of Human Knowledge a priori ” (Critique 4). All of human kind is looking for 
an understanding of knowledge, and answers that cannot be gained via “empirical 
application” of reason (Kant, Critique 13). Kant posited in the Critique of Pure Reasons 
that metaphysics needed to prove itself indestructible as a science; it was not simply to be 
dogmatic. Kant needed to have metaphysics show how one arrives at conceptions a priori 
(Critique 14). 
Immanuel Kant searched for a priori knowledge that strictly conformed to 
universal rules (Critique 3). “The human intellect, even in an unphilosophical state, is in 
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possession of certain cognitions a priori” compared to empirical knowledge which is 
knowledge that comes a posteriori, “through experience” (Kant, Critique 2). Kant was 
attempting to recognize that scientific knowledge had to be learned, but that other 
knowledge, such as the intuition of knowing what is right, is inherent in humans and 
requires judgment.  
In order to understand reasoning and decision making within ethics, judgment 
needs to be explored. Immanuel Kant explained his delineation of types of judgments by 
suggesting that there are two types: analytical and synthetical judgments. “Analytical 
judgments” are explicative, as they analyze and explain whereas “synthetical judgments” 
are “augmentative” and “add” to knowledge (Kant, Critique 7). Synthetical are also 
judgments of experience such as mathematical judgments, “In all theoretical sciences of 
reason, synthetical judgments a priori are contained as principles” (Kant, Critique 9). 
Kant also suggested that metaphysics contains “synthetical propositions a priori” 
(Critique 12). 
One of the more important metaphors for Kant’s work revolves around reason 
because it is, “The faculty which furnishes us with the principles of knowledge a priori” 
(Critique 15). Kant engaged in a critique of pure reason not because he was concerned 
with “enlarging” conception, as he would if he was defining a doctrine, but instead he 
was interested in the, “correction and guidance of our knowledge” (Critique 16). Kant 
wanted this guidance to be explained within a transcendental theory. 
Immanuel Kant discussed the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements in the Critique 
of Pure Reason where he attempted to find a transcendental experience that is not 
inflexible. For Kant, then, the transcendental aesthetic was a, “Science of all the 
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principles of sensibility a priori” (Critique 22, 45). The transcendental aesthetic only 
contains the elements of space and time (Kant, Critique 35). Therefore, experience is 
necessary to view change. Kant wondered if “time and space are real existences? Or are 
they relations or determinations of things?” (Critique 23). Kant’s answer suggested that 
space is where external “phenomena” can occur, it is infinite, and it is an intuition 
(Critique 24). The objects recognized in space are, according to Kant, “representations of 
our sensibility” (Critique 28). However, Kant then explained time in contrast/connection 
to space and explained that time is not “empirical” (Critique 28), but, time is “a 
subjective condition of our (human) intuition” (Critique 31). Within time and space, then, 
Kant finds knowledge (Critique 33).  
Immanuel Kant explained that logic is the, “Science of the laws of the 
understanding” and that logic is either general or particular (Critique 45). The general is 
universal and it is either pure (one’s senses, imagination, memory, habits) or applied 
(empirical) (Kant, Critique 45-6). On the other hand, there is the particular—correct 
thinking about a particular class of objects. Logic is concerned with a priori relation to 
objects (Kant, Critique 48). In attempting to find and define truth, one can use analytic 
logic, “the negative test of truth” (Kant, Critique 50).  
When Kant explained the dialectic, in terms of its Greek origins, he suggested it 
was a logic of illusion (Kant, Critique 50). Kant felt the dialectic lowered the dignity of 
philosophy. He then divided transcendental logic into transcendental analytic and 
dialectic. Transcendental analytic is a “clue to the discovery of all pure conceptions of the 
understanding” (Kant, Critique 53), where understanding is the faculty of judging (Kant, 
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Critique 55). Therefore, the analytic is subjective and non-empirical, and why Kant was 
different for his day. 
Kant investigated the transcendental aesthetic and reduces it to 1) empirical, 2) 
pure and 3) sensuous intuition (Kant, Critique 22-3). “There are two pure forms of 
sensuous intuition, as principles of knowledge a priori these two a priori institutions are 
then namely space and time” (Kant, Critique 23). Through intuition, we consciously put 
items into categories (Kant, Critique 83). Categories allow us to arrange and connect our 
perceptions which are, “representations accompanied with sensation” (Kant, Critique 85). 
Categories also allow empirical cognition—an experience. They are “conceptions which 
prescribe laws a priori to phenomena” (Kant, Critique 93). 
Immanuel Kant’s goal was to offer a type of plan for a system of principles of 
pure reason. This architectonic plan was an attempt to explain pure reason as a priori to 
experience, and anything one would know absolutely. What makes this reason pure is 
when it is not associated with anything empirical. 
Kant’s Lectures on Ethics 
 In his Lectures on Ethics, suggested to have been written and offered from 
1775-1780, Immanuel Kant explained that the world needed to unite and form a more 
universal understanding of each country and each other instead of forming individual 
pockets of statehood, armed and ready for defense as well as offensive colonization 
(252). Kant suggested that each country move toward perfection and thus a morally 
perfect world.  
This type of Platonic perfection is what most people know of Kant, the utopian 
thinking of an isolated philosopher, locked away from the world. But the Lectures invite 
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readers to connect education to morality. Kant suggested that if education is used in an 
appropriate manner, children will grow in a more moral world: 
Wherein lies our hope? In education, and in nothing else. Education must 
be adapted to all the ends of nature, both civil and domestic. Our present 
education, both in the home and at school, is still very faulty, in respect of 
discipline, doctrine and the cultivation of talent as much as in respect t of 
the building of character in accordance with moral principles”  Kant’s 
lectures are not as utopian as his formal texts. Upon first read the Lectures 
seem like they come from a different scholar than the one who wrote the 
various Critiques, however, reading the ideas, they become recognizable 
to Kant. (Lectures 252-253) 
It is this type of perfection of human nature that Kant tried to find on God’s earth. 
However, as mentioned above, this is where Kant’s work is critiqued—for its reliance on 
perfection. However, in his “Forward” to the Lectures on Ethics, Lewis White Beck 
suggests that if one reads Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason without the background of 
Kant’s work in ethics, and the accessibility of the Lectures as well as Metaphysics of 
Morals, then one cannot justifiably take away the part from the whole and complain of 
Kant’s “unearthly” account of ethics (xii). The Lectures explain divine will and authority.  
 In accounting for divine will, Immanuel Kant suggested that one should not 
presume that they have received good fortune because God demanded that it be so, for 
that one individual. Rather, God has the whole universe in mind and one should do as he 
or she ought and try to the best of one’s ability to live a good life, and God will take care 
of the rest (Kant, Lectures 94-95). Kant explained that ethics is a “practical philosophy” 
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and suggested that living this life is possible, not unattainable (Lectures 71). It is difficult 
however, to reach this perfection, as for Kant, ethics should aspire to include the “highest 
perfection of social morality” (Lectures 74). 
In summary of the metaphors that rise out of the works of these Enlightenment 
philosophers, as explained by Alasdair MacIntyre, rights and justice can be viewed in 
terms of their import to a burgeoning society that was on the cusp of an economic 
explosion of different models of ownership and enterprise. Freedom, reason, property 
rights, passions, duty, and reason all revolve around the same notion of individual rights 
versus the ruling classes or bodies. Immanuel Kant suggested it was through education 
that ethics would be grasped in this changing world that now held on to the sciences 
because of the proofs they afforded decision making. Turning now toward a modern day 
discussion of these philosophes will be important for the understanding of these 
metaphors in terms of postmodernity and communication ethics.  
The Ongoing Conversation 
In their acclaimed text Communication Ethics: Methods of Analysis offering 
pedagogical case studies for the classroom, James A. Jaksa and Michael S. Pritchard 
provide a quick read on Kant’s categorical imperative and how it relates to deontological 
thinking in regard to decision making. They explain the differences between the 
categorical imperative and utilitarianism. Jaksa and Pritchard suggested that Utilitarians 
consider alternatives, opposed to the categorical imperative, which considers a decision at 
a universal level, questioning if the decision could be applicable to all (70-95).  
As a precursor to the Critiques, Immanuel Kant wrote extensively on ethics and 
morals. Stephen Darwall clarifies Kant’s work on the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
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Morals by explaining how the categorical imperative works within ethics. It was Kant’s 
hope that all moral actions would be based on, “principles we can will all to act on and 
treating rational personality always as an end in itself” (Darwall 145). If one can 
universally ask all to act as he/she would act within a certain situation, then it is a moral 
action. All rational beings would act in an ethical way because of the a priori of the 
categorical imperative as being the supreme reason for action. For Kant, Darwall 
concludes that the most “fundamental moral convictions” a person can have must be 
“known a priori” and that this reasoning comes from a “rational agent” (147). Therefore, 
communication would need to be between two rational agents who both have a strong 
moral “character” (Darwall 148) that controls the dialogue and whose actions are based 
in duty and good will.  
Stephen Darwall further explains the difference between Immanuel Kant’s type of 
deontological thought compared to the Utilitarians that followed him toward the end of 
the Enlightenment and beginning of modern times (see Chapter Five of this work on J.S. 
Mill, in particular). Darwall explains that Kant put the emphasis on the agent where Mill 
would have considered emphasizing an action based on the happiness (Darwall 168) 
found within what Peter Byrne would consider the teleological result (86). Byrne further 
explains that Kant did not base his morality in the form of the authority of a higher 
power, but in the authority of the agent (153-154). This type of individual autonomy will 
be considered at length in Chapter Five, as it is considered the root of individualism.  
The rhetorical interruption that attacked the scholars of the Enlightened period 
include science (and math/geometry) and all that Isaac Newton brought to the table. Proof 
was necessary for any discussion that involved truths. The beginning of the individual as 
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having a freedom that included an economic basis of protection was on the horizon as 
land ownership became possible for more than the elite did. Immanuel Kant’s views of 
ethics are used to discuss Voltaire’s Candide for the praxis portion of Chapter Four. 
Historicity—Voltaire 
Compared to other philosophers of the Enlightenment, Peter Gay suggests that 
Voltaire and his writing were steeped in a passion different from others. Gay is of the 
opinion that Voltaire wrote in defense of others, “words in behalf of a humane code, in 
defense of victims of legal injustice, in criticism of cruelty, bellicosity, and 
superstition…” (“Introduction” 16). Voltaire’s writing was a critique of the social, 
religious and economic society that surrounded him in eighteenth century Europe. 
Voltaire’s Candide is a classic novel offering a cynical and satirical view of 
Enlightenment thinking allowing for a discussion of communication ethics of the history 
of the eighteenth century as well as today.  
Candide is a short text written at the end of the eighteenth century, that allowed 
Voltaire to anonymously announce his political disrespect for theology and the theory 
that God will make sure all things come out for the best—in the end. Richard A. Brooks 
elucidates the connection of the writing of Candide with the philosophical views of 18th 
century Germany/Europe: 
The biting satire of Candide marked the death knell of the German 
rationalist philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in the popular mind. 
The devastating ridicule to which Voltaire subjected Leibniz’s philosophy 
as well as the bitterness evident in Voltaire’s fictional masterpiece suggest 
the personal important of the controversy for the French philosophe. More 
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significantly, however, the sharp difference in point of view between these 
two great thinkers may be seen as part of a broad movement of opinion in 
eighteenth-century thought involving changing religious and social values. 
Their dispute reexamined a dilemma traditional not only to Christianity 
but to all monotheisms. (158)  
Leibniz was a respected rationalist of the early Enlightenment and a very well known 
philosopher whose work was eventually used and then critiqued by Immanuel Kant. 
Voltaire wrote Candide in direct opposition to Leibniz’s philosophy.  
Andre Maurois explained in his “appreciation” published in the Lowell Bair 
version of Candide that Voltaire was troubled by the intense optimism of many modern 
scholars, especially Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (see Candide Translated by Lowell Bair 
1-14). Voltaire had seen his share of abuse, war, unjust governmental practices and even 
banishment from his homeland because of his own personal views. He anonymously 
authored some of his pamphlets and other works, as “A royal decree of 1757 had restored 
the death penalty for writers and publishers convicted of attacking religion” (Bottiglia 
107). Therefore, Voltaire could not write these views publicly, but under a pseudonym.  
For Voltaire, a benevolent god that considered a certain sect his “chosen”, and 
others “not”, could not possibly exist. Voltaire wrote about the life that surrounded him in 
the mid eighteenth century within the text of Candide, as explained by William F. 
Bottiglia, “His (Voltaire’s) central problem is that of human conduct in relation to the 
somber mystery of physical and social evil” (88). He explicated these nuances of the 
eighteenth century in his writings of both pamphlets and novels.  
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The historical background, however, the “external” as Bottiglia refers to it, that 
affected the writing of Voltaire, were the changes that surrounded Voltaire including: 
[. . .] the consequent sense of homelessness or exile; various literary and 
philosophic quarrels (Maupertuis, Rousseau, etc.); the Seven Years’ War; 
the Lisbon disaster [. . .]. Metaphysics had become the unknowable. [. . .] 
Free will had been reluctantly abandoned in favor of determinism; yet 
optimistic fatalism was dispiriting and repugnant to one who could 
confront social evil only with programs of reform based on faith in man’s 
progressive possibilities. (101) 
Throughout Candide, the reader will find reference to these issues, especially with the 
metaphor of exile. Extreme fatalism is obvious from the beginning through to the end of 
the book, when Candide almost exasperated, capitulated and accepted his fate that they 
all needed to tend their garden. It is because of the way that Peter Gay refers to Voltaire, 
as the “representative philosophe” for the Enlightenment, that this work considers 
Voltaire’s novel, Candide to be a model for a discussion of communication ethics within 
the confines of the historicity of the Enlightenment (The Party 3). One way Voltaire 
questioned the social, economic, political and religious order around him, was within the 
dialogue of the novel, Candide.  
Different from the prior two chapters of this work, the next two chapters will not 
delineate an idea outline of the novels based on a chronological explanation. Rather, an 
explanation of the story will be apparent as a few metaphors found within the texts are 
illuminated. Because the prior two novels, the Odyssey and the Inferno both had major 
delineation points (books, or cantos) it was more practical to outline the book, and then 
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discuss the metaphors. However, within these next two novels, Candide and The Plague 
in Chapter Five, a discussion of the progression of the stories will be intertwined with the 
discussion of the metaphors that announce themselves as important to the conversation on 
communication ethics and the rhetorical interruptions of the Enlightenment and 
Modernity.  
Historical Engagement—Candide 
 The reader is introduced to a young Candide at the beginning of the novel, 
as he was found to be secretly engaged in a liaison with Lady Cunegonde, who was to 
become the passion of his life. The problem was that Cunegonde was also the daughter of 
the Baron who had been kind enough to allow Candide to live in his home. Therefore, 
Candide was quickly banished by the enraged Baron, for this unscrupulous attempt to 
seduce the Baron’s own daughter. Candide was considered by the Baron to be beneath 
the Baron’s family according to their hierarchical pedigree. Upon his banishment, 
Candide began a laughable, horrible, outrageous journey that exiled him from his love 
and his mentor, the forever-optimistic Pangloss who stayed behind (Voltaire 15-16). 
Throughout the short comedic novel, frequent and incredibly outrageous mishaps 
engaged Candide that afforded him the opportunity to question his optimistic teacher as 
well as meet a pessimistic friend, Martin. The various people Candide befriended turned 
on him and became enemies or died in the most horrid of ways. When Pangloss, 
Candide’s professor, re-emerged on the canvas, disfigured from syphilis, he told Candide 
that his beautiful Cunégonde had been raped and murdered during a battle. Candide was 
of course, horrified, but within a few chapters, Candide heard that, in fact, his love 
Cunégonde was miraculously alive.  
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Candide wavered back and forth, on whether all was good in the world or not, as 
now he was on a mission to find his love, Cunegonde, whose whereabouts were 
unknown. On his continued travels to find Cunegonde, Candide ran into formidable 
obstacles, including the fact that Cunegonde had not only been raped, but was betrothed 
to the governor of Buenos Aires (Voltaire 51). Candide’s odd and ironic troubles 
continued as Candide finally found his one true love but discovered that she is not only 
being held as a slave, but as a sex slave!  
The novel continues to bring its readers on a journey of separation, fate and love. 
Finally, the characters all arrived together again—old friends and new, to live together as 
a small community. Though Cunegonde was older and physically deteriorated and had 
grown “ugly”, Candide still agreed to marry her and live with her forever. The friends 
grew bored and fought until they fatefully met the “Turk”, a farmer who lead an 
incredibly normal and dull life, (by a former baron’s standards), but all noticed his 
happiness, as well as the happiness of the family that surrounded the farmer (Voltaire 
112). This led Candide to the grand conclusion that all must, indeed, tend to their garden. 
This novel represents a satiric look at life in the eighteenth century. A few metaphors can 
be discussed to help explain the changes occurring in the society as well as exemplify the 
communication ethic of the day. 
Philosophical and Rhetorical Implications of Metaphors 
Major metaphors found within Candide include discrimination, pessimism, (an 
almost perverse) optimism, exile, universalism, and an unwavering faith in god vs. evil. 
Voltaire expanded upon problems and questions raised during the Enlightenment 
including evil, and how to account for it; religious misconduct (especially by clerics, 
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themselves), and that god created the best possible world (how could he not?) There are 
numerous scenes in the book that are gory, yet full of Voltaire’s comedic cynicism. 
Voltaire had Candide observe the evil experienced by all types of people and watched 
how those people come to terms with evil in their everyday life. Candide could not 
imagine how one continued to walk through daily life when faced with such struggles. 
This is a question of communication ethics.  
Discrimination 
There is vicious discrimination in the text, especially concerning Cunegonde’s 
brother, Baron Thunder-ten-tronckh. Candide thought that the baron was dead, but 
miraculously found him masquerading as a Jesuit priest. The two exchanged excitement 
over finding one another and Candide told the baron that his sister, Cunegonde, was 
indeed alive. Of course the baron was relieved and excited to hear such news. However, 
when Candide told the baron he intended on marrying his sister, the baron was absolutely 
shocked, horrified and outraged.  
Even at this stage of the game, after all of the trials and tribulations their family 
and both men had been through, instead of being happy that his sister would marry a man 
who was deeply in love with her, the baron was concerned that Candide was of lower 
status than his family. The baron argued with Candide by exclaiming, “How impudent of 
you even to think of marrying my sister, who has seventy-two generations of nobility 
behind her! You ought to be ashamed of yourself for daring to mention such an audacious 
scheme to me!” (Voltaire 52). Candide countered with the explanation that he saved 
Cunegonde and his own mentor, Pangloss had always taught him, “that all men are equal, 
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and I will certainly marry her” (Voltaire 53). They continued to argue and the baron 
attacked Candide, who, in horror, killed Cunegonde’s brother in self defense.  
The differences between the nobility and the commoners were great in the 
eighteenth century, and it would have been unthinkable for members from two different 
groups to marry. Candide showed his naiveté when he was shocked by the baron’s 
disgust and anger. He is a character that did not see the differences in society that were so 
obvious to everyone else. Candide was that inexperienced character, who wanted to see 
the good in all, and not believe that the world could have such faults as that horrendous 
type of bigotry that he was witness to throughout the novel. For instance, the women who 
were prejudiced toward Jesuits surprised Candide (Voltaire 57). 
Another type of oddity was the constant change between a perverse optimism 
showed by some of the characters (especially the religious) and a very sad pessimism. 
This dichotomy is now discussed in terms of the various characters who exemplified such 
notions and how they came to terms with each other. 
Optimism/Pessimism 
Throughout the novel, Candide often became depressed and pessimistic. 
However, his mentor Pangloss offered his standard chestnut of wisdom to his pupil, “all 
is for the best” (Voltaire 16, 19, 27, 82, 87, 101, 106). Though the reader knows that all is 
not for the best, sometimes bad things happen to good people, the reader can view the 
novel as outsiders and see that the optimistic Pangloss is there to educate Candide and 
mentor him to continue through his struggles. Through the character of Pangloss, Voltaire 
is sarcastic toward the optimistic work of the German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz, “‘I still hold my original opinions,’ replied Pangloss, ‘because, after all, I’m a 
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philosopher, and it wouldn’t be proper for me to recant, since Leibniz cannot be 
wrong…’” (107-108).  
If one were to be simply pessimistic, it would be easy to give up the fight. 
However, Pangloss felt it was his duty to move on, and at the same time, move his 
student forward on life’s journey. Therefore, this education continued and within that 
education and the travels of Candide, the reader can find pessimism and optimism 
fighting each other for supremacy. 
As Candide went through these various ordeals, in his travels to reach Cunegonde 
again, as he continued to lose her throughout the novel, Candide met Martin, a poor 
scholar whom Candide befriended and asked to join him on a trip to find Cunegonde. To 
counter-act the optimism of Pangloss, the reader has the character of Martin who gave 
Candide his most pessimistic temperament yet (Voltaire 73, 75, 82). It was during their 
travels that Martin showed himself to be a pessimist, the antagonist to Pangloss. Martin 
believed God had abandoned the world.   
When Candide asks his new friend Martin if there was good in the world, Martin 
responded, “‘perhaps so, but I haven’t seen it’” (Voltaire 73). Martin traveled alongside 
Candide, acting as the foil to Candide’s optimism. Even to the bitter end, once the troop 
of odd friends was finally safe and together, Martin was sure that the world was against 
mankind and that he just had to be patient (Voltaire 110). 
Even with the various forms of pessimism and optimism that Candide faced, and 
listened to, he still suggested at the end of the novel that all they could hope to care for is 
indeed, their own garden. The idea being that the only way to handle the craziness of the 
world was by tending to one’s own work, and paying attention to only what each person 
 The Scholarship and Praxis of Communication Ethics 142 
 
can themselves control. Because there is so much that is out of one’s own control, one 
should do his/her own part to perform work to the best of their ability, because that is all 
that can be controlled.  Throughout the novel Candide was faced with banishment and 
that often turned him despondent. However, he always recovered his optimism, and 
moved forward to his next adventure. He was always in the search for his Cunegonde.  
Exile 
From the beginning of the novel Candide is immediately exposed to being exiled 
from the place he knew as home (Voltaire 17). The baron threw Candide out of his home 
because he caught Candide having a sexual liaison with his daughter, Cunegonde. The 
baron could not accept Candide as a suitor for his daughter and expelled him from his 
land. With nowhere to go, Candide found himself in the middle of the Bulgars—men who 
savagely beat Candide. Again, with sarcastic wit, Voltaire explained the King of the 
Bulgars saved Candide when he rode to the scene on his horse and inquired as to why the 
Bulgars were beating Candide. After hearing the story, the king suggested that Candide 
must be a metaphysician and did not know the way of the world, and could not, therefore, 
be held accountable for his words or actions (Voltaire 19-20).  
 Another crazy incident involving Candide and Pangloss occurred when 
their ship sank on the way to find Cunegonde. They were the only ones, along with a 
sailor, who had survived, and they safely swam to the shore of Lisbon. Once they were 
on Lisbon, there was an earthquake (which occurred in actuality), and 30,000 people 
died. Pangloss wondered out loud to his friend, curious as to what the reasoning would be 
behind this event (Voltaire 26-27). As with his age of Enlightenment, Pangloss was 
looking for a reason for such an atrocity. Pangloss attempted to suggest that another 
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earthquake that happened recently must have been related, and that made him feel as if he 
was answering his own question. Science could give them an answer in the eighteenth 
century, where events were constantly questioned.  
 Once Candide and Cunegonde arrived in South America, the governor 
wanted to marry Cunegonde and sent Candide off to Paraguay. Once there, he found 
Cunegonde’s brother, Baron Thunder-ten-tronckh, and as mentioned previously, Candide 
killed her brother in self defense when he became enraged at Candide for still loving his 
sister. Because of the murder, Candide had to flee. Again, he was in exile, and traveled 
by land and river to find, in the end, a very rich land, where children threw gold into the 
streets (Voltaire 58-61). It was in this new land that Candide was faced with what could 
be called a form of Kantian universalism. 
Universalism  
 During his trip to this new land of Eldorado, a land of Spanish-speaking 
natives, Candide was accompanied by a guide named Cacambo, who was able to translate 
and communicate with the natives. Candide requested that Cacambo ask the leader of the 
elders if they practiced a religion. The leader was shocked by the questions, asking if 
Candide thought they were “ingrates” to not have a religion. The leader was confused; 
questioning Candide as to if there was more than one god (Voltaire 62). 
 Candide also lent an ear to listen to the tales the leaders of Eldorado were 
telling about their great land, where there was no need for prayer, because the inhabitants 
of this land had everything then wanted. Instead, they constantly thanked god for what 
had been provided to them. Candide responded that all should travel, the way he had been 
able to do recently, in order to learn about all of these different ways of life (Voltaire 63). 
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Candide also referred to the strangeness of other lands, but stated that it was because he 
never left his hometown before, and this was the only way he could refer to these new 
endeavors—only as “strange” (Voltaire 39).  
This recognition of difference and desire to travel to learn about other cultures is 
reminiscent of a sophistic way of thinking in ancient Greece, realizing that ideas are 
relative to various cultures and values, which is what Alasdair MacIntyre alluded to (as 
stated above) when he suggested the Enlightenment was influenced by sophistic and 
Hobbesian thinking. Belief in god and various types of religions were also confusing in 
the West, ever since the Reformation brought Protestant thinking into the mix with 
Christianity. Voltaire also used Candide as a vehicle for his discussion on religion of the 
eighteenth century. 
God/religion 
 Voltaire uses various forms of religious men as characters or disguised 
characters throughout the novel in interesting and sarcastic ways. There were a few 
disguised men including Candide disguising himself as a Jesuit priest in order to flee a 
country after a murder (Voltaire 53). However, once Candide came upon people who 
could help and feed him, it was only after he took off his robe and explained that he was 
not a Jesuit that they were willing to offer him assistance (Voltaire 57). This showed that 
the men changed suits based on their needs as well as on the intolerance of those around 
them. 
Voltaire had other characters finding themselves in trouble including the “old 
woman” who was the daughter of a pope, yet she lived through horrifying turmoil, 
including being raped (43). There was also a Franciscan Friar who was blamed in the 
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seduction of a young woman (Voltaire 89), and Candide was cheated by men, who are 
only identified as “the Jews” (Voltaire 110). Obviously, Voltaire was mocking the 
religious and religion of the eighteenth century, as there were many scandals within 
religious institutions in those years. 
The way that Pangloss’ optimism is expressed, the teachings he offered Candide 
and that he internalized, seems to be a form of religious expectations that God will take 
care of all— “all is for the best” (Voltaire 16, 27, 101). They also believed the earthquake 
at Lisbon sprang from an angry god and attempted to sacrifice humans for the sake of the 
angered god, of which Candide and Pangloss were victims (but, of course, neither died, 
as they seem to each have the seven lives of a cat). Kant explained in his Lectures on 
Ethics: 
There are people who ascribe each individual occurrence to God’s special 
providence and say that God has showered benefits and happiness upon 
them, thinking themselves in this to be God-fearing. They believe that this 
is to be religious. They believe that respect for God consists in assuming 
that each and every thing has been individually, specially and directly 
ordained by Him. …We must do what is in our power; we must do what 
we ought; the rest we should leave to God. That is true submission to the 
divine will. (95) 
Though Kant believed in a Supreme Being, a God, he suggested one must not be 
ostentatious enough to assume that things happen for them because God wanted those 
actions to occur specifically for that individual. One should submit one’s self, as Pangloss 
did, to say, ‘things just happen’ and find a happy medium between optimism and 
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pessimism, a form of “meliorism” (Bottiglia 101), suggesting that individual effort is 
necessary for an enhanced civilization. 
So, the metaphors of optimism and pessimism, exile, universalism and 
evil/religion and how they are engaged within Candide offer a glimpse into Enlightened 
thinking, for good or bad, that was engrossed in the scientific and economic battles of a 
new era. In terms of communication ethics and standpoint theory, depending on where 
one stands within a community, whether a social group, a family or a religious 
community, effects how communication is offered from one person to another, as well as 
to the group. Having Pangloss, for instance, act as the eternal optimist was indicative of 
his philosophical background and religious training. Julia Wood explains: 
Standpoint theory contributes to our understanding of diversity by 
highlighting how social locations and the conditions, opportunities, and 
understanding entailed in them shape individuals’ thoughts, feelings, and 
communication. Although not denying individuality, standpoint theory 
insists that membership in socially defined groups substantially constrains 
ways of knowing and acting in the world. (11) 
Wood also explains that there is a benefit that comes from diversity, and that is what was 
found in the Enlightened era, a multiplicity of voices, from the scientific, religious and 
economic communities that affected the communication of people finding themselves 
within unfamiliar groups.   
The hero, Candide, continued to trust in his teacher and mentor, Panglosss, who 
was always suggesting that things (sometimes-evil things) happen for a reason, because 
God deemed it so. Therefore, Candide should have accepted the outcome with a light 
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heart and move on with his life. Candide continued to be lectured by various characters in 
the book, who explained that daily happiness as well as misfortunes was all God’s doing, 
and therefore, all would be well with the world. This type of optimism that Voltaire 
criticized is visible in Immanuel Kant’s Lectures on Ethics. 
In his Lectures, Kant asked what we should do, based on our duty. (Critique of 
Pure Reason). Voltaire would also agree, as Bottiglia explains, through his emphasis on 
how Voltaire ends Candide and how we can interpret the metaphor of the garden. 
Candide recommended to his group of friends, with varying degrees of expertise in 
varying fields, that they should move to “cultivate our garden” (Voltaire 113). Thus, the 
goal for Candide was to form a collaborative effort that was for the good of the 
community (Bottiglia 104). Could it be suggested that this is a type of categorical 
imperative? What is good for all is the teleological end? Voltaire’s words can be seen to 
be a response to Gottfreid W. Leibniz, who, as T.K. Seung explains, refers to God 
suggesting that, “He creates the best of all possible worlds” (2). The metaphysical 
optimism of many philosophers was what Voltaire’s words responded to throughout most 
of the text of Candide.  
Alasdair MacIntyre understands the utopian nature of Kantian ethics and is 
concerned that decisions were separated from the background of the “social order” 
surrounding the moral code of the day (Short History 198). However, Kant’s ethics are 
still useful today, as they allow one to use personal judgment in the face of daily living. It 
is not a god who banishes people. Instead, people banish people. It is not a god who sends 
an earthquake; it is the natural environment of our earth. How the community handles the 
consequences of that earthquake is what makes people a community. 
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Summary 
Enlightenment philosophy and issues need to be discussed in order to observe the 
contemporary significance of the issues profoundly delineated by Kant and fancifully 
exposed by Voltaire. Ethics matters, of course, but, whose ethics and are they bound by a 
supreme being? Both Voltaire and Kant would consider the explanation that morals and 
ethics need to come from within the individual, themselves. Some of the characters in 
Candide believed that the various atrocities and evil that surrounded them (war, death 
brought on by earthquake, poverty…) were results of people’s actions upsetting their god. 
Susan Neiman’s timely book, Evil in Modern Thought ends with a chapter 
dedicated to the discussion of America’s fateful September 11th, “Where failure to get to 
work becomes a way of saving one’s life, our sense of powerlessness becomes 
overwhelming” (282). Originally drawn to Neiman’s work because of her discussion of 
Hanna Arendt’s Banality of Evil, it was an equally interesting surprise to also read her 
comparison of the earthquake in Lisbon (that Voltaire wrote about in Candide), to 
Auschwitz and 9/11 (Neiman 281-288). Neiman suggests that just as the people of Lisbon 
were unprepared and caught by complete and total surprise, so were those who lost their 
lives in the World Trade Center, Pentagon & Shanksville, PA on the morning of 
September 11, 2001 in the United States. Sometimes there is not an answer, but the 
enlightened philosophes wanted one! 
William A. Galston explains that Kant understood Enlightenment thinking, but 
wanted to counter those thoughts by explicating that it is only though human effort that 
evil will be quieted (73). In explaining Kant’s position on evil, Galston explained that it 
is through “improving ourselves” that we can counter evil (74). In Postmodernity, we 
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love to blame everyone but ourselves. Dialogic communication is necessary in order to 
attempt to live life to the best of one’s knowledge and abilities and then only can one 
seek to deter evil in other’s lives or various areas of the world. 
Alasdair MacIntyre is still concerned that Kantian thinking is not prudent for 
today’s social structure as it does not afford the ability to live within a social order: 
But the consequences of his doctrines, in German history at least, suggest 
that the attempt to find a moral standpoint completely independent of the 
social order may be a quest for an illusion, a quest that renders one a mere 
conformist servant of the social order much more than does the morality of 
those who recognize the impossibility of a code which does not to some 
extent at least express the wants and needs of men in particular social 
circumstances. (Short History 198) 
The rhetorical interruption—that of science usurping religion, turned ideas upside down 
and people’s way of thinking inside out during the Enlightenment. Tradition was being 
questioned. Those finding themselves struggling with questions of faith and ethics during 
the Enlightenment had scholars such as Voltaire and Immanuel Kant explaining in poetic 
and analytic fashions, how best to continue to live their lives. This is where modern 
scholars begin, coming out of the throws of scientific theories and in the beginning of a 
capitalistic world.   
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Chapter Five:  Modern Ethics and The Plague 
In what does the unity of an individual life consist? The answer is that its 
unity is the unity of a narrative embodied in a single life. To ask ‘What is 
the good for me?’ is to ask how best I might live out that unity and bring it 
to completion. To ask ‘What is the good for man?’ is to ask what all 
answers to the former question must have in common. [. . .] The unity of a 
human life is the unity of a narrative quest. (MacIntyre, After Virtue 218-
219) 
 
 The world had changed. Capitalism began to see the light of day in the United 
States, World Wars I and II were on the horizon and the industrial revolution changed the 
west in ways that are more revolutionary than revolutions themselves. Science had 
proven itself, but, now, people wanted more—more for themselves. Ethics were 
discussed in terms of how to determine the good for the individual rather than the 
community or other institutions. Alasdair MacIntyre explains that there was no longer a 
universal where ethics resided (Short History 268) but instead, a world of individuals 
with their own view of a moral way of life: 
Eighteen-century English moralists and nineteenth-century Utilitarians 
write from within a society in which individualism has conquered. Hence 
they present the social order not as a framework within which the 
individual has to live out his moral life, but as the mere sum of individual 
wills and interests. (267) 
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An implication of the lack of universal ethics, MacIntyre cautions, is that 
Modernity has made it a necessity to be attentive to who and what ideas one includes 
within their circle of influence. Not only do we have to choose the people, we also have 
to choose the tenets by which we will live our lives and by which we judge ourselves and 
others, as these characteristics and tenets are no longer considered pre-determined nor are 
they universal to all groups. 
Introduction 
In discussing modern moral philosophy, Alasdair MacIntyre explained that, 
among others, John Stewart Mill, Henry Sidgwick, G.E. Moore, and John Dewey 
pondered the understanding of the good and the definition of knowledge, “We are thus 
brought to ask what states of affairs are good, what kind of things ought to exist for their 
own sake” (Short History 249). Yet another rhetorical shift had occurred, as the 
Enlightenment had ended, and questions were surfacing again in what is now termed the 
Modern age. Not that there are specific dates of demarcation that specifically define these 
various periods, however, it is this period, the end of Enlightenment philosophy and the 
beginning of Modernity, that will be examined in this chapter. The end of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century way of thinking and the beginning of the twentieth century 
demarcated the end of the Enlightenment and the beginning of Modernity.  
In describing the end of Enlightenment thinking as it related to universal morals, 
Clifford G. Christians explains: 
The Enlightenment version of common morality has been preeminent in 
the European and North American context since the 18th century. 
Determined to remove all external authority except human reason, the 
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Enlightenment celebrated advances in science and politics founded on 
rational consent. But now, the curtain is coming down on 300 years of 
Enlightenment modernity. The foundations on which universal norms 
were built have eroded. (“The Ethics” 4) 
The beginning of individualism led the way toward agency and choice-making being 
emotivistic in nature. The Western tale of Modernity offered a choice between a moral 
vocabulary that dates back 4,000 years to Aristitotelianism or a rival individualistic 
ethical stance that was conceived as a response to the Enlightenment and came to define 
Modernity.  
This chapter will attend to the historical moment of the end of the Enlightenment 
and the beginning of Modernity, discuss the scholars/philosophers that Alasdair 
MacIntyre wrote about in Short History of Ethics in term of modern thinking, and address 
the metaphors that emerge from their work that speak to the period. These metaphors 
include duty, obligation, happiness, intuitionism, Utilitarianism, hedonism, good, and 
emotivism. The chapter will end with a discussion of the novel The Plague by Albert 
Camus, as a useful form of communication ethics praxis.  
John Herman Randall, Jr., suggests that Immanuel Kant allowed the thinking of 
modern times to go forward on its own, without the need for scientific evaluation: 
We do and must act from a sense of moral obligation, we do and must feel 
a religious reverence for something in the world greater than ourselves, 
and we do and must respond to a beauty in things that cannot be 
scientifically explained. Hence, since we can neither prove nor disprove 
by the methods of science that we must choose the right rather than the 
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wrong, that we are free so to choose, and that the universe is governed 
somehow by a moral law. [. . .] Where science can neither prove nor 
disprove, we are justified in having faith. (413)  
Therefore, the end of the scientific mode and the beginning of the individual who 
has faith either in him/herself, in religion, or both is now apparent! Turning now to 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s discussion of those writers and thinkers who authored the bridge 
from the Enlightenment to Modernity the way of writing can be viewed as the philosophy 
regarding the cusp of the Enlightenment that led the assault into modern times. 
Alasdair MacIntyre follows a true lineage of scholars in his final three chapters of 
A Short History of Ethics, discussing the Utilitarians, the Reformists and the Idealists up 
through modern day scholars (early twentieth century) including John Stewart Mill, 
Henry Sidgwick G.E. Moore and John Dewey. Though the twentieth century brought 
countries around the globe into world war conflicts, MacIntyre only traces the modern 
turn through its zenith in the early and middle twentieth century and does not discuss 
ethics and morality past the 1930’s in A Short History of Ethics. However, MacIntyre 
explains the beginning of emotivism and its influence on modern thinking, “Perhaps in 
some such reaction to Moore lies one of the seeds of emotivism. Moore himself staked 
everything on the appeal to objectivity” (Short History 257). MacIntyre explains the 
lineage of thinking and aligns each scholar within a context of the categories suggested 
above. MacIntyre begins the discussion on Mill by explaining Mill’s following of Jeremy 
Bentham’s philosophy of Utilitarianism.  
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John Stewart Mill: Happiness, Institutions 
From a young age, and because of his father’s persistence and insistence, John 
Stewart Mill (1806-1873) was a Utilitarian scholar. Mill’s father was a student and 
follower of the work of Jeremy Bentham who is especially known for his philosophy of 
Utilitarianism. Bentham suggested that choices are made by individuals because of two 
guiding principles, pleasure and pain. Thus, Bentham’s hedonistic thinking as related to 
an, “individual as exhibiting a natural, rational self-interest--a psychological egoism” 
(Sweet 2001) was purely emotivistic in nature. Vernon E. Cronen explains in 
communication ethics literature that with the measurement of one’s pleasure or pain, 
Bentham would conclude that,  
Policy could be assessed by calculating its consequences, not for society 
as an organic whole, but as a kind of arithmetic in which increments of 
pleasure and pain are calculated for each individual and then summed 
across individuals, thus ‘privileging’ the individual. (25) 
Bentham, then, would quantify the good or bad that came from the pleasure or pain so 
that individuals could make decisions based on those outcomes.  
John Stewart Mill became a prolific writer in the support of the liberty of the 
individual. MacIntyre explains Mill’s philosophy of Utilitarianism, for which Mill is 
most famous, “He, like Bentham, treats pleasure as a unitary concept” (Short History 
236). Mill became known as a Utilitarian who suggested that happiness was the end to 
which all action strove. According to Alasdair MacIntyre, using the original work of 
Jeremy Bentham, Mill advanced the idea of the greatest pleasure and happiness for the 
public good, especially in publicly sponsored institutional settings (Short History 237). 
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However, MacIntyre points out that using happiness as a criterion for decision making 
could be “morally dangerous” because it is a slippery slope to traverse since people can 
make many a pleasure seem to be for the good of the whole when, in fact, it does not 
endure itself to any standards of proof. Consideration should also be given to who or 
what characteristics are used to determine standards, against which to compare competing 
claims, for offering the greatest good for the greatest number.  
 In A Short History of Ethics, Alasdair MacIntyre explains some of the problems 
with J.S. Mill’s proof and use of happiness as a criterion for the greatest good. He also 
suggests that one of Mill’s main critics was G.E. Moore who disagreed with the premise 
that one would know that pleasure is in fact desired by the public. However, for 
MacIntyre, it is understandable why the Utilitarian criterion was useful in Modernity as, 
“The individualism of modern society and the increasingly rapid and disruptive rate of 
social change brings about a situation in which for increasing numbers there is no over-all 
shape to the moral life but only a set of apparently arbitrary principles inherited from a 
variety of sources” (Short History 243). So, the Utilitarian way of life made sense for a 
society where the individual was paramount and decision-making resided in the self, 
based on what is good for the self and made the self happiest. 
J.S. Mill was also an advocate for women, as he brought a Women’s Reform Bill 
of 1867 to the British House of Commons (IEP “Mill”). This was at the end of his career 
and a few years before his death. He believed that women had the right to hold property 
and not give away her rights because of marriage. In terms of ethics, Mill suggested that 
men made up the rules and that women were forced to be subservient and that there was 
no other ethical reason for women not to have the same rights as men. Mill was in favor 
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of women’s right to vote and having equal rights within a marriage. Writing around the 
same time as J.S. Mill, Henry Sidgwick was also considered a Utilitarian with a 
hedonistic tendency.  
Henry Sidgwick: Egoism, Hedonism and Intuitionism 
Though Alasdair MacIntyre does not dwell on the work of Henry Sidgwick 
(1838-1900), MacIntyre does suggest that Sidgwick’s writings “haunt” the writings of 
those who come after him (Short History 244). Writing in a time of incredible change, in 
his 1874 tome Methods of Ethics, Sidgwick offered a unique position on moral concepts, 
looking specifically at the three conceptions of egoism, hedonism and intuitionism 
(Rawls v-vi). Alasdair MacIntyre explains that Sidgwick was effected by his own 
rejection of the Christian faith which he had once embraced (Short History 243).  
In John Rawls’ forward to the seventh edition of The Methods of Ethics he 
suggests that Sidgwick gives us the first academic work of moral philosophy 
investigating moral conceptions (vi). Sidgwick has an “important place” in the utilitarian 
tradition/doctrine which holds that, “the ultimate moral end of social and individual 
action is the greatest net sum of the happiness of all sentient beings” (Rawls v). 
Sidgwick’s method of ethics included “…any rational procedure by which we determine 
what individual human beings ‘ought’—or what it is ‘right’ for them—to do, or to seek to 
realize by voluntary action.” (1). Therefore, if happiness is what people are striving to 
achieve, being self indulgent and egoistic is a way to make sure one is fulfilled, but not 
concerned with others’ happiness. Sidgwick also offered a prescriptive and rhetorical 
approach to ethics, seeking to persuade people to follow his method of oughts.  
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For Henry Sidgwick, the two methods which take happiness as the ultimate end 
included “egoistic hedonism (egoism)” and “universalistic hedonism” (11, 411). When 
given a situation with a choice of two items, an egoist will choose the one that offers a 
greater pleasure over pain (Sidgwick 121). For Sidgwick, these pleasures and pains are 
quantitatively measured (123). Sidgwick suggested that Bentham taught universalistic 
hedonism as “Utilitarianism” (11) which takes into account everyone who will be 
affected by the happiness afforded by the hedonistic act(s) (411). Therefore, the 
Utilitarian has the duty to ensure the improvement of the moral order (Sidgwick 476). In 
this sense, it seems that Sidgwick could have been considering the happiness of a group 
instead of just the individual, as that duty he discusses is not just duty to oneself, but duty 
to be concerned for the moral order of all.  
Alasdair MacIntyre explains that a few nineteenth century philosophers such as 
T.H. Green and F.H. Bradley considered “good” in terms of the society in which one 
lives, but they used a form of metaphysics that allowed them to ask these questions, and 
Green and Bradley were in the minority as far as this type of thinking was concerned 
(Short History 244-248). But, looking at the beginning of the twentieth century and the 
early cusp of modern times, the successors of the philosophies of Green and Bradley, 
“were to write as if morality and with it, moral philosophy existed apart from all specific 
social forms” (MacIntyre, Short History 248). Thus, this work turns to what is agreed 
upon as modern moral philosophy and specifically, the work of G.E. Moore. 
G.E. Moore: Good 
Alasdair MacIntyre asks questions about the kind of things that ought to exist for 
their own sake. G.E. Moore (1873-1958) would suggest that the goods that should indeed 
 The Scholarship and Praxis of Communication Ethics 158 
 
exist should be those which are “intrinsically good.” However, there is a problem in 
attempting to understand what good means as Moore considered good “indefinable” and 
he also suggested that good “cannot be the name of any complex whole” (MacIntyre, 
Short History 249, 250). Moore explained in Prinicpa Ethica that good is not causal and 
therefore is indeed “indefinable” (22). This would seemingly go against what Henry 
Sidgwick suggested, since Sidgwick believed that goods are quantifiable (123). Moore’s 
work contested the work of hedonists, and criticized the work of J.S. Mill (MacIntyre, 
Short History 251).  
Within his seminal text Principa Ethica, G.E. Moore disagreed with J.S. Mill’s 
naturalistic argument for hedonism (70-74), and criticizes Mill’s philosophy found within 
Utilitarianism (108) explaining, “Egoism, as a form of hedonism, is the doctrine which 
holds that we ought, each of us, to pursue our own greatest happiness as our ultimate 
end” (96). Therefore, Moore views Mill’s utility as a form of hedonism that, though 
quantifiable, was not a form of ethics that was intrinsic in nature, as Moore felt a person 
would understand ethics intuitively.  
According to G.E. Moore, ethics investigated assertions about that property of 
things which is denoted by the term ‘good,’ and the converse property denoted by the 
term ‘bad’ (36). Moore suggested “[. . .] the fundamental principles of Ethics must be 
synthetic propositions, declaring what things, and in what degree, possess a simple and 
unanalysable property which may be called ‘intrinsic value’ or ‘goodness.’” (58). Moore 
criticized naturalistic ethics, “theories which owe their prevalence to the supposition that 
good can be defined by reference to a natural object. [. . .] no intrinsic value is to be 
found except in the possession of some one natural property, other than pleasure [. . .]” 
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(39). He also criticized evolutionary ethics, as proposed by Herbert Spencer. “Evolution 
could hardly have been supposed to have any important bearing upon ethics” as Moore 
argued, “The influence of the fallacious opinion that to be ‘better’ means to be ‘more 
evolved’” (58).  
Alasdair MacIntyre suggests that G.E. Moore had two kinds of followers: those 
who were intuitionists and those who were occupied with identifying what was definable 
as inherently good. Moore explained that the highest value can be placed on the pleasure 
found in human intercourse and beautiful objects (MacIntyre, Short History 256). 
MacIntyre criticizes the homogenous nature of those who followed Moore—the 
intuitionists, as they were a group of like men who already agreed on the premises. Then 
what they announced as good, would be agreed upon quite easily (MacIntyre, Short 
History 257). MacIntyre also suggests that Moore’s values subscribed to the private 
rather than public form of life and, “exclude all the values connected with intellectual 
inquiry and with work. Moore’s values are those of a protected leisure, though it is in 
what he excludes rather than in what he does value that the parochial and classbound 
character of his attitudes appears” (MacIntyre, Short History 256).  
Alasdair MacIntyre suggests in both Short History of Ethics (257) and After 
Virtue (his follow up to A Short History of Ethics), that Moore’s work was a precursor to 
emotivism, which MacIntyre attributes to Moore’s pupil, C.L. Stevens (After Virtue 12, 
17). MacIntyre posits that Moore’s philosophy is incredibly defective, due in most part to 
Moore’s premise that good is indefinable. MacIntyre disagrees and considers Moore’s 
treatment of ethics “faulty” (After Virtue 16). Perhaps one fault of good’s indefinable 
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character is connected to the question of what good excludes and its private rather than 
public character. 
Emotivism is defined by Alasdair MacIntyre as the “doctrine that all evaluative 
judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of 
preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in 
character” (After Virtue 12). This sense of individualism enabling one to make judgments 
based on the good for oneself is what MacIntyre believes to be the downfall of modern 
moral philosophy. MacIntyre laments the loss of good for society and the focus on the 
individual in Modernity. Though, by the end of After Virtue, MacIntyre does explain that 
he has hope for the future as all virtues are not lost in Modernity. However, MacIntyre 
emphasizes that we are indeed at a “turning point” and can maintain our civility (After 
Virtue 263). 
Alasdair MacIntyre briefly mentions John Dewey in A Short History of Ethics 
and simply notes that Dewey is as far away from G.E. Moore as he can be on the subjects 
of means and ends when it comes to satisfying one’s purpose(s). Dewey did not separate 
means and ends, but believed they were interrelated. “Dewey concentrates on the agent, 
while Moore concentrates on the spectator. Dewey almost obliterates the distinction 
between fact and value, between is and ought, while Moore emphasizes it” (MacIntyre, 
Short History 253). In generalizing and explaining the philosophers that followed Moore, 
MacIntyre suggests that these men were intuitionists who carried on “the philosophical 
appeal to what we all are alleged to recognize in moral matters” (Short History 256). As 
stated above, MacIntyre does not see the philosophy of the intuitionists as helpful, since, 
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conceivably, one should already know how to act, and therefore, ethical behavior should 
simply be inherent to one’s decision making process. 
Intuitionists 
Alasdair MacIntyre continues his chapter on modern moral philosophy by 
explaining the scholarly lineage of philosophers who worked with the same type of 
material as G.E. Moore did. However, MacIntyre is quick to point out that they worked 
with the philosophies independently of Moore. These scholars all considered the 
“treatment of good, right, duty, obligatory, and the rest of the moral vocabulary as though 
it was a coinage of permanently fixed values and simple scrutiny” (MacIntyre, Short 
History 254). However, MacIntyre further challenges the problem with the thinking of 
intuitionists, by explaining that they “suffer from one difficulty: they are, on their own 
view, telling us only about what we all know already” (Short History 254). 
E.F. Carritt and H.A. Pritchard both followed the work of G.E. Moore and are 
considered intuitionist thinkers. Carritt was a “critic of utilitarianism” and his work was 
noted in a paper by H.A. Pritchard in 1912 (MacIntyre, Short History 254). Pritchard 
suggested that duty should not be treated analytically, but rather, duty should just be 
something that is not questioned. Therefore, duty cannot “be supported by reasons” 
(MacIntyre, Short History 254). Alasdair MacIntyre points out that both men had critics 
in A.J. Ayer and R.G. Collingwood in that they attacked Carritt and Pritchard, “for their 
lack of historical sense, for their tendency to treat Plato, Kant, and themselves as 
contributors to a single discussion with a single subject matter and a permanent and 
unchanging vocabulary” (Short History 255). As the Enlightenment was left in the 
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shadows of modern times, it can be seen that the vocabulary was changing to be more 
individualistic. Thus the modern dilemma.  
The Ongoing Conversation 
Vernon E. Cronen offers his theory for communication ethics in his book chapter 
entitled, “Coordinated Management of Meaning Theory and Postenlightenment Ethics” 
where he discusses his work as it relates to the phrase used by Alasdair MacIntyre, the 
Enlightenment project. Cronen gives credence to communication in the process of ethical 
development as he suggests that “a rational basis for the critique of moral orders can be 
developed from the perspective of communication as the primary social process” (24). 
The questions addressed during Modernity concerned the individual in response 
to science and modern society. Coming out of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, 
where God and religion where taken out of the equation to the point of accepting only 
what could be proven via scientific inquiry, Modernity was left with the individual and 
the loss of, 
[. . .] social dominance. We know that there were important 
socioeconomic developments contributing to the new sense of 
individuality too. Probably these developments started with the reopening 
of commerce in the 12th century and the later rise of the bourgeoisie; a 
new class was not defined by its relationship to a place on the land or to a 
place in the socioreligious hierarchy. (Cronen 25) 
Cronen does point out that there were some philosophers who did not agree with the 
prominence given to agency, including Kierkegaard. But, Cronen further explains that 
this new group of intellects allowed for a new class of people that were not visible in 
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early times. The new economic life of the Post-Enlightenment period also had an impact 
on the precedence given to individuals and individualism, “Concurrently, economic 
changes seemed to require liberating the ‘new’ persons, giving them the power to come 
and go and do business, powers not granted by the feudal political system” (Cronen 26).  
 In his synthesis of communication ethics scholarship over a 50-year period during 
the twentieth century, Ronald C. Arnett suggests that there are five main themes running 
through these works. Three of the themes he considers to be in the public realm, 
(“democratic, universal/humanitarian, and codes”) and one in the private realm 
(“contextual) (Arnett, “Scholarship” 58). Therefore, Arnett suggests only one theme, that 
of a “narrative ethic attempts to go beyond this public/private dialectic with a creative 
synthesis” (“Scholarship” 58). Counter to what G.E. Moore purported about private 
versus public values, Arnett would suggest that a communication ethic can only be 
manifested when contrived within a socially agreed upon narrative that has communal 
impact and support. Rhetorically, this type of agreement is powerful and binding, in that 
all are in agreement and it is difficult to change. But, it is still, indeed, fluid and can 
change over time as stories change. 
According to Samuel M. Edelman the story of the Jewish refugee held high 
rhetorical significance in the middle to late twentieth century (165-173). Edelman 
explains the use of the face of the refugee as a metaphor for loss of homeland, as the 
Israelis who were prisoners themselves and/or lost their home during the war were 
hoping to be reunited with a home, post-World War II. The imagery of a refugee as 
suggested by Edelman is a valid segues to enter into the world of Albert Camus’s The 
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Plague, as this work suggests that those who were spurned by the plague became exiled, 
for many reasons which will be explained in the following pages.  
Just as Edelman’s Jewish refugee was ravaged by World War II, Albert Camus 
witnessed the same peoples devastated by a regime that was uncontrollable for many 
years in the mid-twentieth century. The Plague is a valid entry into communication ethics 
of the modern era, as Camus explores the relationships of people within a common 
narrative of a community whose world was turned upside down. There is a connection 
between refugees and those scarred by the plague of Modernity who become shallow and 
homeless themselves, as the metaphors of Camus’ book demonstrates. 
Historicity—Camus 
Looking at the novel by Albert Camus, The Plague represents a world that had 
fragments of its population experiencing deprivation, while other fragments of the 
community were waiting to experience the worst they could imagine. A metaphor for the 
Nazi’s war on humanity, The Plague was written on the cusp of World War II. Camus 
penned The Plague during and while he witnessed Nazi Germany’s attempts to deprive 
the Jews of not only their homeland, but, their lives. Camus himself was exiled, having to 
flee Paris since he was a member of the underground resistance (Lottman 237-240). 
Camus knew what it felt like to be different, as characters that lived in Oran were 
different once the plague descended upon their town. 
Historical Engagement—The Plague 
The narrator in The Plague offered the reader a bird’s eyes view of the deprivation 
the people of Oran, a French port in Algeria, experienced during a plague that descends 
upon their town in the year 194_ (Camus 3). The plague appeared slowly, over a course 
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of a few weeks, sickening and eventually killing various townspeople. Once the news 
was spread, and the medical establishment decided to announce that it was indeed a 
plague that had befallen Oran, the town deteriorated into a sheltered, almost forgotten 
city of citizens walking through life in a daze. The unfortunate and ironic issue for the 
people of Oran was that once the plague settled and the issues of the plague became a 
part of everyday life, the townspeople eventually went about their business just as they 
had before the plague. The death that hovered over the city did not change the drab nature 
of the town’s being as it was before the plague came to town. However, the plague did 
reveal some tendencies that may otherwise not have been realized.  
 From the beginning of the novel, the reader is not aware of the identity of the 
narrator, as he or she is not named or announced until the end. However, Dr. Bernard 
Rieux seems the likely candidate, as he would have had the information at his disposal to 
be the narrator (Camus 6). But, the reader is not sure until he identified himself in the 
end. Dr. Rieux was at odds with so many issues throughout the text, that it is interesting 
to view the events in Oran from his point of view. He was the doctor who first diagnosed 
the possibility of the outbreak of the plague and encouraged the town’s Prefect to declare 
the plague. Tarraou, a character who wrote a journal throughout the ordeal noted in his 
writings that the narrator used a form of historical dialogue. This is why the novel, The 
Plague, offered a glimpse into not only the time and place setting within Oran, but what 
the people were feeling, and discussing during their most hideous of days during the 
plague.  
The narrator explained that rats rose up from their normal dwellings underground,  
beneath the shadows, and began to be noticed—dead in the streets. Within days, Dr. 
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Bernard Rieux realized that a few of his patients, formerly dying from causes unknown, 
were really dying from a form of plague. It was incredibly difficult for the government 
officials to come to consensus and finally declared that a plague had indeed been 
identified. Such an announcement, as one could imagine, would bring dreadful 
consequences for the city. The Prefect of the community begged to know from Dr. Rieux 
if the doctor really and truly thought the plague had descended upon the town. Finally, 
after thirty deaths per day were being reported, the Prefect closed the town gates (Camus 
59).  
The scene at the gates showed the townspeople shocked into the realization that it 
was the beginning of the end for the town. They were about to enter a time warp or sorts. 
They were being held in a community where nobody could come nor go, where no 
communication could be exchanged with the outside world. Going forward in Chapter 
Five, then, the novel will be explained through the window of major metaphors that 
emerge from the novel offering connections to communication ethics and the philosophy 
of the scholars of the day. 
Philosophical and Rhetorical Implications of Metaphors 
Deprivation that leads to hedonism 
 When the gates are closed and the townspeople are incredibly troubled by the fact 
that not only could they not exit or re-enter, their communication with others had found 
the same fate. One of the major metaphors Albert Camus raised in The Plague is that of 
deprivation. The reader can see a communication deficiency in many forms, including the 
deprivation felt because of the closing of the gates and the townspeople being “cut off” 
from the outside world.  
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The people of Oran lost touch with the outside world. A few hours before the 
plague was announced the sentries closed the gates of the city to prepare for the 
onslaught of people requesting to leave for various reasons (Camus 62). Letters were not 
even allowed to be written and sent to the outside, for fear of spreading the disease. The 
narrator explained that the townspeople were reduced to writing short telegrams with 
predetermined phrases.  
In addition to facing such a horrible, untreatable disease, the people of Oran lost 
the ability to communicate with loved ones or friends and acquaintances. This type of 
everyday communication is something one might take for granted as an ethic of 
communicative reciprocity. In modern times, one expects to be able to contact friends 
and vice versa, without much interference, if any at all. When this normal ability to 
communicate is taken away, by force (as with the law in Oran) or by one’s own neglect 
of “keeping in touch,” a noticeable void can be felt.  
If it is an unconscious decision to stop the contact, perhaps because of laziness or 
lack of caring, the sting of the decline or loss of the friendship does not seem to hurt as 
much. Or, there may be a personal, intentional and deliberately conscious decision to end 
a friendship, which can be very difficult on the psyche! It is fun and exciting to begin a 
friendship, but, to make the decision to end a friendship, or maybe even more difficult, a 
love affair, could affect the very core of one’s being. But, at least the individual is 
making the decision; whereas in Oran, the townspeople had lost the opportunity to 
converse and keep in touch because of a plague for which they did not ask. It was not 
their decision to be deprived of communication to those outside of Oran.  
 The Scholarship and Praxis of Communication Ethics 168 
 
The narrator suggested that the deprivation enacted by the plague led to suffering 
that was twofold. The first was the suffering of the victims themselves, trapped inside the 
city walls, and the second being the families left behind, outside of the city (Camus 64). 
Not only did the plague affect the citizens who made their homes in Oran, but, also the 
travelers to Oran were deprived of their homes (Camus 67). Even if a member of the 
community was not a victim of the plague in terms of the physical—mentally, all were 
victims. Those caught behind the city walls before the announcement of the closing of the 
borders were victims, whether citizens, visitors, or not.  
Therefore, we find Rambert, a journalist who had the bad luck and misfortune to 
be in town on assignment, for another, unrelated story. He was trapped when the gates 
were closed. Thus Rambert became a witness to a completely different story—the story 
of the plague. Rambert could not return home to the woman he loved and Albert Camus 
showed us how this young man handled his absence away from his beloved as Rambert 
began to create a new life for himself amongst his new found acquaintances that included 
Joseph Grand, Jean Tarrou and Dr. Rieux.  
This deprivation led to a type of hedonism, as it seemed as if the townspeople 
wanted to laugh in the face of evil, daring the plague to strike them directly. The people 
would head out to the cafes to eat and drink as Tarrou explained in his description of a 
day in the life of Oran, “Most of them seemed determined to counteract the plague by a 
lavish display of luxury. Daily, about eleven, you see a sort of dress parade of youths and 
girls, who make you realize the frantic desire for life that thrives in the heart of every 
great calamity” (Camus 110). The people are not worried about spending, either, as they 
buy lavishly, including wines at lunch and great meals.  
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Tarrou also noted that, “once these people realized their instant peril, they gave 
their thoughts to pleasure. And all the hideous fears that stamp their faces in the daytime 
are transformed in the fiery, dusty nightfall into a sort of hectic exaltation, an unkempt 
freedom fevering their blood” (Camus 111). The narrator does not discuss if this 
hedonistic tendency was or was not apparent before the plague, however, it seems that the 
actions of the townspeople were different. The possibility of eminent death can play with 
how one acts in both public and private. The sense of deprivation was intense at the 
beginning of the plague, but dwindled with each passing day.  
Numbers    
One of the quirkiest characters in the novel was Joseph Grand. Because of his 
idiosyncratic desire to have words and numbers perfectly correct, and because of his 
professional and then volunteer work with the government, Grand was always anxious 
about the numbers related to the plague. Grand worked as a clerk in the Municipal Office 
for the local government, but volunteered for Dr. Rieux and the plague “staff” to keep 
track of these numbers, spending his personal, free hours in the evening, pouring over the 
figures, ensuring their accuracy. Grand’s infatuation with the numbers (number dead, 
number with the disease, number quarantined), is quite like the Nazis and their incredible 
penchant for orderliness and keeping of lists (Wiesel 43, 68). 
This list making can keep one from thinking about the real death that surrounded 
them; mindless tasks that allowed one to look like he or she is really doing something, 
and not being ordered to put others to death (Nazis) or sitting around waiting for death to 
occur (a plague). Hannah Arendt described Adolf Eichmann’s banality of evil in this 
way. At the beginning of the rise of the judenrein–to have the Reich not inhabited by 
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Jews, or to be rid of the Jews (48)—Eichmann was stationed in Vienna, Austria. 
Eichmann’s contention was that he was simply involved in a form of the “political 
solution” (41). Since the Zionists with whom he worked were interested in having the 
Jews return to Israel as their homeland (American-Israeli Cooperative Initiative, 2002), 
from Eichmann’s personal view, he was assisting the Jews in their desires while also 
serving the German state. Therefore, he was a helpful government official! 
 By 1938, however, it was decreed that the Jews had (no more hopes for 
assimilation and therefore had) to leave Austria, and Eichmann was incredibly successful 
in the orderliness of this campaign. He was happy with his results, even devising an 
easier format for completing less paperwork during the deportation process. It was 
absolutely shocking to Hannah Arendt that Eichmann was so “unrepentant” (52), but she 
also understood his point of view, as he was part of the “aura of systematic mendacity 
that had constituted the general and generally accepted atmosphere of the Third Reich” 
(52). They used numbers to forget. 
Hannah Arendt explains that those in the bureaucratic offices of the Nazi party 
deluded themselves with the thoughts that sending the Jews to the concentration camps 
was an administrative or economic duty. This detachment from emotional discussions 
and feelings allowed the men to unceasingly continue with their work. Arendt suggested 
that Adolf Eichmann and the like were not demons, but men who were proud of their 
work and had strong feelings for their German statehood. 
It is easier for the government worker, the military man or the doctor to be 
absorbed by the importance of ‘the numbers’ as long as the names of those with the 
disease, those on the extermination list, or those already dead from the plague, were not 
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names recognized by these professionals. Dr. Rieux even explained that he only felt a bit 
uneasy about the early deaths. When one deals with death and disease on a daily basis, it 
is easier to not have feelings about the dead.  
In explaining the history of plagues and the possible number dead in the thirty 
plagues throughout written history, Dr. Rieux suggested to his friends the reason behind 
his lack of empathy, “But what are a hundred million deaths? When one has served in a 
war, one hardly knows what a dead man is, after a while. And since a dead man has no 
substance unless one has actually seen him dead, a hundred million corpses broadcast 
though history are no more than a puff of smoke in the imagination” (Camus 35). So, 
does teaching history have an effect on students of war? Of plague? How do these 
numbers affect the reader? Is the doctor correct in suggesting that history will continue to 
play itself out, and people will not change their patterns of behavior or communicative 
ways because of a calamity? It seems that men and women will make it possible to 
continue on in light of a struggle, and find ways of coping, both publicly and privately. 
They will find ways to ‘go on’ as many people suggest after a death in the family or a 
crisis. One must continue to live and cannot give up hope; that would be against the 
human condition.  
The radio stopped announcing weekly totals, and simply began reading daily 
numbers of those who had succumbed to the plague. Tarrou guessed that it was because 
“‘they fancy they’re scoring off it because a hundred and thirty is a smaller figure than 
nine hundred and ten’” (Camus 104). People teased themselves into believing what they 
want, if the numbers make sense. The unconscious heard the 130 figure, which did not  
sound as bad as 910. One can fool oneself by believing what they want to believe and 
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only listen to what they want to hear. Through rhetoric, one can persuade the public to 
believe numbers that in one way, or another, are more or less important than they truly 
are. This type of persuasion can be seen as governmental propaganda, which is 
controversial in any age.  
An incredibly ironic comment came from Dr. Rieux, and the reader cannot tell if 
it was said sarcastically or if he was serious, and his sympathy for the dead had really 
gone by the wayside. The discussion centered on the manner in which the corpses were 
being handled. The narrator explained that they had run out of coffins, and were reduced 
to re-using the same five coffins over and over again. After depositing the dead in the 
cemetery, the sanitary squad would return to the hospital for more bodies. The narrator 
suggested that “This system worked excellently and won the approval of the Prefect” to 
which Dr. Rieux replied, “‘Yes…And though the burials are much the same, we keep 
careful records of them. That, you will agree, is progress.’” (Camus 158). Progress! This 
is what the gentle doctor is reduced to! Forgetting that he is talking about dead bodies 
that just a few short days prior were live bodies.  
The victims of the plague did not ask for that type of death; they did nothing 
wrong to deserve that death. Yet, the doctor that treated them was thinking of the 
progress of taking care of their dead bodies instead of hoping for a cure! What the Nazis 
considered progress, and what the Allies considered progress were obviously two 
different consequences. Grand, Dr. Rieux and the Nazis were factual, they were counting, 
and ethically, they were performing their job. They took orders, and they fulfilled them. 
Can they, therefore, be held accountable for their actions? How they treated people in 
their daily communicative interactions was normal, they thought, but, was it ethical? 
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Within their own stories and broader community narratives, they were ethical. However, 
these systems were obviously competing systems of ought. Where then, does evil come 
from, if both sides think they are acting ethically? 
The narrator took on the role of philosopher when he suggested that evil comes 
from ignorance: 
[. . .] and good intentions may do as much arm as malevolence, if they 
lack understanding. On the whole, men are more good than bad; that, 
however, isn’t the real point. But they are more or less ignorant, and it is 
this that we call vice or virtue; the most incorrigible vice being that of an 
ignorance that fancies it knows everything and therefore claims for itself 
the right to kill. The soul of the murderer is blind; and there can be no true 
goodness nor true love without the utmost clear-sightedness. (Camus 120-
121) 
As Hannah Arendt attributed Adolf Eichmann’s actions to that of a banal mind, so to 
does the narrator of The Plague when he suggested that a murderer’s ignorance comes 
from thinking he or she knows everything, including having the right to kill, as Hitler felt 
he and the Nazis were doing right. Justification of murder was done by an ignorant form 
of logic.  
Another way to view the metaphor of numbers is within the world of our tragic 
hero, Grand. The number of days, weeks and years that Grand spent on the writing of his 
book was staggering, and he never got very far in his accomplishment of finishing the 
opening sentence, let alone the whole book itself. Grand explained to his new friends, 
that he has been writing and working on his book for many years. However, the tragedy 
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of his character is that Grand only worked on his opening sentence by constantly 
changing the wording, trying to get it just right. Not only could he not write well, though 
he so wished he could, but in everyday life Grand could not find the right words to speak 
within normal conversations.  
The real tragedy was that Grand could not write within his “leisure” (Camus 41-
42). Many people try to reach a goal or attain certain achievements, but it is how one 
goes about obtaining that goal that can be considered ethical. What made Grand happy 
was his work. But, he was incredibly frustrated, because the paths that he chose, 
government work and literary writing, were not suitable to his talents.  
In terms of numbers, one never knew who was “next” to catch the dreaded disease 
and have his or her life cut short by the plague. In addition, even if a citizen of Oran was 
not currently sick, they could be a carrier of the disease, so suspicion was prevalent. 
Therefore, they felt the need to quarantine victims’ families. A native of Oran, Tarrou 
was a shadowy character who knew the comings and goings of all the townspeople, and 
knew where to find assistance for those willing to “pay,” for escape, he was looked upon 
with suspicion because of his connections and unethical uses of those connections. 
Tarrou constantly questioned if the plague was not, in fact, around them always, not just 
now. He suggested that the suspicion aimed at him was itself akin to a plague, a blight 
that was inescapable. 
 A citizen of Oran would never know if they were next to fall physical victim to 
the plague and be dead within the week. One did not know if their brother, sister, mother, 
neighbor was carrying the disease and would possibly spread the disease unknowingly. 
Explaining the situation in the town’s jail, the narrator told how living in a community, in 
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close quarters, such as those living in jails or monasteries had a higher chance of catching 
the death sentence.  
But, it did not matter who you were, “The plague was no respecter of persons and 
under its despotic rule everyone, from the warden down to the humblest delinquent, was 
under sentence and, perhaps for the first time, impartial justice reigned in the prison” 
(Camus 153). This sentiment can be traced as an analogy to war-torn Europe and how 
Albert Camus viewed the Nazis. The Nazis kept their prisoners in camps that were eerily 
similar to those described in The Plague. There was not any justice found in the 
concentration campus, just as it was unjust when a victim fell to the plague. There was no 
rhyme or reason as to why the plague attacked a healthy person. 
Loss of sympathy and habits    
The narrator commented on the congeniality of the neighborhoods before and 
after the outbreak of the plague. Before the plague, neighbors were friendly and talkative 
as they sat on doorsteps and visited with each other. Once the plague was forced upon 
them, everyone stayed indoors, as the narrator discussed the hardship of reacting with 
sympathy to the groans of those affected by the disease. If one should start to turn from 
their neighbor, the citizen’s heart could become cold—but, what else could they do?  
It is difficult to be empathetic or even sympathetic, because the distraught one 
may feel can be overwhelming. So, a citizen of Oran would grow cold to their neighbor 
because it hurt to feel that sympathy. “But under the prolonged strain it seemed that 
hearts had toughened; people lived beside those groans or walked past them as though 
they had become the normal speech of men” (Camus 103). The narrator discussed how 
defeated the people of Oran became when they could no longer remember the faces of 
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their loved ones. Their memories were starting to fade, and they forgot the face of the 
other, “Not that they had forgotten the face itself, but—what came to the same thing—it 
had lost freshly substance and they no longer saw it in memory’s mirror” (Camus 164). It 
began to become difficult to even talk about their own family members, the pain was so 
real. They had forgotten the face of their loved-ones and their memories were fading. 
This can lead to more despair than the plague itself. When a family member dies, one 
longs to remember their face. The narrator explained in The Plague that the townspeople 
were losing so many, so quickly, it was difficult to remember the faces of those who 
passed before them. 
As the plague continued on, the citizens of Oran became more and more quiet. 
They did not even bother to tell their neighbor about their pain of separation, or their loss, 
since all were involved. It was useless. There was no consoling the other, since they were 
all (pre-)occupied in the same horrific dream. There was no empathy to be dispatched. 
They fell into a habit of not feeling, “this precisely was the most disheartening thing: that 
the habit of despair is worse than despair itself” (Camus 164). The deprivation of the 
townspeople took on many forms and caused great loss and, eventually, exile, another 
major metaphor Albert Camus uses in The Plague.   
Exile 
The townspeople felt exiled in their own homes, for a few reasons. One, for fear 
of going outside and possibly contracting the disease and second, if they had a family 
member who had the disease, the rest of the family stayed inside so as not to spread the 
disease. Being an exile in one’s own home is oxymoronic and incredibly difficult to 
maneuver. Being exiled among friends and family, when a group decides it is going to 
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ostracize an original member of the group—that feeling of being ‘left out’ and not with 
the crowd, is a disastrous feeling of exile.  
 Eventually, the city could no longer handle its sick and dead in the hospitals and 
morgues. Oran also needed to house its quarantined citizens—those whose family 
members were diagnosed with the plague—in one convenient and large enough place so 
that others might not be infected. Therefore, bodies were sent to a crematorium as the 
town could no longer handle individual burials. If a family member was infected with the 
plague, the rest of the family was forced to stay at the stadium where a makeshift 
community home was established, as a form of shelter, in order to keep family members 
in quarantine. The people ordered to live in the stadium found themselves in this form of 
exile, suffering a (mentally) painful death themselves, as they were isolated from the rest 
of the world (Camus 217). Their only sin—being related to a victim of the plague. “Thus 
the first thing that plague brought to our town was exile” (Camus 65). 
Though there was plenty of time for those quarantined to morn the loss of their 
loved ones to the plague, Tarrou suggested that those in exile decided to think about how 
to escape the stadium instead. It was easier to think of these plots instead of the plots in 
which their family members were buried. The scenes described by the narrator at the 
stadium and crematorium were horrifically reminiscent of the death camps organized by 
the Nazis during World War II. The stadium can be envisioned as the death camps where 
living souls discussed amongst themselves the plans for escape and the concern for when 
the next batch of deaths in the crematoriums would occur.  
And thus there was always something missing in their lives. Hostile to the 
past, impatient of the present, and cheated of the future, we were much 
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like those whom men’s justice, or hatred, forces to live behind prison bars. 
Thus the only way of escaping form that intolerable leisure was to set the 
trains running again in one’s imagination and in filling the silence with the 
fancied tinkle of a doorbell, in practice obstinately mute. (Camus 67) 
With this quote in mind, one could almost imagine that that narrator, Dr. Rieux (Camus) 
is speaking of the Jews and others imprisoned by the Nazis during their stays at the 
concentration camps. How would they talk with each other and sustain their spirits? They 
had each other, and nothing else. Therefore, how they communicated was imperative to 
the sustenance of their relationships with each other. 
In one of his sermons during the early part of the outbreak, Fr. Paneloux said that 
the plague came as punishment for sins that Oran somehow “deserved” the descending of 
the plague upon their community (Camus 87-91). Throughout history, this has been a 
problem with organized religion, trying to explain-away a terrible tragedy. The thought 
that somehow, the adoring god, who gave the earth to its inhabitants given life, would rip 
it away with a contagious plague as a form of penance.  
The priest’s sermon in The Plague is reminiscent of what happened post- 
September 11th in America. On a nationally syndicated television show in September 
2001, Jerry Falwell, with Pat Robertson concurring, suggested on the 700 Club that the 
perpetrators attacked the Untied States because of gays and the abortionists “helped make 
this happen” as a form of penance for those sins (700 Club transcript). Death does grab 
people by the subconscious and makes one question and wonder how to continue on with 
living, for those left behind, life is different. But, to suggest that a benevolent god would 
strike down a community is unconscionable. Though religious leaders have their place in 
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times of calamity, blaming does not offer a communicative ethic to allow the followers to 
change their actions in the future.  
A form of hedonism, trying to be happy for your own sake, no matter what the 
cost to others, was seen a few different ways during the plague in Oran. First, the people 
who were trying to make it out of the city, no matter what the cost, were only concerned 
for themselves. They wanted out, at any price, whether to escape the plague, or to get 
back home if they were not originally a citizen of Oran. Second, those in exile easily fell 
into hedonistic tendencies. Many visited the cafes as explained above. The reader, then, 
can see some hedonistic tendencies of the doomed people of Oran, within their 
communicative practices, especially with the way they acted with and toward each other. 
Those who still went to the restaurants and bars in the evenings could be considered 
hedonistic.  
However, some would say that sanctioned people, such as the citizens of Oran, 
needed to continue on with how they normally lived, so that they did not go crazy—from 
boredom or from worry. It is often discussed in the media or even in one’s personal life, 
about families who say events should go on soon after a death in the family, because that 
is “the way” the deceased family member “would want it” . . .to continue on with life. 
Others worked for the good of the polis, such as the sanitary group who assisted with the 
removal of bodies from their homes/hospitals to be taken to the cemetery. But, many in 
Oran were concerned with themselves.  
So, was it emotivistic tendencies that led to the deprivation felt by the people of 
Oran, which then eventually led to hedonistic actions? Or, are people who are faced with 
such a demonizing agony allowed to find happiness any way possible and not be fed by 
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individualism? The philosophers outlined in this chapter, Moore, Mill, Sidgwick and 
Dewey work toward happiness as a good. The people of Oran wanted to continue with 
their lives as they had been, before the plague. They were happy, at least they thought so!  
Knowing intuitively that a decision is ultimately going to produce happiness and 
be a good, does not seem to represent how the people of Oran pre-and post-plague acted. 
They did act by the numbers, however, being rational in their thinking and understanding. 
They enacted a type of utilitarianism that allowed for their hedonistic actions. However, 
it is the metaphor of the person in exile that most exemplifies the modern period, both 
philosophically and practically.  
Summary 
 The scholars of the modern world were experiencing a new type of progress at an 
incredibly fast pace that effected social, political, and economic life. In delineating the 
major metaphors that come from the final few chapters of A Short History of Ethics, this 
fifth chapter outlined the moral vocabulary of duty, obligation, utility, emotivism, 
hedonism, happiness, and good. These metaphors resonate with scholars of the late 
nineteenth century and very early twentieth century outlined above. There are many 
communicative implications for these metaphors as they relate to communication ethics.  
Because Alasdair MacIntyre suggests that virtues have to be understood in terms 
of the life that surrounds oneself, the modern person finds him/herself left with an 
individualism that does not have an understanding of a “social life which the tradition of 
the virtues requires, a kind of understanding very different from those dominant in the 
culture of bureaucratic individualism.” (After Virtue 225). Therefore, communication can 
be set outside the standard if one does not situate oneself within a tradition. 
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Communication could then be met with hostility and misunderstanding if one, or neither 
side, is rooted within a framework where they can go for understanding.  
What does this mean for modern communication ethics? “All this of course does 
not entail that the traditional moral vocabulary cannot still be used. It does entail that we 
cannot expect to find in our society a single set of moral concepts, a shared interpretation 
of the vocabulary” (MacIntyre, Short History 268). Alasdair MacIntyre wants his readers 
to understand that it is not useful if members of modern society continues to act 
individualistic and emotivistic and expect to be understood by the other. Therefore, the 
groups that find themselves bound to a tradition need to be open and listen to others and 
work toward the understanding of the others’ traditions. This can happen via ethical 
communication through stories told based on the narrative within which people work and 
live. 
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Chapter Six:  The Rhetoric of Story-Laden Communication Ethics 
Deprive children of stories and you leave them unscripted anxious 
stutterers in their actions as in their words. Hence there is no way to give 
us an understanding of any society, including our own, except through the 
stock of stories which constitute its initial dramatic resources. (MacIntyre, 
After Virtue 216) 
 
Until one is turned away from the past, and rounds the corner to the present, it is 
difficult to recognize differences within a current historical moment in which one is co-
present. Once there is distance from the moment, then the discordance can be recognized 
based on the anticipation of the concordance that was no longer apparent (Ricoeur, Time, 
Vol. 1 21). Therefore, only now can we look back upon these various periods to discuss 
what the rhetorical interruptions were. Some of the philosophers discussed in the 
previous chapters were able to see the discordance within a close time frame of the 
concordant acts, but, it still required a ‘looking back upon’ to determine that a shift was 
occurring or had occurred. For instance, Immanuel Kant’s work was based on the 
realization that science was indeed going to be the new eighteenth century “god term”(to 
borrow Richard Weaver’s term for progress in Modernity) (212), and Kant’s 
philosophical work on reason went forward knowing that he needed to recognize science 
as the first principle of his day. 
Alasdair MacIntyre understood this difficulty of reading the current moment in 
time when he said, “When I speak of a historical narrative I mean one in which the latter 
part is unintelligible until the former is supplied, and in which we have not understood 
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the former until we see that what followed it was a possible sequel to what had gone 
before” (Short History 91). Therefore, it is with the understanding of historicity that this 
work looks back at the embedded metaphors of communication ethics found within 
historical novels in the present of that particular period (Ancient, Medieval, 
Enlightenment and Modern) with an eye on the anticipated future. As Postmodernity 
continues, communication ethics can be informed by the philosophies coming from these 
historical periods. Communication ethics can effect, as well as be found within, the story 
of a group in Postmodernity. 
Introduction 
Jacques Le Goff criticizes the periodization of the Renaissance, suggesting the 
Middle Ages “endured from the third century until the middle of the nineteenth century” 
(The Medieval Imagination 10). His point is to suggest that some historians will separate 
dates to define periods for various reasons, including economic disturbances, civil unrest 
and religious revolutions. Le Goff posits that these termed periods are more “illuminating 
than others” but, they are useful, none the less, for defining certain time frames for points 
of discussion. Realizing that these time frames are not perfect, this work has delineated 
four time periods based on Alasdair MacIntyre’s philosophical communication text A 
Short History of Ethics.  
The four periods discussed in the proceeding chapters included Ancient Greek 
ethics, Christian ethics during the Medieval period, Enlightenment ethics and Modern 
ethics. Each of these chapters is summarized below with a discussion of their import to 
the study of communication ethics in a postmodern historical moment. These periods all 
have something in common; a rhetorical interruption that occurred and shaped a period of 
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change and confusion, if not frustration. This work reviewed those interruptions to 
determine where communication ethics fits into the equation and how these ethical 
theories and practices are used to inform communication. Virtue contention and the 
dismissing of tradition brought the West into the postmodern world. 
Alasdair MacIntyre follows an Aristotelian path in his work that suggests virtue is 
integral to a good life. Ronald C. Arnett points out that though MacIntyre was concerned 
that our postmodern sense is experiencing a virtue crisis, previous periods have also dealt 
with these issues, and ours is not the first. “In chronological terms, this is a new 
chronological moment in history, but the historicity of virtue contention is not novel” 
(Arnett, “Freire’s” 163). These shifts in the narrative fabric of living life occurred many 
times in the past and this work reviewed four of those times, in attempting to discuss how 
“‘we address virtue contention in this historical moment?’” (Arnett, “Freire’s” 163). 
Times exist side by side and one can learn from history. 
Synthesis: First Five Chapters 
Based on the preceding chapters, witnessing a “call of conscience” (Hyde 78) 
throughout history can offer lessons in communication ethics when the rhetorical 
interruptions become apparent. In retrospect it can be realized that something became 
dramatically different within the society that once existed. It is difficult to recognize such 
a shift while one is in the middle of a narrative disruption (i.e. science’s challenge to 
Christianity/transcendental reasoning in eighteenth century West), but, there was 
discordance that surrounded these various narratives.  
Because of the need for a call of conscience in time of narrative disruption, one 
would use rhetoric to call the ‘Other’ and interrupt. The communicative interruption has 
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to be ethical if one is going to call on another and have them trust the caller. A 
communicative turning to the Other then occurs as a response. Hyde suggests that it takes 
courage to respond (77-78), because the dissonance could make one uneasy for fear of 
what is ahead.  
In ancient Greece, the vocabulary of morality was tied to justice, and the role one 
played within the stories to which they belonged created a sense of tradition. In the 
Christianity of the Middle Ages, the vocabulary was tied to the Gospels, both Old and 
New Testaments, and how one could serve God and his commandments. In the Middle 
Ages, there was also a rhetorical shift as to the recognition of the composition of the 
audience, which found Christians working to include the poor and disenfranchised. 
During the Enlightenment the vocabulary of morality shifted to science since God’s 
existence was in question. In Modernity, the movement from the universal to the 
individual began to offer a new moral consciousness to the average person. The 
individual then became the hallmark of morality. What was good for the needs of one 
man, the self, became crucial in ethical deliberation. Traditions were dismissed and 
agency became central. Within the historical moment of Postmodernity, one needs to 
determine the type of moral vocabulary that he/she will use. Therefore, the vocabulary 
should be tied to a story within a narrative that makes sense for the ground upon which 
one stands. Traditions are being revisited and again embraced.  
Chapter One  
At the beginning of this work, Chapter One explained the various periods that 
were going to be used in order to discuss temporal philosophies in the West. The concept 
of using novels for a praxis orientation for communication ethics was also explained, and 
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the next four chapters were used in exemplifying the import that fiction can indeed have 
on the education of communication ethics within a historical moment. By deciphering 
and explaining rhetorical interruption within the historical context of these periods, 
communication ethics can be announced and discussed as one is surrounded by temporal 
glimpses into the historicity of the various eras. 
The idea of a quest for a unity of life is explained by Alasdair MacIntyre as the 
“unity of a narrative quest.” (After Virtue 219) One may fail or succeed on this quest, 
but, the only way to know if a life is a failure or a success is by attempting such a quest. 
Key features of a conception of quest include two ingredients. First, the need for a 
conception of a telos (a variety of ends or goals) to begin a quest is necessary. Second, in 
the course of a quest, one may encounter dangers and harms but these episodes provide 
the goal of the quest. “A quest is always an education, both as to the character of that 
which is sought and in self-knowledge.” (MacIntyre, After Virtue 219) For the novels 
discussed in this work, each main character was on a quest, trying to answer question for 
living the good life. Chapter One, then, explained what was to follow in Chapters Two 
through Five, a discussion of rhetorical interruptions found within historical narratives 
and the quests in which the main characters found themselves.  
Homer had Odysseus working toward his ultimate goal of returning home. After a 
long battle and being lost Odysseus wanted to see his wife and son again and rule his 
kingdom of Ithaka. In Dante’s Inferno, the Pilgrim wanted to understand the after life. He 
took a terrifying journey through hell so that he could go back and understand how to live 
the good life within a Christian presupposition of God. Voltaire’s Candide was constantly 
trying to find his love, Cunegonde, even after many ordeals and mishaps. Once Candide 
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found her and decided to spend his life with her and his new friends, Candide suggested 
they all tend to their garden. Finally, Camus’s Dr. Rieux was trying to take care of his 
sick patients, dying of the plague. The doctor/narrator was searching for not only a cure, 
because there did not seem to be one, but, a cure for how to live during, as well as after, 
their travesty was over. Chapter One paved the outline for chapters Two through Five, 
Two beginning with the ethics of Ancient Greece. 
Chapter Two  
In discussing the Heroic society of Ancient Greece, Chapter Two began with what 
Alasdair MacIntyre refers to as the “pre-philosophy” of Homeric poetry and the 
understanding of the roles to be held by men within their families and society for the 
good of the polis (Short History 5-13) The discussion moved to Sophistic rhetoric and 
then to Socrates and Plato who offered a universal a priori for the notion of the good. 
Then this work proceeded to Aristotle’s view of the virtues and justice when he offered 
an understanding of the good for the polis. Homer’s Odyssey was then discussed as a 
form of praxis for communication ethics. How families passed oral and written traditions 
through the generations was important for values to be understood from one family, 
town, and culture, to the next.  
Throughout the Odyssey there was a view of a universal understanding, where 
there was an agreed upon narrative by which all could share and live together. There was 
a communicative ethic where everyone was in agreement on the offering of hospitality to 
strangers. To be a good host was virtuous, because one was being kind to those who were 
in need. For Plato, only philosopher kings were able to understand the higher level of 
knowledge and be able to teach the young. But, for Aristotle, acting just to achieve the 
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good life, via wisdom and courage, was a teleological idea that was practical in daily 
living. Aristotle was able to use Plato’s philosophy of ethics in a more humble manner for 
use by all people, not just the educated and wealthy. 
The Odyssey discussed the effort Odysseus put forth in order to return to his 
home, and his wife and son. This ethical poem reflects the time before the rhetorical shift 
and changes in Athenian society. It was only after the Sophistic period and the looking 
back upon history that Plato performed in his philosophy, that the discordance was 
recognized against the concordance of Homeric life. The rhetorical interruption, then, 
was the relativity of the implications of travel and the non-Athenian ways of living life. 
The ancient Greek philosophy Alasdair MacIntyre discussed in A Short History of Ethics 
then proceeded to the works of Christian thinkers and writers including Saints Augustine 
and Thomas Aquinas. The traditions of the Church replaced the tradition of the polis. 
Chapter Three  
The discussion of Medieval Christianity in Chapter Three offered a glimpse into 
the beginning and end of the long period of history often referred to as the Middle Ages. 
This chapter offered a sense of understanding about the history of the time when 
Christianity began to rise, and then eventually fall at the end of those 800-plus years. 
Saint Augustine of Hippo offered the postmodern reader an opportunity to witness 
confessing as a form of communication ethics, a rhetoric that was, “the temporal 
lifeblood of the proclamation of God’s Word through preaching” (Troup 2). Augustine’s 
concern in the Confessions about not wanting to interpret the Bible incorrectly, or lead 
his flock astray was a serious worry for him, as he did not want to mislead them. 
Augustine was converting and preaching to a people who he described as, “[. . .] proud. 
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They have no knowledge of Moses’ opinion at all, but love their own opinion not because 
it is true, but because it is their own” (Confessions 264). Augustine was worried about the 
truth and being truthful in his communication to his followers within the Christian 
Church.  
Over 800 years later, St. Thomas Aquinas opened up the Aristotelian tradition to a 
European Christianity on the verge of schism, as just a few hundred years later in 1517 
Martin Luther posted his 95 Thesis that led to the creation of the Protestant religion. 
Aquinas Christianized Aristotle by adding the idea of sin and disobedience to Aristotle’s 
original theories. Sin was an action that violated the Ten Commandments and was 
considered a form of disobedience. Alasdair MacIntyre explains Aquinas’ thoughts on 
disobedience based on Aquinas’ writings in his Summa Theologiae “Each particular act 
of disobedience is a consequence either of a corruption of reason by the force of some 
passion or of bad habit or of some undisciplined natural tendency” (Whose Justice? 181 
[from S.T. I-IIae, 94,4]).  
The decision to be disobedient comes from the choice of the will to be evil or do 
good. It is only through “divine grace” that one can reach for that good and this is where 
Alasdair MacIntyre argues that Aquinas integrated the teachings of Paul with 
“Augustine’s psychology” alongside Aristotle’s (Whose Justice? 181). Within the next 
few decades, Dante wrote from within the same Christian tradition as Aquinas when he 
penned his famous epic, the Divine Comedy.  
Dante wrote the Divine Comedy while in exile from his home in Florence, Italy, 
at the beginning of the fourteenth century. Scholars believe this poetic epic was written 
sometime between the years 1307-1321 (Schwartz 1). Dante wrote the book in Italian, 
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not the Latin of the day, and therefore, the book was not taken as seriously as it would 
normally have been at the outset of its writing. Chapter Three of this work focused on the 
first of the three books within the Divine Comedy, that of the Inferno. The metaphors 
found within the Inferno that have relevance to communication ethics include justice and 
confession.  
Chapter Four  
 Though Alasdair MacIntyre discusses at length some of the philosophers who 
wrote at the cusp of the Middle Ages and throughout the time now known as the 
Renaissance, it was the philosophers of the Enlightenment during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, and Immanuel Kant who is given the esteem by MacIntyre. Kant’s 
philosophical account of ethics, among other transcendental philosophies is still 
discussed today in the form of his categorical imperative. The categorical imperative was 
Kant’s suggested test by which to measure decisions, in an effort to universalize ethical 
action (MacIntyre, Short History 197).  
The philosophy as well as the scientific reasoning of the Enlightenment offered 
the capability to those who wanted to take away the power from the Church, with the 
assumption that humans could engage in moral judgment separate from a narrative. 
Therefore, the importance of the individual is apparent as the Enlightenment led toward 
modern thinking. “Because of their problematic consequences in our own time, many 
now reject the assumptions of the Enlightenment” (Dupré, Introduction xiii). The 
traditions of the polis and the Church were now questioned and eventually dismissed in 
modern times.  
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 Metaphors that were illuminated within the work of Thomas Hobbes, Benedict de 
Spinoza, John Locke and David Hume included freedom, passions and property rights.  
Following the Reformation, these men were involved in a shift of power from the 
Church, to the state, to individual landowners. What the individual wanted was beginning 
to become paramount and how people communicated with their sovereigns became the 
impetus to revolutions in Europe and the new America. Political pamphlets were 
distributed in mass, and salons began to offer the elite thinkers, Voltaire being one of 
them, an opportunity to discuss and plan future forms of resistance to their governments. 
 Voltaire’s satirical short comedy, Candide, was written near the end of the 
eighteenth century. Candide was a commentary on what Voltaire witnessed in the form of 
a perverse optimism by the religious as well as the corruption of the government. Other 
metaphors that shed light on the time period included the universal and exile. Voltaire’s 
work was on the heels of another rhetorical shift that occurred with the change in 
economic structures and the wave of individualism that began to take over the West.  
Chapter Five  
Chapter Four offered a modern view of communication ethics by explaining the 
major philosophers that came out of Kantian Enlightenment thinking which led to the 
beginning of modern thinking. Men such as the Utilitarian John Stewart Mill wrote on the 
greatest happiness as the means to the end of a good. Henry Sidgwick’s ethics forged an 
understanding of hedonism and egoism. G.E. Moore’s Principa Ethica suggested that one 
should attempt to obtain the good but, he did not define the good, as for Moore it was, 
“indefinable” (MacIntyre, Short History 249). These philosophers all wrote at the end of 
the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, prior to the great wars that were 
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witnessed by Albert Camus, the author of the novel The Plague that is discussed at the 
end of the fifth chapter.  
Albert Camus offered a first-hand account of what it is like to be exiled both 
figuratively and metaphorically. The world had experienced a war as they had never 
known, on a grand and massive scale. Camus wrote during this time and immediately 
after World War II. Even before the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, The Plague still had 
significance as our world is trying to deal with various types of genocide on an 
international level. The current relevance of this novel is fascinating, considering the 
United States is two years into a war that continues to carry with it an uncertainty about 
its impetus for invading Iraq, as well as the overall goals of the military campaign. How 
we discuss the war and the war effort is an interesting facet for today’s student of 
communication ethics as they find themselves in the potentially limitless confines of a 
Postmodern world. 
Consequences for Rhetoric of Story-laden Communication Ethics  
in Postmodernity 
Because of the multiplicity of narratives found not just within the West, but also 
the world, rhetoric is a persuasive communicative effort that should be ethical in nature, 
especially in Postmodern society. In order to better understand various standpoints and 
communicate across cultures, it is imperative that ethical communication be considered in 
all rhetorical ventures. Whether political, social or religious, economic or familial, 
situations need to be textured with the history that surrounds the moment.  
Therefore, historicity is important, so that an event is not carved out in 
chronological order, but put into relief (Ricoeur Time, Vol. 2 61-99). Paul Ricoeur would 
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suggest that one needs to respond to a multiplicity of emplotments (Time, Vol. 2 73) and 
Ronald C. Arnett would suggest one needs to respond to the agreed-upon historical 
moment (Dialogic Confession 29). Therefore, rhetoric and story-laden communication 
ethics have significant importance for our current postmodern moment.  
This work contributes to the scholarship of communication ethics in a postmodern 
moment because the postmodern narrative is a multiplicity of narratives that must be 
understood within an ethical climate. The novels outlined in the previous chapters offer 
the postmodern student an understanding of the implications of communication ethics 
through a story by which to understand the historical moment within which the narratives 
were written. Ronald C. Arnett explains Paulo Freire’s work in using story-centered 
communication ethics in teaching literacy to the illiterate people of Brazil and Chile 
(“Freire’s” 489-490). By linking a “communication style that shapes his story-centered 
communication ethic,” Arnett explained Freire’s significant contribution to pedagogy of 
literacy (491). Because of postmodern “contention over virtue and power disparity,” 
(Arnett “Freire’s” 492-493) communication ethics that are story-centered are important 
for mutual understanding.   
Finally, communication ethics scholars have the opportunity to associate their 
work within a broad range of material with communication departments sitting in the 
middle of an interdisciplinary mix of course work and programs. There is also an 
opportunity for collaboration with other academic departments in current day colleges 
and universities. This diverse academic opportunity will benefit the work of the 
academician as they work toward assisting students in comprehending and appreciating 
the theoretical underpinnings of communication ethics.  
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The teaching of communication ethics in higher education has been on the rise 
since Thomas R. Nilsen first published Ethics of Speech Communication in 1966. 
Clifford G. Christians and Edmund B. Lambeth researched the “status of ethics 
instruction in communication departments” in 1996 (236). Almost 40% of 
communication study programs were teaching communication ethics. As this teaching 
proliferates, scholars have an obligation to discuss, for instance, how rhetoric enables one 
to persuade within ethical dialogue, and how ethical communication on an interpersonal 
as well as mass media level is imperative.  
Rhetoric  
Philosophers of communication ethics should not separate communicative, 
philosophical nor ethical theory from the praxis. This work has suggested the use of 
historical novels as opportunities for the teaching and understanding of an historical 
viewpoint and the type of dialogue and metaphors that emerged within these various 
periods. These metaphors can assist in examining this postmodern period and in assessing 
the communication ethics that need attended to now. “In abstracting certain 
characteristics of the [historical] sequence, and thus lending it an ideal character, we 
acquire a method for noting similar sequences embedded in quite different historical 
processes. And in noting similarity we may also note differences” (MacIntyre, Short 
History 93). It is differences that were discussed in the preceding chapters—the rhetorical 
interruptions, the discordant.  
As Paul Ricoeur consistently explained throughout Time and Narrative Volume 1, 
one can only recognize the discordant if very aware of the concordant (21, 31, 70-73). 
The differences assist in the understanding of the changes within a community, as well as 
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understanding of judgments made. Ricoeur explained St. Augustine’s concept of the 
present, “he [Augustine] sees discordance emerge again and again out of the very 
concordance of the intentions of expectation, attention, and memory” (Time, Vol. 1 21). 
Therefore, ethical rhetoric is necessary to debate where the future is headed, as well as 
how and where the future could or should turn. For Ricoeur, attentiveness is action 
specific, within the historical moment. The expectation of action has a teleological 
component and memory is based within a community where an opportunity for change is 
always present. 
Within Aristotle’s text Rhetoric, Paul Ricoeur noted the difference between 
Aristotle’s notions of probability and acceptance. For rhetoric, one can find the 
“acceptable” within the concordance of the persuasive speech (Ricoeur, Time, Vol. 1 9). 
To do this, one has to tell a story that is probable and acceptable and has a sense of 
completeness to the story.  
In discussing ancient Greek society and the effect of rhetoric on the polis, 
Alasdair MacIntyre explains how politics worked during the times from Homer to 
Aristotle. Rhetoric had to be employed ethically in convincing the populace of what was 
right and wrong, but it was easier in Homeric society when roles were understood and 
duty was carried out in order to fulfill those roles. Ethical rhetoric is crucial for 
Postmodernity as conflicts on an international as well as personal level surface. 
Understanding the other is crucial in a persuasive campaign. Both interlocutors are 
responsible to the other for communicating, both verbal and nonverbal forms. The 
rhetoric of postmodern communication needs to have multiple ethics for multiple stories 
corporately agreed upon and find their way into an overarching, perhaps petite, narrative.  
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Story-laden Communication Ethics  
By reviewing historical theories and novels, this work discussed the praxis 
orientation of communication ethics. This work offers the one looking back upon history 
an opportunity to determine if ‘doing that’ again makes sense or not. The question 
brought to these texts includes determining what the rhetorical interruption was during 
that period. What was changing, from one society to the next can be viewed through the 
eyes of these novels, which were written at the beginning or end of the four eras 
discussed in the preceding chapters. By reviewing historically based novels, written 
during the period, about that moment in time, one can see a civilization that explains its 
culture via how it speaks, acts and reacts to each other.  
The Greeks thought the gods were responsible for what happened in their lives. If 
evil existed, it was because the gods deemed it so. The Christians felt there was an after- 
life and therefore, they had to live the good life as a means to that heavenly end. Because 
of science and an emerging reliance on property rights, the Enlightenment questioned god 
and believed everything happened because nature intended it to, scientifically speaking. 
The modern man was an individual who was able to decide his own fate and future, 
independent of the stories and narratives around him.  
It is interesting to observe that many great epics—and Homer’s and 
Dante’s (not to mention Virgil's) are excellent examples of this point—
often appear very late in the cultural moment that they hold up for our 
examination. There’s often a sense that what the poem is most celebrating 
is under a certain strain, under threat, and that the forces which will 
overthrow it are already gathering strength. [. . .] This phenomenon has led 
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to a saying to the effect that the greatness of a particular culture finds its 
most eloquent expression at the moment of its passing away. (Johnston 1) 
Paul Ricoeur considered Augustine’s rhetoric a rhetoric of disruption, as Augustine was 
always searching for the discordant in life (Time, Vol.1 3) and the element of disruption. 
Conversely, Aristotle’s was a rhetoric of agreement, as he was situated within a greater 
sense of order within the polis. Ricoeur’s discussion on narrative is crucial for the final 
section of this work, because he values the worth of metaphors that open the horizon of 
significance for an idea and narratives t hat organize meaning.  
Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and story 
 Paul Ricoeur is an important philosopher to turn toward in the final chapter of this 
work, as his Time and Narrative Volumes 1, 2 and 3 focused on the two ideas of narrative 
and metaphor. Both of these concepts were relied upon throughout this work and Ricoeur 
explained their import as two concepts woven together to elucidate how events are pieced 
together to form a plot that tells a story that makes sense to its audience. A narrative 
organizes, and for Ricoeur, ethics places subjects before actions. Therefore, for one to 
speak ethically, the language must be thought about first. Consideration is crucial for 
ethical communication.  
Ricoeur used the philosophy and philosophical theology of Augustine and 
Thomas Aquinas as a guiding principle throughout his work in Time and Narrative 
Volume 1. Ricoeur wove together Aristotle’s sense of emplotment and Augustine’s sense 
of time (Time, Vol. 1 5-51). The discordance discussed above in relation to Augustine 
and his rhetoric of disruption is used by Ricoeur throughout Time and Narrative, Volume 
1 to explain his work on narrative. Ricoeur suggested that concordance encourages a 
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sense of completeness where discordance is only recognized because one knows 
something is missing from the normal concordance to which one becomes accustomed.  
Without narratives in Postmodernity, one would live in a highly individualistic 
world. This does not mean the narrative has to be an overarching universal. Our world 
has come to realize in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, that a universal or 
universals are no longer possible in a world of multiple narratives, as well as first 
principles. First principles assist in explanation as they take one back prior to the issue, 
and help set the agenda. Stories within a narrative present the “followability” for a 
narrative (Ricoeur, Time, Vol. 1 149). Narratives provide the structure within which 
ethical communication can flow and provide meaning to life. 
In the past few chapters, this work discussed the “doing” of praxis, the doing of 
communication ethics. How does one do communication ethics in a postmodern world? 
For Paul Ricoeur, the “doing” involves a narrative with a plot where characters are 
involved in events surrounded by a historical moment (Time, Vol. 2 48-55). Following 
this system makes narratives understandable and intelligible to others. In Postmodernity, 
one can engage the good by engaging the plot of a story one is either a member of, or 
within which one wishes to become a participant.  
For Paul Ricoeur there are multiple rights, but there are still things that are wrong 
within stories and narratives (Time, Vol. 1 95-120). “A story describes a sequence of 
actions and experiences done or undergone by a certain number of people, whether real 
or imaginary” (Time, Vol. 1 150). He equates this description of story to that of 
emplotment. These stories direct us toward a teleological completion (Ricoeur, Time, 
Vol. 1 150). Finally, Ricoeur considers history a narrative of the looking back upon, 
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“This is why, in spite of their critical relation to traditional narrative, histories that deal 
with the unification or the disintegration of an empire, with the rise or fall of a class, a 
social movement, a religious sect, or a literary style are narratives” (Time, Vol. 1 151). 
Therefore, stories about groups of people and communities are written about in epics, as 
agency cannot drive a narrative. In Postmodernity, agency can no longer be the guiding 
principle, but stories of individuals gathered within communities connected to “petit” 
narratives (Lyotard 60).  
For Ian Watt who wrote Myths of Modern Individualism, he suggests that the 
eighteenth century was a time of developing agency. He explored the metaphor of 
individualism by looking at the myth, among others, Robinson Crusoe. “Robinson Crusoe 
can be seen as an articulate spokesman of the new economic, religious, and social 
attitudes that succeeded the Counter-Reformation [. . .] (xv). This individualism was a 
product of the Enlightenment and survived through Modernity, that has led to the 
inevitability of Postmodernity, as one man on an island was not how the world evolved. 
Ours is a world with many nations, many narratives and many people trying to 
communicate within those boundaries.  
Why Postmodernity was Inevitable 
 In A Short History of Ethics, Alasdair MacIntyre explains why he values the 
historical philosophy of the ancient societies mentioned throughout this work. He does 
not want to separate the philosophy from the history, because that would separate the 
“philosophical theory” from the “problems to which it is intended to be a solution” 
(MacIntyre, Short History 92). Therefore, MacIntyre offers a sequential historical view of 
philosophical ethics throughout this text, beginning with the ancient Greeks and 
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culminating with the ending of the Enlightenment at the end of the eighteenth century and 
the beginning of Modernity at the dawn of the twentieth century. Since MacIntyre wrote 
the book in the mid-twentieth century, he does not discuss Postmodernity. However, this 
work attempts to look at why Postmodernity was inevitable in terms of communication 
ethics and universal versus temporal bound narratives.  
Postmodernity is not an era but rather a recognition of a multiplicity of eras. In a 
communication framework, postmodern ethics recognize a multiplicity of standpoints. 
Within a story, agents and ideas are embedded within given frameworks and these stories 
can stand side by side. Postmodernity is defined by Jean-François Lyotard as “part of the 
modern,” where rules are no longer what they once were (79-81). The rules are only 
being established once the artifact is produced 
In his foreword of Jean-François Lyotard’s seminal text The Postmodern 
Condition, Fredric Jameson explains the import of Lyotard’s position on narrative:  
What is even more striking in his methodological perspective, however—
indeed, to my knowledge he is one of the few professional philosophers of 
stature anywhere formally to have (although Paul Ricoeur and Alasdair 
MacIntyre also come to mind) drawn this momentous consequence—is the 
way in which narrative is affirmed, not merely as a significant new field of 
research, but well beyond that as a central instance of the human mind and 
a mode of thinking fully as legitimate as that of abstract knowledge. (xi)  
In Postmodernity, agency is embedded and no longer autonomous. Petite narratives exist 
where people can find their homes and agree to establish their roots, if they are not 
already planted. 
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Over these 2,500 years of written history, there has been a movement from virtues 
rooted within societal habits announced and corporately agreed upon narratives, to that of 
the individual whose decisions whether virtuous or not, can be emotive in nature. Now in 
Postmodernity, there seems to be a rhetorically based interruption that is leading us back 
into narratives with virtuous roots, which will allow for a place for individuals within 
certain stories to join and agree with those narratives.  
Throughout history, and especially in the period between Medieval times and the 
Enlightenment, there was a change in equating man’s role with his calling, and vocation, 
and therefore, how he acted. Men were called by trade or role, farmer, father, ruler, 
landowner, and his actions were evaluated accordingly (MacIntyre, Short History 94). 
With the rise of the individual, and as Alexis de Tocqueville explained, a form of 
individualism, the meaning of roles was lost (482-484). “The use of evaluative words was 
lost, so we can imagine a society in which traditional roles no longer exist” (MacIntyre, 
Short History 91). The growth of the state as well as market economies could only lead 
one to the import of the individual (MacIntyre, Whose Justice? 210). Finding a tradition 
that has a history to it, that offers advice, good or bad, for the postmodern moment, is 
where history now stands.   
In After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre explains “modern individualism” as not being 
concerned with tradition (219). The idea of determining for oneself the courses and 
actions taken in one’s own life is a modern one. Tradition and historicity would not be 
understood for the modern person. However, from a narrative standpoint, the view of 
being detached from one’s family would not be thought of, because one is embedded 
within a family’s history.  “What I am, therefore, is in key part what I inherit, a specific 
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past that is present to some degree in my present. I find myself part of a history and that 
is generally to say, whether I like it or not, whether I recognize it or not, one of the 
bearers of a tradition” (After Virtue 220). As Postmodernity goes forward, a narrative 
understanding, especially petite narratives (Lyotard 60), of accepting what has come 
before, recognizes the value created from working within a tradition (MacIntyre, After 
Virtue 222-223). 
In speaking on the postmodern moment, Ken Anderson explains that we are in a 
world where the individual takes precedence in communicative efforts: 
The changes in society and technological resources have markedly 
reshaped communication theory and practice. Individual rather than 
societal goals are now a far more dominant focus of communication. This 
evolution makes the task of developing a consensus on appropriate ethical 
standards exceedingly complex and difficult. (Andersen 12) 
As the narratives and stories around us change in Postmodernity, or, as people begin to 
agree upon stories that create a corporately agreed upon narrative, the ground one stands 
upon, marking one’s territory in the sand, will shift. What we consider to be appropriate 
communication will change as the ground we stand upon is modified. What we consider 
to be ethical will change as our ground changes. One needs to be cognizant of this 
postmodern opportunity to listen to others, to learn from others, to be open to others’ 
cultures, views and opinions, on ethical communication.  
 In this postmodern moment, there are many opportunities for communicative 
action to come alive, “where constant learning guides knowledge of one’s own stance and 
that of another” (Arnett, Dialogic Confession 2). Aristotle’s notion of phronesis, practical 
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wisdom, can be used in Postmodernity, even if one presupposes known social practices. 
The wisdom of the discourse for communication ethics comes in listening and learning 
about others’ practices in order to come to an understanding about the Other. Narratives 
are fluid and have an opportunity for change when there is agreement on those changes 
that comes from the stories themselves.  
In explaining the significance of the work of the German Pastor Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer, who died at the hand of the Nazis at the end of World War II, to this 
historical moment, Ronald C. Arnett explains, “Bonhoeffer details what happens in a 
moral crisis; he, like Alasdair MacIntyre today, understood the pragmatic need for ethics 
to rest on narrative ground, not the whim of an ‘emotive” self’ (Dialogic Confession 1). 
Communication ethics need to be intertwined within stories that inform narratives where 
one can find a postmodern home.  
 In a postmodern world, answers to societal, religious and political questions need 
to be attempted in a rhetorical fashion while discerning appropriate fist principles. Two 
people questioning each other, while attempting to understand the ground upon which 
each other stands, an answer can be attempted that can work in Postmodernity. In 
Postmodernity, one cannot be imperialistic and impose a framework on others.  
Agreeing to live within a narrative framework in Postmodernity does not mean 
that one has to stay placed firmly rooted in a certain narrative. Over time, stories can 
eventually be woven to change within the framework of a corporately agreed upon 
narrative.  
Narrative provides the interpretive context for understanding metaphorical 
significance of communication concepts and action. Numerous narratives 
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compete for connection to the historical moment. In addition, the same 
metaphor can be used by different narratives to guide communicative 
action—which is why dialogue is necessary to understand the other in our 
postmodern age. (Arnett and Arneson 300) 
Choice is obvious in Postmodernity, but what is being reclaimed is one’s stake in a 
tradition. Choosing to stay within a tradition in which one was raised, or choosing to join 
another, and learn from the culture of the group, is what Postmodernity offers to the 
individual looking to strengthen their home or seeking another. Ethics will emerge 
through communication with those people found within traditions. 
Summary 
The goal of this work was to create a use of a praxis model of performing 
communication ethics scholarship through the readings of historical novels combined 
with philosophical theories on ethics and communication ethics. The thesis suggests that 
historicity would be understood using novels as they relate to the philosophy of 
communication ethics set within historical traditions. Postmodern societies can use a 
praxis model to inform decision-making and the challenging problems people face in the 
twenty-first century.  
Through his seminal work A Short History of Ethics, Alasdair MacIntyre provides 
a historical lineage of Western philosophers who studied and wrote about ethics within 
the time span from Homer in ancient Greece to modern day scholars such as G.E. Moore. 
By adding the communicative component of a novel as the praxis portion of the 
scholarship, this work explained the usefulness of the narratives in explicating the 
rhetorical interruptions that occurred in and around the periods written about in these 
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various novels. The rhetorical interruptions created a new way of life for each of these 
periods that effected communities, religious institutions, and governments. 
Communication ethics is part of the dialogue that ensues within dyads as well as larger 
groups found in these historical societies.  
This work viewed communication ethics through the lens of historical periods 
including Ancient Greek ethics, Christian ethics during the Medieval period, 
Enlightenment ethics and Modern ethics in order to illuminate rhetorical interruptions 
that occurred within the various societies. The import of the polis and the Church, and 
traditions found within Greek and Christian societies, allowed people to have a common 
understanding and narrative by which to live their lives and interpret communication 
between and amongst their various groups. Then, the contention of traditions found 
during the Enlightenment with science demanding fact over religious belief, was the 
beginning of a belief in what could be proven. Modernity ushered in a belief in the 
individual who was willing to dismiss tradition and have faith in one’s self.  
There is now, in Postmodernity, a resurrection of tradition, giving people ground 
upon which to stand. Communication ethics bound within a tradition or a story where 
multiple narratives have surfaced is a positive step in the communicative process. 
Listening to others’ stories and determining the narrative by which they live their lives, 
will unveil a tradition. Communication is always the carrier that unveils the ground on 
which we stand. Communication ethics was and can continue to be part of the dialogue of 
society. 
The change—the evolution is what is important for today. That communication 
ethics is being discussed in terms of the poor and disenfranchised, as well as mediated 
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communication is a step in the right direction, “One aspect of this move toward more 
inclusive theories of communication is identification of the role communication plays in 
balancing individual and collective interests” (Andersen 11). Communication affects 
individuals and societies at one in the same time.  
Through stories one can find the ground on which to stand and ethically 
communicate with others in Postmodernity. Alasdair MacIntyre suggests that the exercise 
of virtues will allow one to join or continue in a tradition in which one wants to be or is 
already embedded, “[. . .] the history of each of our own lives is generally and 
characteristically embedded in and made intelligible in terms of the larger and longer 
histories of a number of traditions” (After Virtue 222). Those traditions are there and 
some are waiting to be created; if we knock the door will be open. 
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